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Glossary
A2 Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU in 
January 2007
A8 Eight Central and Eastern European countries 
that joined the EU in May 2004 (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia)
BIS Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
CBI Confederation of British Industry
CIC Commission on Integration and Cohesion
CLG Department for Communities and Local 
Government
DCSF Department for Children, Schools and Families
DfID Department for International Development
DWP Department for Work and Pensions
e-Borders A system of collection and analysis of data provided 
by transport providers in respect of journeys to and 
from the UK
ECJ European Court of Justice, now the Court of Justice 
of the European Union
EEA European Economic Area, a free trade area made 
up of the (now) 27 EU member states plus Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway
EEC European Economic Community
EU European Union
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HRA Human Rights Act 1998
HSMP Highly Skilled Migrant Programme
ILO International Labour Organisation
ILR Indefinite Leave to Remain
IND Immigration and Nationality Department
vii
glossary
IOM International Organisation for Migration
JCHR Joint Committee on Human Rights
LFS Labour Force Survey
MAC Migration Advisory Committee
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NHS National Health Service
NQF National Qualifications Framework
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development
ONS Office for National Statistics
PAC Public Accounts Committee
PBS Points-Based System
PSA Public Service Agreement
RLMT Resident Labour Market Test
SAWS Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme
TCN Third Country National (not a citizen of a country 
in the EU)
TUC Trades Union Congress
UASC Unaccompanied Asylum Seeking Children
UKBA United Kingdom Border Agency
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WRS Workers Registration Scheme
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introduction: migration policy 
in the 21st century
Migration presents us with a paradox. The vast majority of the public say that fewer migrants should be allowed to come to 
the UK and each new government promises tighter controls, yet a 
significant number of people continue to come. That divergence alone 
makes migration an intriguing area of public policy to explore.
Of those born in the UK, 83% want fewer migrants (foreign born) 
to come, as do a majority of those who were themselves born abroad 
(Lloyd, 2010: Table 73). More than a third of the public now regularly 
cite race and immigration as among the most important issues facing 
the country, significantly higher than in most European countries 
and a sharp increase from a decade ago (Eurobarometer, 2009: 11; 
MORI, 2009). During that time, national policies on labour migration, 
asylum, family migrants and international students have been radically 
overhauled. Yet the public is evidently far from reassured.
Nor is the UK alone in this experience. No country in Europe set 
out to expand its post-war population through permanent migration 
or made a conscious choice to become a multicultural country. Yet, 
by 2008, more than 30 million foreign citizens were living in the 27 
member states of the European Union (EU), 6.4% of its population, of 
whom two thirds were citizens of countries outside the EU (Eurostat, 
2010b). The social, economic and political effects of migration are 
inextricably interwoven into the fabric of Europe and its future 
(Hansen, 2002).
In the decade 2000–09, towards 1.9 million more people came 
to live in the UK than left to live abroad (ONS, 2010a). A British 
immigration minister insisted in 2009 that ‘The British people can be 
confident that immigration is under control’ (Woolas, 2009) but they 
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were not, 71% rating the government’s management of immigration 
as poor (Transatlantic Trends, 2009). Migration was a salient issue in 
the 2010 general election and the Conservative policy to set tighter 
limits was popular on the doorstep. Yet its manifesto anticipated the 
tensions it would face:
We want to attract the brightest and the best people who 
can make a real difference to our economic growth. But 
immigration is too high and needs to be reduced.… We 
want to encourage students to come to our universities and 
colleges, but our student visa system has become the biggest 
weakness in our border controls. (Conservative Party, 2010)
No sooner had the Coalition government taken office than its policy 
faced opposition at home and abroad that it could not afford to ignore.
competing policy objectives
Migration has a significant bearing on many of the core responsibilities 
of government and therein, for politicians, lies the rub. Government 
choices are constrained by the significance of migration to competing 
policy objectives: from economic competitiveness and capacity to 
deliver public services to international relations and compliance with 
human rights law. There is, however, no consensus on the weight that 
should be placed on those priorities: should we value the remittances 
migrants send home as a contribution to international development 
(Van Hear et al, 2009), for instance, or bemoan them as a loss to the 
British Exchequer (Migration Watch, 2009)? Options are further 
constrained by the legacy of migration trends and legal precedents 
from the past; and immigration controls cannot always deliver what 
governments aspire. These constraints, however, are rarely transparent. 
Eager to reassure, governments over-promise and under-inform. A 
polarised, highly charged public and media discourse inhibits reasoned 
debate on policy options. The public does not know why governments 
cannot simply shut the door.
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Ask why migration should be curbed and the answer, with differing 
emphases, focuses on the impact on jobs, public services, community 
cohesion and the environment. While critics near-universally 
acknowledge that migration has brought economic and social benefits, 
the suggestion that it will be the primary cause of the UK population 
rising to an estimated 70 million prompts tabloid headlines that it is 
‘a time-bomb ticking under our environment’ (Daily Mail, 2009), 
putting pressure on housing (Green, 2009), stretched public services 
and natural resources (Balanced Migration, 2010). Some argue that 
migrants damage the employment prospects for British workers 
(Migration Watch, 2010) or undermine the trust and mutual belonging 
on which support for the welfare state depends (Goodhart, 2004). Tight 
restrictions are also, critics argue, what the public want, and failing to 
respect their views fuels support for the far right.
These claims have been seriously challenged by scholars, questioning 
the data, assumptions and value judgements on which they are based 
and the fearful tone in which they are expressed. It is argued that 
the UK experience of migration is unremarkable in an international 
and European context; that claims about the impact of migration on 
population growth are based on a questionable use of statistics; that 
evidence on the economic impact of migration is finely balanced 
(Chapter 3); and that migrants take up less space and use no more 
resources than other residents. Members of minorities are not choosing 
to live parallel lives, neighbourhoods are becoming more ethnically 
mixed not more segregated and diversity has not threatened support for 
the welfare state (eg Banting and Kymlicka, 2006; Phillips, 2006, 2007; 
Peach, 2009; Finney and Simpson, 2009). NGOs have similarly been 
sceptical of claims about the impact of migration on the environment 
(FOE, 2006).
Nor are public attitudes as clear-cut as they might seem. Dig beneath 
the headlines and we find that opposition to migration is not uniform 
or consistent. The government’s own Citizenship Survey found young 
people less likely than their elders to be hostile to migration and no 
less than 84% of the public in England (2008–09) see their local area as 
a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together 
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(Lloyd, 2010). The public are considerably less concerned about legal 
migration than illegal migrants and fewer than half believe migrants 
bring down wages. Just 54% think migrants reduce the number of 
jobs available, despite mistakenly believing that they comprise 27% 
of the population, almost three times the actual figure (Transatlantic 
Trends, 2009).
Migration is, moreover, a freedom many British people want for 
themselves: the freedom to study in Japan, work in Canada, retire to 
Spain or have a gap year in Africa and to bring home the soulmate 
they meet on the way. Every year, thousands of British citizens leave 
the UK to live abroad (some 364,000 in the year to March 2010), 
around 5.5 million living permanently overseas and a further 500,000 
for part of the year (Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006; ONS, 2010c). As 
an employer, moreover, we want the freedom to employ a brilliant 
scientist from China or migrant carer to look after our kids; freedoms 
that require reciprocity: British citizens free to live and work in the 
other 26 EU member states, for instance, in return for the freedom 
of their citizens to live and work here. Some UK residents, however, 
have not themselves benefited from migration and question the impact 
on Britain and their neighbourhoods of those who do come to work, 
study or seek refuge here.
this book
No student of public policy would suggest that strengthening the 
evidence base will in itself be sufficient to reconcile these conflicting 
views. This book, nevertheless, in providing an overview of policies, 
their development and some alternative options, aims to put the 
debate on a more informed footing and to throw light on the politics 
of migration policymaking: the conflicting objectives, constraints and 
trade-offs from which policies and practices emerge (Spencer, 2003). 
As in earlier volumes in this series, the intention is thus not simply to 
set out what policy is and how it has developed but to explain why, to 
explore whose interests it serves and the ways in which the concepts 
and language used in policy discourse can privilege certain ideas over 
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others (Ball, 2008 ), a process that can accord the status of ‘common 
sense’ to views which are not necessarily highly evidence-based.
While the central focus of the book is on the UK, its experience 
can only be understood in a global and European context. The UK 
itself, moreover, is not one nation, but four. While the central tenets 
of migration policy are not devolved, the text notes some policy 
divergence in Scotland in particular, as well as the central importance 
of local policymaking in relation to migrants living across the UK. 
The book makes reference to policies towards source countries and to 
emigration, but focuses primarily on entry to the UK and on policies 
towards migrants remaining on a temporary or permanent basis. It 
notes evidence on policy outcomes and considers alternative options 
that academic, parliamentary and civil society critics have proposed.
In this chapter I begin by identifying the global migration trends that 
provide part of the context for migration policy. I move on to show 
how our understanding is enhanced by migration theory, enabling us to 
critique some common perceptions about migrants, their motivations 
and future intentions. Mistaken assumptions and a poor evidence base 
are by no means the only hazards for policymakers in this field. The 
section that follows, drawing on the emerging literature on migration 
policymaking, sets the context for understanding the politics and 
process of policymaking itself. We cannot understand policy today 
without knowing something of its history and the chapter continues 
with a brief review of how we came to this juncture. It concludes 
with an explanation of the significance of recent data on migration 
and migrants before outlining the structure of the rest of the book.
terminology
Before we continue, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the terms 
used in the text and their significance. Why ‘migration’, for instance, 
rather than ‘immigration’?
Immigration is defined by the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) as ‘a process by which non-nationals move into a 
country for the process of settlement’ (IOM, 2004: 31). Thus, immigrant 
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has connotations of long-term stay. In more common usage in recent 
times is international migrant, defined by the UN (and in UK statistics) 
as someone who changes their country of residence for at least a year 
so that their destination effectively becomes their country of usual 
residence. Unlike immigrant, it encompasses those whose movement is 
relatively temporary or circular (moving on or back home). It can also 
refer to those leaving to live abroad; unless they are citizens or long-
term residents, referred to as emigrants. Technically, those who come to 
the UK from other parts of the EU are not migrants but EU citizens 
exercising their right to free movement within its borders.
Whether the term migrant refers to foreign nationals (non-citizens) 
or the foreign born depends on the data available. UK data (where it 
exists) is generally on the foreign born (thus including UK citizens born 
abroad). While migrant can refer to all those born abroad, it is used in 
common parlance to refer to those who have relatively recently arrived. 
Refugees are often identified separately because of their distinct legal 
status (see Chapter 2). An asylum seeker is someone who has applied, 
or intends to apply, for that status.
Migration is ‘a process of moving, either across an international border 
or within a state’ – reminding us that the impact of the latter can also be 
significant, if beyond the remit of this book – the term ‘encompassing 
any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition 
and causes’ (IOM, 2004: 41). It is in that inclusive sense that I use the 
term and equally migration policy. Irregular migration, the term I use in 
preference to its many alternatives (see Chapter 5), is movement that 
takes place outside of the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and 
receiving countries. There are other terms, like ‘integration’, the meaning 
of which I shall explore in Chapter 6.
a global phenomenon
The UK is far from alone in experiencing migration on a significant 
scale. Across the world, only 3.1% of the world’s population are living 
abroad and that percentage has barely risen in the past two decades. In 
that sense, migration remains the exception, not the norm. Absolute 
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numbers, however, grew from 155 million in 1990 to 214 million in 
2010, and in Europe (including Russia) from 49 million to 70 million 
(UNDESA, 2009). Of the world’s migrant population, 16 million 
people (8%) are refugees, most remaining near the country from which 
they fled (with a further 26 million internally displaced). Just over one 
third of international migrants have moved from a developing to a 
developed country. An estimated 50 million people are living abroad 
with irregular migration status (UNDP, 2009).
International mobility has become easier since the 1980s because of 
political reform, cheaper transport and a communications revolution 
that has opened up access to information, ideas and networks hitherto 
the prerogative of the few. As before, people migrate to work, study, and 
rejoin their families or to find a safe place to start a new life; but now 
we also see new reasons for moving: for retirement in sunnier climes, 
commuting across borders to work, the temporary migration of young 
working holidaymakers and migration within what was once but is 
no longer the same country. In the new global and European map of 
migration, the old dichotomies of migration analysis – forced versus 
voluntary, temporary versus permanent, legal versus illegal – blur as the 
motivations for migration and the forms it takes have become much 
more diverse (King, 2002: 89). People in the poorest countries remain 
the least mobile. Rather than development reducing the likelihood 
of migration, however, development and migration can go hand in 
hand (UNDP, 2009).
Castles and Miller (2009), in their classic text in migration studies, 
The Age of Migration, identify six broad trends in current patterns of 
migration: globalisation, the tendency for ever more countries to be 
affected and to receive migrants from a large range of source countries; 
acceleration in the number of people involved; growing differentiation 
in the range of categories of migrant; feminisation, the significance 
of women in current migration flows; politicisation, in its impact 
on domestic politics and prominence in bilateral and international 
agreements; and transition, where countries of emigration become 
countries of immigration. The outcome is societies that look very 
different from those in which the older generation grew up. Migrants 
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can be distinct in terms of ethnicity, culture, faith, physical appearance, 
language, legal status and residential concentration, but the social 
relevance of this depends on a changing economic, social and political 
context over time and on the significance attached to it by existing 
residents (Castles and Miller, 2009: 10). It is likely, moreover, that 
migration will continue, shaped by a complex interplay of economic, 
geopolitical, social, technological and environmental factors, though 
it is difficult to forecast either its scale or direction (OECD, 2009).
understanding the dynamics of migration
Migration policies can be posited on unspoken assumptions about the 
reasons why people move, choose to come to Britain or their behaviour 
after arrival. Migration theory provides a lens through which we can 
interpret more accurately what is happening and help to explain why, as 
so often the case, policies do not achieve their stated objectives (Massey 
et al, 1993; Brettel and Hollifield, 2000; Castles and Miller, 2009).
Decision to migrate
From the ‘new economics of migration’ theorists (eg Stark and Bloom, 
1985), for instance, we see that the decision to migrate may not be 
that of an individual but part of a collective strategy of a family or 
household to enhance its economic security; a strategy in which risk 
may be spread by other members remaining to work in the local labour 
market. Equally, the viability of a refugee’s return to a post-conflict 
society may be predicated on other family members retaining their 
capacity to send remittances from abroad (Van Hear et al, 2009). It is 
thus the household that needs to be the unit of analysis in explaining 
motivations, and for policy interventions intended to attract migrants 
(when competing for skilled workers for instance) or to deliver durable 
solutions for refugees.
Those considering migration, however, are not necessarily in a 
position to make rational choices. Neoclassical economics originally 
envisaged individuals weighing up the costs and benefits, moving from 
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areas with high population density, low living standards or political 
repression to areas in which they could maximise their economic 
opportunities and political freedoms. Yet few can in practice assess 
potential relative earnings in different countries, still less know the 
rules governing access to their welfare systems (as has at times been 
assumed in the UK in relation to asylum seekers).
Nor can migrants necessarily exercise choice at all. While it is possible 
to identify migrations that are unequivocally forced (as from ethnic 
cleansing) or voluntary, the distinction between choice and compulsion 
is often less clear. Entry channels label them as labour migrants, asylum 
seekers, students or dependants, masking the overlapping reasons why 
people have left their homes and their experiences on arrival. Some of 
those who anticipate temporary residence will change their intentions 
as job opportunities or relationships lead them to stay (whether or not 
with permission). In the chapters of this book I separate out the main 
categories of entry to enable readers to access quickly the material 
they need, but those labels can make more sense to policymakers than 
to migrants themselves.
Structural causes
Neither ‘voluntary’ nor ‘forced’ migration can in fact adequately be 
explained at the level of individual or household decision-making, 
but instead require an understanding of the structural conditions in 
sending and destination countries that set the context in which those 
decisions are made. In sending countries, conflict may be a trigger to 
move but poverty, insecurity, lack of the rule of law, environmental 
degradation, youthful populations and the income differential between 
the developing and developed world can be underlying structural 
factors (Malmberg et al, 2006; OECD, 2009). Migration can in turn be 
part of the development process. It can hinder development through 
loss of highly skilled people (‘brain drain’) but can also make a vital 
contribution through acquisition of skills, trading and investment 
connections. Remittances from within the EU to non-EU countries 
totalled €21.5 billion in 2009, with a further €8.1 billion to countries 
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within its borders (Eurostat, 2010a). It is regularly argued that migration 
policies could more effectively take into account development 
outcomes and, in the UK, that the Department for International 
Development should therefore be more centrally involved in their 
formulation (Select Committee on International Development, 2004; 
Chappell and Glennie, 2009; UNDP, 2009).
In destination countries, a key insight, initially from dual-labour 
market theory (Piore, 1979), is that demand for migrant labour is a 
structural feature of advanced industrial economies in which there is 
a permanent demand for workers willing to accept poor conditions, 
low wages and lack of security. The decline in women fulfilling that 
role is one factor increasing demand for migrant labour. Another ‘pull 
factor’ is ageing populations, creating a demand to replace the declining 
numbers of young workers as well as for caregivers to look after the 
elderly (OECD, 2009: 10). The emphasis in this analysis on demand 
rather than an exclusive focus on ‘push factors’ in source countries is 
highly relevant to analysis of the UK’s reliance on labour migration 
today (see Chapter 3).
A structural analysis of supply and demand in individual source 
and destination countries does not, however, give us the full picture. 
World systems or globalisation theory (eg Sassen, 1988; Castells, 1989) 
has shown that migration is grounded in the operation of the global 
market economy – shaped in part by foreign investment in developing 
countries and the disruption that ensues – and that the extent and 
direction of global migration flows can reflect the consequent cultural, 
communications and transport links between the industrialised and 
developing world. As many European countries have found, mobility 
is particularly evident between former colonial powers and colonies 
because of the trade, transport, communication, cultural and linguistic 
ties that remain. The implication of these structural analyses is that if 
the intention is to change migration patterns, then the fundamental 
solution lies not in regulating the symptom, migration, but in addressing 
the underlying conditions that drive it.
Finally, there is a further factor with which policymakers have to 
contend. From within and beyond migrant communities, a ‘migration 
wilful betrayal or capacity constrained?
10
industry’ of recruitment agencies, lawyers, advisers, travel agents and 
smugglers has emerged to provide services for profit (see Chapter 5). 
As organisations that depend on migration proliferate, it becomes more 
institutionalised and independent of the underlying structural factors 
that originally caused it (Massey et al, 1993; Salt and Stein, 1997).
Self-perpetuating dynamic of social networks
If we want to understand the direction and continuity of migration 
to particular destination countries, we need to take on board a further 
significant dimension. Network theory drew on the earlier concept 
of ‘chain migration’ to explore the ways in which networks of kin 
and shared community of origin can incentivise both migration and 
choice of destination. Networks, a form of social capital (Portes, 1998), 
reduce both the cost and risk of migration by helping migrants secure 
access to jobs and accommodation, providing information, contacts and 
support. Access to networks can contribute to a migrant’s decision to 
remain, start a family or be joined by dependants; while the presence 
of children with evolving networks of their own further reduces 
the likelihood of return. As the network is reinforced, migration 
becomes self-perpetuating because new migrants in turn reduce 
the costs for later arrivals. Thus migration can become progressively 
more independent of its original drivers; new arrivals less reflective of 
economic demand in the destination country and more representative 
of the sending community from which they come. This analysis has 
particular resonance in family migration (Gurak and Caces, 1992; 
Haug, 2008):
It is this powerful internal dynamic of the migratory process 
that often confounds expectations of the participants and 
undermines the objectives of policy-makers in both sending 
and receiving countries. (Castles and Miller, 2009: 33)
The trend for some migrants to retain political, economic and social 
links with their country of origin led to a new body of thinking on 
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transnational communities, which built on earlier work on diasporas 
(Vertovec, 1999). Transnational links facilitate circular migration and 
transnationalism has helped to raise awareness that migrants cannot be 
categorised as temporary or permanent settlers. Patterns of migration 
are now more fluid over time and migrants’ intentions on arrival 
are a poor predictor of long-term behaviour. Significantly, while 
governments may fear that retaining transnational connections will 
reduce migrants’ motivation to participate in the economic and social 
life of the country, studies have shown that this is not necessarily the 
case (eg Jayaweera and Choudhury, 2008). It is thus important not 
to overestimate the significance of continuing transnational links for 
migrants whose primary focus may nevertheless be their lives and 
aspirations in their country of residence. I look at what the literature 
tells us about ‘integration’ processes in Chapter 6.
Impact of policy intervention
Early theories of migration tended to overlook a further factor: the 
impact of the state on migration flows. Political scientists have sought 
to address this omission, arguing that:
the speeding train of international migration is fuelled by 
economic and social forces, but it is the state that acts as a 
switching mechanism, which can change the course of the 
train, or derail it altogether. (Hollifield, 2008: 196)
Migration analysts disagree, however, on the extent to which states can 
regulate migration. Some argue there is in fact a pattern of states failing 
to prevent unwanted flows: ‘The more that states and supranational 
bodies do to restrict and manage migration, the less successful they 
seem to be’ (Castles, 2004: 205). The extent of irregular migration in 
particular can suggest that migration is driven by forces governments 
cannot control. This is attributed to a range of causes including a failure 
to take account of the long-term dynamic of migration processes 
(including the actual motivations of migrants and demand for their 
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labour); a tendency to overestimate the efficacy of regulation; and 
constraints within the policymaking system itself, leading to ‘poorly 
conceived, narrow and contradictory policies, which may have 
unintended consequences’ (Castles, 2004: 222).
Policy failure in liberal democracies has been attributed in part 
to ‘political hyper activism’, when politicians gain ‘points’ with the 
media and party colleagues from new initiatives but see less political 
mileage in efficient implementation or in evaluating past initiatives 
(Dunleavy, 1995: 61). Political hyper activism is indeed evident in 
the recent history of migration in the UK: no less than seven major 
pieces of legislation in the decade 1999–20091 and 47 changes to the 
Immigration Rules in the five years 2004–09 alone (UKBA, 2010). 
The consistency with which government policy on most aspects of 
migration is criticised from all sides suggests that the policy failure 
thesis has some traction in the UK.
In contrast, however, there are scholars who argue that far from 
exhibiting weakness, states have recently been intent on maximising 
their intelligence, technical efficiency and inter-agency collaboration 
to strengthen border and internal surveillance, blurring the boundary 
between immigration controls and other law enforcement (Bigo, 2002; 
Bigo et al, 2009).  There is evidence to support this ‘securitisation’ thesis 
in the UK (see Chapter 5), notwithstanding that it may attribute greater 
coherence to policymaking than is always the case.
state capacity subject to constraints
What is clear is that states’ capacity to manage migration is not 
unfettered. They operate within political, legal, economic, technical and 
evidential constraints and are trying – through a process of trade-offs 
that are rarely explicit – to achieve differing and sometimes competing 
policy objectives. Motivations and capacity to intervene effectively 
can differ significantly in relation to different categories of migrants, 
combining openness to skilled migrants, for instance, with highly 
restrictive regimes in other respects. Some of the constraints derive from 
the dynamics of migration processes: the demand generated within 
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domestic labour markets, for instance and, as we saw, the impact of social 
networks. A further constraint derives from the history of migration 
to the country and past legislative and institutional responses, because 
the cost of reversal can be high or future options have been closed off 
by past choices, thus encouraging continuity along the original path 
(Hansen, 2002).
Academics seeking to explain a gap between restrictive public 
demands and the measures implemented by their governments (or 
between restrictive policies and their outcomes) have focused on the 
competing interests served by migration and the interest groups and 
state institutions that articulate them (Facchini and Mayda, 2009). While 
the impact of economic interests has had most attention, suggesting 
for instance that those who benefit from immigration are more 
influential than those who are ‘cost-bearers’, economic models have 
been found only partially to account for policies adopted (Freeman 
and Kessler, 2008).
We might expect labour market interests to be more evident in 
relation to some dimensions of migration than others, such as asylum 
policy. We might also expect that the capacity of some sections of 
society to articulate their interests will be less than that of the business 
sector, and not only because of the differing resources at their disposal. 
Research has found that collective action by interest groups is not a 
direct outcome of the costs and benefits of immigration ‘but of the 
extent and way immigration is politicised and publicly mediated, and 
how certain positions are made to appear more feasible, reasonable, 
and legitimate, compared to alternative definitions of political reality’ 
(Statham and Geddes, 2006: 251). States play a key role in setting that 
context. Far from merely reflecting the views of pressure groups, the 
interests of the state itself (and conflicts of interest within it) need to 
be explained if we are to understand why particular policies emerge 
in the form they do (Boswell, 2007; Hollifield, 2008).
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Impact of international, European and domestic law
Obligations under international human rights law can be one 
significant constraint: foreigners now enjoy rights of entry and within 
the country that were once exclusive to citizens. States’ autonomy 
has, in this respect, been curtailed (Soysal, 1994). That impact can be 
overstated but when rights are anchored in national legal systems they 
can impose limits on states’ capacity to restrict entry, family reunion 
and the social rights of migrants after arrival (Joppke, 1998; Hollifield, 
2008: 211). Governments can be further restrained by public adherence 
to the ethics on which these international standards are based, requiring 
respect (as we shall see, for instance, in relation to family life or 
deportation) beyond rights enforceable in any court of law.
In the UK, the UN Convention on Refugees has required successive 
governments to consider the protection needs of those who claim 
asylum; and the recent Council of Europe Convention on trafficking 
influenced the support provided for its victims (see Chapter 5). With 
these notable exceptions there has been limited endorsement of 
international standards protecting the rights of migrants per se. The 
UK is not among the minority of states that have ratified the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families 
(1990). States can also enter reservations on their compliance with 
international standards as the UK did for many years, in this context, 
in relation to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Both before and since it was brought into UK law by the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA), the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) has imposed a range of constraints, in relation to family 
reunion for instance and to the return of foreign nationals to countries 
where they could face torture. The courts do from time to time ensure 
that these constraints are keenly felt. Nevertheless, most rights in the 
ECHR are not absolute and states have considerable leeway in their 
implementation (Jackson et al, 2008).
UK domestic law beyond the HRA has also constrained the 
government’s options, notably in relation to asylum seekers within 
the UK (see Chapter 2). Race discrimination law, on the other hand, 
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has not prevented a disproportionate indirect impact of immigration 
controls on Black and Asian migrants, the law specifically providing a 
broadly worded exemption in relation to immigration control, carried 
forward by the Equality Act 2010. It was argued in 2002 that the 
absence of a Bill of Rights, a weak legislature and ‘a timid judiciary’ 
had ‘allowed British policy makers to translate public preferences 
into public policy more directly than in any other liberal democracy’, 
resulting in one of the tightest immigration control regimes in the 
Western world (Hansen, 2002: 265). Recent Home Secretaries, 
consistently challenged in the courts, might not share that view.
International governance framework
Recognition that neither migration flows nor their socio-economic 
and political impacts can be managed by the UK in isolation has led 
to negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements, the former 
including a ‘Common Travel Area’ allowing free movement to and 
from Ireland2 and readmission agreements to return irregular migrants.
Multilateral migration governance, however, is limited. Responsibility 
at UN level is spread across institutions, including the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The International Labour 
Organization (ILO) includes only limited categories of migrants within 
its focus; and the IOM was established in 1951 to promote practical 
solutions and provide services to member states, not binding agreements. 
Despite the very nature of migration necessitating cooperation across 
borders, states have been unwilling to commit fully to international 
cooperation because controlling who enters the territory is seen as 
integral to state sovereignty. Yet it is argued that neither sovereignty nor 
competition between states for skilled migrants need be undermined by 
more systematic sharing of information and expertise or greater policy 
coordination. The absence of a UN framework of governance has led to 
a proliferation of regional and international mechanisms for interstate 
dialogue, including the Global Forum on Migration and Development 
since 2007 (GFMD, 2010), demonstrating that migration cannot be 
addressed effectively on a unilateral basis (GCIM, 2005: 66; Betts, 2008).
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European Union
Highly significant in this context is the role of the European Union, 
the impact of which we shall see throughout this book. A core purpose 
of the EU is free movement of European citizens within its borders, a 
right extended in 1994 to the other three European Economic Area 
(EEA) countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. At enlargement 
of the EU from 15 to 25 states in 2004, the UK could have chosen to 
restrict access to the UK labour market for a transitional period, but 
in this instance did not do so (see Chapter 3). With the right of free 
movement for EU nationals come associated rights that differ from 
those of other ‘migrants’, for instance, in relation to family reunion 
(see Chapter 4).
Cooperation in relation to migration of ‘third-country nationals’ 
from beyond the EU is unavoidable as many of those arriving in the 
UK have travelled through other member states. The 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty established EU competency to legislate on international 
migration, replacing earlier intergovernmental arrangements such as 
the 1985 Schengen Agreement (to remove checks at internal borders), 
to which the UK was not a party. With Ireland it negotiated a selective 
opt-out from EU law which has enabled it to maintain a strongly 
national approach when it chooses to, while opting to collaborate 
where that helps to achieve its objectives, as on asylum and irregular 
migration (Geddes, 2005; Peers, 2009).
The EU’s policy framework was set out in 1999 (Tampere), and 
revised in the Hague Programme of 2004 (CEU, 2004) and later the 
Stockholm Programme of 2009 (CEU, 2009). The aim is to work 
towards a comprehensive asylum, migration and border policy, from the 
root causes of forced migration through to integration or return, based 
on common standards and on cooperation with third countries. An 
early priority was establishing a mechanism for allocating responsibility 
among member states for handling asylum applications (the ‘Dublin 
system’, under which the UK returns asylum seekers to other states on a 
monthly basis) with separate Directives providing common procedures 
in the refugee determination process (to deter ‘asylum shopping’) and 
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minimum standards for the reception and treatment of asylum seekers 
(see Chapter 2).
EU law now sets out conditions for the admission and residence of 
third-country nationals including, for instance, Directives governing 
admission for study and for highly skilled workers. The UK opted 
out of these measures, as it did from the 2003 Directive on family 
reunification. It has shown more enthusiasm for cooperating with 
FRONTEX, an agency set up in 2007 to strengthen the EU’s external 
borders (see Chapter 5); and opted in to Directives in 2002 providing 
a level of harmonisation on offences and penalties for illegal entry and 
trafficking, but not to a further Directive in 2009 covering sanctions 
on employers who employ those not entitled to work. Meanwhile, 
the EU has sought the cooperation of source countries in reducing 
irregular migration and provides some practical assistance, to which 
the UK contributes.
The UK’s self-interested opt-out arrangement causes some 
resentment and hence resistance when it chooses to engage (Peers, 
2009). The 2007 Lisbon Treaty increased EU competence to develop 
common standards on immigration and asylum, extended the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)3 and made all 
decisions subject to qualified majority voting. When the UK now 
decides to opt in, it can thus be outvoted.
the policymaking process
To understand migration policies, we also need to look at the complex 
processes through which they emerge. This is far removed from an 
idealised process of logical ‘stages’: from recognition of a problem, 
through consideration of the options, agreement on the way forward, 
to implementation. While it is possible in broad terms to identify 
these stages they do not necessarily occur sequentially. Moreover, a 
key stage occurs before that process begins: the way in which an issue 
is perceived (‘socially constructed’) and the language in which it is 
discussed is hugely important in setting the terms on which policy 
options are considered. Thus, for European countries that see migration 
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through the prism of nation-states with distinct territories and citizens, 
it is an anomaly. Hence, migration policies have largely been reactive 
and defensive in contrast to North America where immigrants have 
long been seen as central to the process of nation-building (Penninx 
and Martiniello, 2004). A further example is the aquatic language of 
‘flows’ and ‘floods’, regularly used in relation to migration, which clearly 
carries connotations of threat rather than of the social, economic and 
cultural benefits that migration can bring.
Policy silos
UK policymaking has since the 1980s become increasingly fragmented 
between the international, European, national, regional and local levels, 
and involves a more diverse set of actors from the public, private and 
voluntary sectors. This is true in relation to migration, if less so than in 
some other fields, central government retaining a high level of control 
within the UK and negotiating an opt-out, as we have seen, from EU 
decisions not to its liking. Devolution of power to Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales has led to policy divergence less than in other fields 
because immigration control is not devolved (Kyambi, 2009).
Early studies of national policymaking in the UK emphasised 
the vertical fragmentation of policymaking into discrete Whitehall 
departments (Jordan and Richardson, 1982). Serious attempts have 
been made in recent years to overcome departmental boundaries 
including cabinet subcommittees, interdepartmental taskforces and, 
under Labour, cross-cutting Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets 
(HM Government, 2009). Nevertheless, Whitehall’s ‘federal’ structure 
continues to impede the handling of cross-cutting issues (Parker et al, 
2010). On migration, the dominance of the Home Office has limited 
the influence of other departments and agencies keenly affected by it.
When Labour took office in 1997, the Home Office was the 
lead department on immigration, asylum and citizenship policy, the 
responsibility of its then Immigration and Nationality Department 
(IND). Policy on work permits, international students and seasonal 
agricultural workers (SAWs) had, however, long been in the hands 
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of the departments leading on employment, education and rural 
affairs, respectively. In 2001, Home Secretary David Blunkett took 
responsibility for those entry channels with him to the Home Office, 
making it possible, in theory, to develop a holistic migration policy for 
the first time: an ambition reflected in his 2002 White Paper (Home 
Office, 2002). The downside, reflected in the chapters that follow, is 
that each element of migration policy is isolated from the mainstream 
economic and social policies that it affects, and is affected by. No 
effective governance arrangement has been established to address 
that gap, nor the equally problematic isolation from the devolved 
administrations and local services.
The extent to which public policy in Britain is formulated within the 
executive has tended to marginalise the direct influence of Parliament, 
though its voice has been strengthened by the growing influence of 
Select Committees. On migration and integration, we shall see that 
Select Committees have indeed called government to account and 
have on occasion been highly critical, influencing aspects of policy if 
not the central thrust of its direction.
Party politics and personal influence
Studies have found a tendency for the Opposition to retain their 
rivals’ legislation when elected to govern, ensuring continuity and 
incremental change where party politics might suggest there would be 
a sharp disjuncture (Dorey, 2005: 267–70). This will be evident when 
we look at the early years of the Blair government in its handling of 
the asylum crisis; yet significant shifts in policy were seen elsewhere, as 
with the subsequent Coalition government, and require explanation.
Analysis of recent policymaking in the UK has revealed the close 
working relationship between ‘policy networks’ and government in 
some policy fields and much greater distance in others. The literature 
highlights the influence of ministers’ special advisers after Labour’s 
election in 1997 (evident in the shift towards ‘managed migration’ 
during Labour’s second term) and the continuing role of ‘think tanks’ 
as a source of policy ideas. Significantly, it also suggests that the exercise 
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of power by the executive ‘is heavily dependent on circumstances, 
personalities, styles of leadership and the type of issues or policies 
involved’ (Dorey, 2005: 2). The priorities of successive Home Secretaries 
and indeed of the Prime Minister have at times been highly significant 
in migration, within the broader context of the economic, political and 
international pressures to which they had to respond (Spencer, 2007).
Evidence base
The Labour government elected in 1997 was committed to greater 
use of evidence in the policymaking process, but was slow to apply 
this to migration. A Home Office conference in 2001, ‘Closing the 
Information Gap’, first signalled to researchers that policymakers were 
now interested in developing an evidence base on migration and 
government has contributed through research and funding of external 
studies. There has also been greater willingness to learn from policy 
experiences abroad and to pilot initiatives to assess impacts before 
deciding whether to roll out policies nationwide.
While evidence now plays a greater part in migration policy and 
political debates, the nature of its utilisation in the UK and at EU level 
has been found to be highly selective. Knowledge is rarely deployed in a 
politically neutral way and the validity of data and research findings (for 
instance, on the economic impact of labour migration) are frequently 
contested (Boswell, 2008, 2009). One former advisor on migration 
to the Conservative administration in the 1980s observed with some 
irony that ‘the only decisions that are made primarily on the basis of 
research findings are politically unimportant ones’ (Coleman, 1991: 
420). This, he argued, is in part because some social and economic 
questions are not capable of effective testing, produce contested results 
or are overlooked in the truncated timescale in which policies are 
developed. There is, moreover, the primacy of politics: all governments 
are devoted to staying in office and options indicated by research may 
look unappealing to the electorate. The Coalition government’s newly 
appointed Immigration Minister, in a tongue-in-cheek reference to 
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his predecessors, nevertheless promised he would be ‘relying more on 
evidence than is customary in this role’ (Green, 2010).
Implementation
The policies that emerge in legislative and broader forms evolve in 
the course of their implementation (Hill, 2009). Writing on education, 
but of a process that is equally true in migration and integration, 
Stephen Ball says:
Policies are contested, interpreted and enacted in a variety 
of arenas of practice and the rhetorics, texts and meanings of 
policy makers do not always translate directly and obviously 
into institutional practices. They are inflected, mediated, 
resisted and misunderstood, or in some cases simply prove 
unworkable. (Ball, 2008: 7)
Implementation is often the stage at which policies unravel, are 
abandoned or have unforeseen consequences that become apparent 
when faced with the reality of the issues they are intended to address 
(Dorey, 2005: 3). This will be evident in the implementation of asylum 
policy, for instance, at the local and national level. It has been argued by 
immigration lawyers that the effectiveness and fairness of immigration 
control can depend as much on the quality and efficiency of those 
who are engaged in operating the system as the structure of the system 
itself (Jackson et al, 2008: 5).
Historical overview
To understand policy today it is necessary to step back and remind 
ourselves how we came to be here. In the chapters that follow, I shall 
take account in particular of policy development since 1997, but 
those developments were constrained by the legislation, institutions 
and paradigms shaped in earlier years. It is striking how themes that 
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emerge from this early history resonate with the policy debates and 
practices of today.
Parts of the UK have experienced migration for centuries. 
‘Immigrants, refugees and sojourners’, as one social historian writes, 
‘have been continually present’ (Holmes, 1988: 276). The origins of 
our plurality lie in conquest, flight from persecution, slavery, trade and 
even in the Middle Ages in the search for employment. While cities 
such as London and Cardiff had a long, pre-war, historical experience 
of migration, however, for other parts of the UK it has been a more 
recent development. Nevertheless, no one who has read a social history 
of immigration will doubt the pervasive if immeasurable influence that 
people from abroad have had for centuries on all aspects of British 
life, including employment, literature, entertainment and the culture, 
attitudes and identities of their fellow residents.
Commonwealth immigration
It was the arrival of Jewish people fleeing pogroms in Eastern Europe 
that led to the first modern legislative controls on immigration in 
the form of the Aliens Act 1905, providing the Home Secretary with 
considerable powers to control entry, residence and deportation. British 
subjects from the colonies and later the Commonwealth continued, 
on paper, to enjoy a right of entry but there was a de facto policy 
between the wars to ‘keep out Asian and black settlers’. Historian Ian 
Spencer, drawing on cabinet papers released under the 30-year rule, 
found administrative barriers to prevent would-be migrants obtaining 
travel documents, the instructions for which were secreted in circulars 
and letters to officials. Documents revealed this to be prompted in part 
by fears of a repeat of inter-racial violence that had occurred in 1919, 
but also by ‘underlying assumptions about the general undesirability 
of physically and culturally distinct groups’, whether British subjects 
or not (Spencer, 1997: 8–24).
This account challenges the perception that Commonwealth 
citizens had free access to the UK until 1962 and that, facing labour 
shortages post-1945, the government welcomed their arrival. Labour 
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shortages were intense and it was this that drew in immigrants from 
the Commonwealth (Rose et al, 1969). Notwithstanding limited 
recruitment initiatives to meet shortages in the health and transport 
sectors, the government discouraged immigration from the New 
Commonwealth while actively recruiting white people from the ‘Old 
Dominions’ and Europe. Relations with the Commonwealth required 
that the ‘illusion’ of openness be maintained but officials in the 1950s:
raised the invention of techniques to keep Britain white 
without using legislation almost to the level of an art form. 
The contrast between the public face of a mother country 
open to all and the private calculation to exclude was sharp. 
(Spencer, 1997: 153)
For the Labour and Conservative administrations of the early post-war 
years, the benefits of legislation to limit entry did not outweigh the 
costs for Britain’s standing in the Commonwealth if legislation were 
to appear racially discriminatory. Only when a formula was found that 
avoided that appearance, a system of employment vouchers restricting 
the entry of those without a job offer or skills in short supply, was the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 brought onto the statute book.
Contemporary relevance of the 1962 Act
The politics of the 1962 Act, despite the passage of time, is instructive. 
First, approaches taken within Whitehall were strongly affected by 
departmental interests. While the views of the then Commonwealth 
and Colonial Offices were tempered by their need to maintain good 
relations with governments highly sensitive to restrictions applied only 
to their citizens, the Home Office was ‘singularly and unrestrainedly 
opposed’ to further immigration, believing it likely to lead to 
unrest. The Treasury, in contrast, argued that there was no economic 
justification for restrictions as immigration had been beneficial for 
the economy and there would be costs if it were curtailed (Spencer, 
1997: 45, 115).
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Second, this period demonstrates how shifts in foreign policy 
can alter the balance of policy options. In the 1950s, the political 
cost to Commonwealth relations of legislation to exclude New 
Commonwealth citizens was too high; by the 1960s, that cost was 
outweighed by domestic considerations and the shift in focus towards 
Britain’s place in Europe, consolidated by entry into the then Common 
Market in 1971. While in 1945 Commonwealth citizens had (at least 
in theory) free access to live and work in the UK, by the 1970s their 
position was largely reduced to that of aliens; while the fortunes of 
Europe’s citizens was the mirror opposite: aliens in 1945 but enjoying 
free movement within the European Economic Community (EEC) 
three decades later (Spencer, 1997: 150).
The unintended outcome of the Act is also instructive: contrary to 
intention, it marked the beginning of the process of significant Black 
and Asian immigration, not the end. By the 1981 Census, well over 
three quarters of Asian immigrants had arrived after the 1962 Act, not 
before. There were three reasons for this: a ‘beat the ban rush’ in the 
many months between announcement of the Bill and the Act coming 
into force; that the law encouraged those in the UK to stay as it would 
prevent re-entry; and, as migrants could bring their families, each 
voucher issued led on average to 3.7 people arriving to settle (Rose 
et al, 1969: 77; Spencer, 1997: 129–55).
Immigration becomes an electoral issue
The strength of anti-immigrant feeling and overt racism in the 1964 
general election led the incoming Labour government to impose 
further restrictions on entry, with all-party support. Setting a pattern 
to become familiar in subsequent years, rights of entry were often 
curtailed not through primary legislation but Immigration Rules. Low-
skilled permits were no longer issued, the definition of family members 
was more tightly drawn, the standard of proof required to establish 
family relationships was made more rigorous and administrative delays 
were used to regulate entry numbers.
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The year 1968 saw the passing in just three days of legislation to 
curb the entry of UK passport-holders after 10,000 Kenyan Asians 
arrived in one month (prompted by hostility in Kenya and fears that 
their bolt-hole to Britain would soon close). Using a formula that was 
later to form the basis of comprehensive reform in 1971, the Act made 
British citizens subject to immigration control (with access controlled 
by an annual quota) unless they, a parent or grandparent were born, 
adopted or naturalised in the UK. When Enoch Powell made his ‘Rivers 
of Blood’ speech one month after the Act came into force calling for 
an end to all non-white immigration, his was not an isolated voice. In 
1969, 327 out of 412 Conservative constituency associations surveyed 
wanted all ‘coloured’ immigration stopped indefinitely (Dummett and 
Nicol, 1990; Spencer, 1997: 143; Hansen, 2002).
At the 1970 general election, immigration was the fourth most 
salient issue. The seminal Immigration Act 1971 consolidated the 
now tight restrictions on all primary immigration, allowing access for 
work only through a work permit system linked to specific jobs. The 
grandparent rule, allowing not only access but also a ‘right of abode’, 
was a qualification far more likely to be met by would-be migrants 
from Old Commonwealth countries such as Canada than by their 
New Commonwealth counterparts. The Act gave the Home Secretary 
huge discretion to make further changes under Immigration Rules: 
those governing the entry of husbands, for instance, changed five times 
between 1974 and 1985 (Dummett and Nicol, 1990).
Symbolically, the 1971 Act came into force on the day the UK 
entered the EEC, 1 January 1973, giving freedom to live and work to 
people from countries with which, in some cases, the UK had been 
at war less than 30 years before. Yet this huge shift in the parameters 
of immigration control attracted little political or public attention. 
It led initially to modest and largely unnoticed numbers of people, 
not withstanding enlargement of the EU to include countries less 
prosperous than the UK: Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal five 
years later (Rechi, 2008).
Meanwhile, Commonwealth citizens within the UK retained 
rights that they had previously enjoyed, including access to 
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employment in most parts of the civil service and to be a candidate 
and to vote in parliamentary and local elections. For those seeking 
to be joined by their dependants from abroad, however, entry was 
rationed by long delays and intrusive procedures to establish identity 
(see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, grants of settlement to Commonwealth 
citizens continued at an average of over 30,000 per year throughout the 
1970s, and political controversy focused heavily on these numbers and 
on the queues of families waiting to enter, rather than on any larger 
policy objective (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 234).
Family migration was not, however, the only issue. Within a year of 
the 1971 Act, a military coup in Uganda and subsequent expulsion of 
British nationals, mostly of Indian origin, led 30,000 people to seek 
sanctuary in the UK. Despite their British citizenship, Ugandan Asians 
were met by high levels of public and media hostility, reception camps 
in former military barracks and attempts to prevent them settling in 
cities such as Leicester which had significant Asian populations and 
where they subsequently made a substantial economic contribution.
Community relations rationale
The rationale for tighter controls was that it was necessary to improve 
community relations. That was consistently challenged on the grounds 
that they would increase the insecurity of immigrants already living in 
the UK (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 220) and undermine the positive 
perception of minorities on which good relations depends. Writing 
in 1996, with the benefit of hindsight, former Labour Minister Roy 
Hattersley spelt out that contradiction:
Good community relations are not encouraged by the 
promotion of the idea that the entry of one black immigrant 
to this country will be so damaging to the national interest 
that husbands must be separated from their wives, children 
denied the chance to look after their aged parents and sisters 
prevented from attending their brothers’ weddings … if we 
27
introduction
cannot afford to let them in, those of them who are here 
already must be doing harm. (Hattersley, 1996)
Nevertheless, from the end of the 1970s there was a bipartisan consensus 
that increasingly tight controls were necessary. Nostalgia among some 
Conservatives for the Commonwealth, still evident in the 1971 debate, 
was no longer voiced and Labour’s enthusiasm for controls was curbed 
only occasionally by pressure from ethnic minority constituents; to 
relax restrictions on foreign husbands, for instance, in 1974.
Conservative era
The choice of Margaret Thatcher as leader of the Conservative Party 
in 1975 marked the shift to a more populist, less inclusive, form of 
conservatism. Immigration policy was no exception. The British people, 
Mrs Thatcher famously said before the election, fear ‘being swamped’ by 
people with ‘alien cultures’.4 Elected in 1979, the government moved 
quickly to impose further restrictions on fiancés, spouses and elderly 
relatives and to limit visitors and students switching to another status 
in Immigration Rules the following year. In its 1981 Nationality Act, 
it brought nationality and immigration law into line by redefining 
British citizenship more narrowly to match those who now had the 
right to live in the UK and creating subcategories of citizenship for 
many who did not.
Further legislation followed in 1987 to penalise airlines and shippers 
that transported passengers without required visas, and in 1988 to 
impose additional restrictions on family reunion. When asylum seekers 
began to arrive from Commonwealth countries such as Sri Lanka, visa 
requirements were introduced to limit their capacity to reach the UK. A 
rise in the number of people seeking asylum after 1990, including from 
the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and former Soviet countries, prompted 
increasingly restrictive legislation in 1993 and 1996 to prevent and 
deter people reaching the UK (see Chapter 2).
Immigration and asylum were salient if not definitive electoral issues 
in the 1990s and were used overtly in the 1992 general election and 
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1994 European election campaigns, a Conservative party official later 
reported to have observed that the issue had ‘played particularly well in 
the tabloids and has more potential to hurt’.5 It was during this period 
that new vocabulary entered the discourse on asylum, of Britain as a 
‘soft touch’ for ‘bogus refugees’ perceived to be ‘abusing’ the system 
and taking advantage of the goodwill of the British people (Spencer, 
1998). While rising asylum numbers caused consternation, some 32,500 
applying in 1997, little attention was paid to the far greater number 
of work permit-holders and their dependants, 63,000 approved that 
year (Home Office, 2001).
Neither asylum nor immigration were, nevertheless, major issues 
in the 1997 election. Only 3% of the public then cited race and 
immigration as among key issues facing the country (MORI, 
2009) and Labour’s manifesto gave migration little coverage beyond 
assurances that it would remove certain ‘arbitrary and unfair’ impacts 
of immigration control. Just six lines were devoted to asylum, the 
issue that would dominate its first term in office, and none to labour 
migration where it would fundamentally change the parameters of 
policy and debate.
The story from here is taken up in the chapters that follow, first 
setting out Labour’s inheritance and the policies it adopted on asylum, 
labour migrants, students, family migrants, irregular migration and 
integration, before in turn handing over to the Coalition government 
in May 2010. We see that the Coalition has retained the thrust of much 
of Labour’s approach but with some elements of reversal to Labour’s 
early thinking in relation to labour migration, students and citizenship, 
a new ‘cap’ on labour migration, and steps to sever the link between 
temporary migration and settlement: to retain access to the ‘brightest 
and the best’ while curbing the impact of migration on population 
growth (May, 2010).
Migration and migrants in the uK
Before I turn to a few facts on recent migration trends there are points 
to note about the data and its political significance. A key difference 
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is between ‘flow’ data, showing the number who enter and leave, and 
‘stock’ figures, showing the number present within the country at a 
given time. On flows, we know most about those from outside the 
European Economic Area (EEA) who are subject to immigration 
control and least about EEA nationals who are not. The UK also has 
limited ‘stock’ data on foreign nationals (non-citizens) within the UK, 
with a little more on those who are foreign-born, which includes those 
who were always or have become British citizens. Many data sources, 
however, only record those who identify themselves as from an ethnic 
minority, a majority of whom are not migrants but born in the UK. The 
paucity of data on those who have migrated to the UK, particularly 
on recent migrants, is a significant limitation on our knowledge of 
what happens to those who enter through various migration channels.
The political fallout of inadequate migration data, including the 
implications for a local authority funding system reliant on accurate 
local population figures, led the Office for National Statistics (ONS) to 
establish a taskforce to improve national and local statistics (2008–12). 
An e-Borders system recording entry and exit (see Chapter 5) may 
provide more comprehensive data by 2014.
Turning to the data we do have we should note, first, the sheer 
number of arrivals at the UK’s borders each year: 101.6 million in 
2009,6 of whom 12.3 million were not EEA nationals (Home Office, 
2010). It is this volume of arrivals, many of them short-stay visitors, 
which is relevant to any discussion on the operation of border controls 
– how feasible it is to carry out checks on each person who enters, for 
instance and to monitor whether those given temporary residence do 
leave when that time has expired.
Controversy often focuses on a quite separate figure, that of net 
migration: the total number of those arriving with the intention of 
staying for more than a year, less the number who leave with that 
intention. It is this figure that is relevant if the focus is on the overall 
number of people living in the UK, and in the Coalition government’s 
commitment to bring net migration down to ‘tens of thousands’. In 
most years until 1993, fewer people came to live in the UK than left, 
but net migration subsequently rose over the next decade to a peak 
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of 245,000 in 2004. In 2008, as Figure 1.1 shows, it fell during the 
recession but rose again to 242,000 in the year to September 2010. 
Significantly, this was largely because of a decline in emigration from 
the UK (Horsfield, 2005; ONS, 2011). Emigration levels are thus crucial 
to the ‘net’ migration figure, yet not subject to policy control – and 
woe betide the government that suggested more British people should 
leave to help bring net migration down!
If the focus is on the impact or needs of new arrivals, it is not net 
migration that is relevant but immigration: not only those arriving with 
the intention of staying more than a year but arguably those here for 
shorter periods as seasonal agricultural workers for instance or on 
short courses. In the year to September 2010, an estimated 586,000 
people came to live in the UK for more than a year: contrary to public 
figure 1.1: Net migration to the UK 2000–10
Note: *Year includes provisional estimate for 2010.




































perception, a level similar to the annual intake since 2004 (ONS, 2011). 
A striking feature in recent years has been the number of people 
coming from the eight accession countries of the EU (‘A8’), the vast 
majority from Poland (Matheson, 2009), although entry declined 
significantly during the recession.
After varying periods of time, some migrants can apply to remain 
in the long term. In the year to September 2010, 239,000 people 
successfully applied for settlement, a significant increase on the previous 
year and, as Figure 1.2 shows, continuing an upward trend. The largest 
category is those who had originally come to the UK through a 
work channel (including dependants), followed by those who had 
come for family reasons, few having come as asylum seekers (ONS, 
2010c). Those whose predominant concern is to limit population 
growth have increasingly focused on this settlement figure, arguing 
that the UK could continue to benefit from labour migration if there 
were tighter limits on those subsequently allowed to stay (Balanced 
Migration, 2010).
figure 1.2: Grants of settlement 2005–10 (excluding EEA and Swiss 
nationals)
Note: *Year to September 2010 
Source: Home Office Control of Immigration Statistics UK (2009, Table 4.4), 
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For those British citizens emigrating to live abroad (in 2004–08), the 
most popular destinations were Australia, Spain, Germany, France and 
the USA. Work was the main reason for leaving, followed by family 
or education (ONS, 2009). We know surprisingly little about those 
who emigrate, although there was a net loss of 2.7 million British 
citizens between 1966 and 2006, nor about those migrants who in 
turn re-emigrate, although both have potential policy implications 
(Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006; Finch et al, 2009).
The UK’s diverse, ageing population
Net migration was the primary driver of the growth in the UK’s 
population for much of the past decade, natural change (the difference 
between births and deaths) once again becoming the main driver in 
2007 (ONS, 2010b). The UK population was 61.8 million in 2009, 
up from 56.3 million in 1983. During that time, the proportion of the 
population under 16 years fell and those over 85 grew, an ageing process 
that will continue, leaving a smaller proportion of people of working 
age. Migration has helped to offset demographic ageing but cannot 
be the sole solution to that problem (Münz, 2007; Matheson, 2009).
At the time of the 2001 Census, around 8% of the UK population 
had been born abroad. By March 2010, this had risen to 11.4%, of 
whom a little under half were British citizens. India was the most 
common country of birth for those born abroad and Polish now 
the most common non-British nationality (ONS, 2010c). By 2008, 
migrants from the A8 European countries accounted for 10% of the 
foreign-born population. Half of them are in the 16–29 age group, but 
there has been an increase in family migration, raising the number of 
A8 child migrants under 16 in the UK to 75,000 (Matheson, 2009): 
small numbers in the overall migration picture but more significant 
for schools and other service providers.
The diversity of countries from which migrants now come is a 
very different picture from the post-war period. Britain’s foreign-born 
population has also become more diverse in terms of religion, language, 
socio-economic status, immigration status, transnational connections 
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and location in the UK. By 2001, there were already people from 179 
nations in London, 45% of whom had arrived since 1990, and 300 
languages were spoken in the capital’s schools. Dubbed ‘super-diversity’, 
a ‘level and kind of complexity surpassing anything the country has 
previously experienced’, this is significant because it has brought new 
patterns of inequality and prejudice, differing needs and barriers to 
service delivery (including the implications of language diversity for 
translation and interpretation services), and requires new modes of 
consultation with migrant communities (Vertovec, 2007: 1024).
chapters of this book
I began this chapter with a paradox – the gap between public demands 
for tighter controls on migration and successive governments’ 
reluctance or failure to deliver – and suggested that, in this experience, 
the UK is no exception. I set out the range of conflicting policy 
objectives and constraints which in practice limit both the policy 
options and the efficacy of controls, including limitations within the 
policymaking system itself, and argued that the options and constraints 
are rarely transparent to the public, nor the rationale for decisions clearly 
explained. I drew on migration theory to show that policymakers need 
to take account of the powerful structural drivers of migration and the 
actual motivations of migrants if they are to design appropriate policy 
levers, but also need to acknowledge the limits on their capacity to 
manage this complex, global process. Finally, I gave a brief overview 
of the history that precedes the chapters in this book, drawing out 
themes from decades past with surprising resonance for migration 
debates and policy interventions today.
In the next chapter I turn to the issue that dominated the decade 
to 2004, asylum, showing how the unprecedented number of arrivals 
and the media and public reaction to it shifted first a Conservative and 
then a Labour government to deploy extreme measures to deter and 
remove people perceived to be abusing British hospitality rather than 
in need of protection. In Chapter 3, I shift focus to look at policy on 
labour migration, tracing the way in which policy has both shaped 
wilful betrayal or capacity constrained?
34
and responded to demand for skilled and low-skilled labour through 
the shift to ‘managed migration’ to maximise the UK’s economic 
interests a decade ago and the enlargement of the EU in 2004, to the 
Points-Based System and its subsequent reversal in some respects by 
the Coalition government. I am also concerned here with policy on 
international students, the largest intake of migrants to the UK and, 
like labour migration, overtly geared towards maximising economic 
benefits for the UK and its education providers until competing policy 
objectives brought the primacy of those objectives into question.
In Chapter 4 I turn to family migration which highlights themes that 
have already emerged in earlier chapters: the gap between the rights 
enjoyed by EU nationals and other migrants; the close relationship 
between entry and post-entry restrictions on access to jobs and services; 
the impact of the courts in curbing government policy options; and 
the stark contrast between the perspectives of policymakers seeking 
to regulate entry and those of individuals whose lives can be deeply 
affected by the rules that they make.
In Chapter 5 I focus on irregular migrants, finding that most of this 
eclectic category of people came legally and overstayed or are in breach 
of their conditions of stay. We see that the enforcement measures used 
to deter, detect, detain and remove them can be disproportionate and 
of limited effect set against the limited priority attached to tackling 
the structural causes of irregularity. As in other chapters, we find that 
there are conflicting interests at play, constraining in some crucial 
respects the extent to which governments have been willing or able 
to intervene; and suggest that a note of realism needs to be injected 
into the promises that are made to the public and in the approach to 
more than half a million irregular migrants currently living in the UK.
The intensity of political debate on the numbers who enter reflects 
concern about impacts after arrival, not least on the labour market, 
public services and relationships with existing residents. Chapter 6 
is devoted to policies relating to the participation and inclusion of 
newcomers and those who settle in the UK, or rather in significant 
respects to explaining a policy vacuum in that field. The Conclusion 
draws together key themes that emerge and suggests reforms that 
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could help to shift both the politics of migration and the outcomes 
of the migration process.
Notes
1 The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999; Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002; Immigration and Asylum (Treatment of Claimants 
etc) Act 2004; Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006; UK 
Borders Act 2007; Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008; and 
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009.
2 Including the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.
3 Now the ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’.
4 World in Action, January 1978.
5 Head of the Conservative Party Research Department, quoted in 
the Observer, 3 September 1995.
6 Not including Ireland. Note that throughout the book migration 
statistics are rounded to the nearest thousand.
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2protection: asylum and  
refugee policy
In this chapter I explore policy towards people who apply for refugee status, ‘asylum seekers’, and those who are refused. Tracing the rapid 
rise in asylum applications from the late 1980s, we see the responses 
of Conservative and Labour administrations: from measures to prevent 
asylum seekers reaching the UK, through procedural reforms of the 
refugee determination system to curtailment of access to work and 
benefits, noting parallel developments across the EU. We see how 
policy was shaped by factors external and internal to the UK that differ 
in degree from those we shall see in other chapters: the constraints 
imposed by international and European human rights law, high levels 
of cooperation at EU level, vitriolic coverage in the tabloid press, 
and major capacity failings within the bureaucracy. It is also here that 
we see exclusion from the welfare state used as a primary lever of 
immigration control:
The utilisation of the welfare state as a device to deter asylum 
seekers added a new weapon to the armoury of post-war 
immigration controls and redefined the relationship between 
migrants and the welfare state. (Geddes, 2000: 142)
To understand how that could emerge and be reinforced by a Labour 
government we need to explore the tension between the UK’s legal 
and ethical responsibility to those in need of protection and the 
political, economic and practical challenges to which that obligation 
gives rise (Law, 2009).
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legal and ethical constraints
It is in relation to people seeking protection that government is most 
constrained by commitments under international and European human 
rights law, and it is on human rights and ethical grounds that, from 
one side of a highly polarised debate, criticism has been based. The 
basis of international refugee law is the 1951 Geneva Convention 
on the Status of Refugees (and subsequent 1967 Protocol) to which 
the vast majority of member states of the United Nations (UN) are 
signatories. Agreed at the height of the Cold War, it defines a refugee 
as someone who:
owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinions, is outside of the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country ... 1
It will be immediately apparent that the definition is a narrow one, 
excluding those who, fleeing civil war or famine for instance, would in 
common parlance be called refugees. Under the Convention, however, 
states must provide an impartial process to determine whether an 
individual qualifies for protection and must not return a refugee to a 
place where they could face persecution (refoulement). Interpretation of 
the Convention falls to the agency set up to safeguard the well-being 
of refugees, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), to the governments of member states and to the courts: the 
UK Supreme Court ruling in July 2010, for instance, that persecution 
on grounds of homosexuality falls within the terms of the Convention, 
a decision accepted by the Coalition government.2
The causes of conflict are often related to poverty and to the 
collapse of effective government and the rule of law, conditions that 
can contribute to the motivation to move (Van Hear et al, 2009). 
Applicants for refugee status can thus include some whose flight is 
entirely because of persecution; some who are fleeing violence that 
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falls outside of the Convention definition of refugee; and others who 
have less need of a safe haven than of economic opportunities for 
which they have found no other channel to migrate. An application 
for refugee status can be made after the person has been in the host 
country for some time. The situation in their country of origin may 
have deteriorated or their application may be ‘opportunistic’ if their 
permission to stay is about to expire (Home Office, 2005: 36). Their 
claim must nevertheless be considered, leading some governments to 
question not the narrowness of the Convention but the constraint it 
imposes on their capacity to control their borders. The judicial nature 
of the process ensures that it is expensive and time-consuming. Legal 
and practical barriers can then make it difficult to remove those whose 
applications are refused (Gibney, 2008: 150).
The UNHCR finds critics of the Convention arguing that it is 
‘outdated, unworkable, irrelevant and inflexible’ and that the protection 
regime globally is threatened by the economic cost of offering asylum, 
by security fears in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and concerns 
regarding mixed motives for migration: ‘States that once had generous 
refugee policies now see the costs of asylum as outweighing its benefits 
… [and] refugees as a burden rather than an asset’ (UNHCR, 2006: 
1). UK leaders have been among those critics, Prime Minister Blair 
arguing: ‘The Convention was drawn up for a vastly different world…. 
The UK is taking a lead in arguing for reform, not of the Convention’s 
values but of how it operates’ (Blair, 2001). The Conservative manifesto 
in 2005 promised to pull out of the Convention and allow only an 
annual quota of refugees to enter, but Labour’s Home Secretary rejected 
that as ‘unworkable, unjust and counterproductive’, arguing that it 
would destroy the international cooperation the UK needs to return 
those whose applications are refused (Home Office, 2005). A House 
of Lords inquiry found that ‘The 1951 Convention regime has stood 
the test of time. There is no viable alternative to it as the principal 
international instrument of protection for those at risk of persecution’ 
(HLSC on European Union, 2004: para 125).
The government has found itself less constrained by the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child because, when ratifying it 
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in 1991, it entered a reservation in relation to immigration control. 
In face of criticism from the UK’s Children’s Commissioners and 
parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights that this ‘sends 
out a powerful signal that the rights of asylum seeking children are 
less important than those of other children’ (JCHR, 2007: 176), the 
government withdrew that reservation in 2009, a notable example of 
the influence of such bodies. Significantly, the government has found 
itself forcefully constrained by the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR, enforceable in the UK courts through the Human 
Rights Act 1998), which requires government to secure the rights in 
the Convention ‘to everyone within their jurisdiction’, thus including 
refused asylum seekers. The courts have consistently challenged aspects 
of asylum legislation and practice as in breach of the Convention so 
that anticipation of what a court decision might be has in itself been a 
constraint on the options government has felt able to pursue.3
rise in asylum applications in europe
The rising number of people seeking protection in the 1990s was 
a global phenomenon. Large population displacements were less 
a consequence of persecution per se than of armed conflict and 
communal violence, as in Somalia and Afghanistan. In some cases, as 
in the former Yugoslavia, ethnic displacement was not a by-product of 
conflict but an intended weapon of war. In the decade to 2001, 70% 
of the world’s refugee population was accommodated in developing 
countries but others sought asylum in industrialised states (Crisp, 
2003). The UNHCR found that this led to a marked shift in approach 
across receiving states: more restrictive policies; curtailment of due 
process; greater use of detention and expulsion; greater collaboration 
between asylum authorities, intelligence and enforcement agencies; 
and a proliferation of alternative, discretionary protection mechanisms 
in sending and receiving states according fewer entitlements than 
guaranteed by the Convention (UNHCR, 2006: 1–2).
As numbers rose in Europe (Figure 2.1), governments did indeed 
respond with measures to deter asylum seekers reaching their borders, 
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to reform asylum procedures, increase capacity to detain and remove 
and to limit access to welfare support. Exclusion from work and the 
welfare system has been used not only to deter future arrivals but 
arguably to exclude asylum seekers from social integration so that 
the migration process could be reversed, while reassuring ‘legitimate 
welfare receivers’ that this is the intention (Geddes, 2000: 143).
EU member states, recognising that an effective response required 
cooperation, began to work towards a Common Asylum System, the 
EU being given legal competence to develop binding provisions by the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The priority was to stop ‘asylum shopping’ 
by setting minimum standards for refugee determination procedures 
and preventing asylum seekers making successive claims in more than 
one state. Successive UK governments, normally keen to present policy 
as entirely home-grown, wanted to ensure that the UK was no more 
attractive to asylum seekers than its neighbours and to be able to return 
them to an EU country through which they had travelled. Moreover, 
it helped if rising asylum numbers was seen as a European problem, 
figure 2.1: Asylum applications in the EU27, 1998–2009
Note: Applications relate to main applicant only.
Source: Eurostat Statistics Explained: Asylum Statistics November 2010; Asylum 




































not a failing of UK immigration control. Hence it signed up to key 
EU provisions, between 1999 and 2004 opting into all seven asylum 
measures in contrast to only one in four on regular migration and six 
out of 21 provisions on border controls (Geddes, 2005).
While the UK was in tune with the restrictive aims at the heart of 
the EU agenda, it also opted into the 2003 Reception Directive that 
set down minimum standards on education, health care and legal advice 
(2003/9/EC). Contrary to UK policy at the time, it also allowed asylum 
seekers to work if their application had been under consideration for 
more than 12 months (European Commission, 2003). The Supreme 
Court has ruled that this includes refused asylum seekers who have 
made a further claim that remains unresolved – an instance of EU 
law requiring a change in UK policy (UKBA, 2010a). Recent plans 
to revise the Directive saw the UK depart from its earlier cooperation, 
concerned that the definition of family members was too wide and 
that the grounds on which it could fast-track cases would be curtailed 
(HLSC on European Union, 2009).
UK destination
The UK was consistently among the top three EU countries in the 
number of asylum applications over the decade 1999–2008, and in 
2000–03 received more than any other EU country. The political 
impact of that headline was not mitigated by the fact that, per capita, 
the UK did not make the top five, or that the lead countries from 
which they came, Iraq, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan and Somalia, were 
all well-known conflict zones (Home Office, 2009: Tables 2.1a, 2.3).
Conservative and Labour administrations were convinced that 
asylum seekers ‘chose’ the UK as their destination because jobs and 
welfare support were too readily available – that Britain was ‘a soft 
touch’. Research did not support that view, finding that linguistic 
and cultural affinities with the UK and existing social networks were 
the key factors. Many ‘sending’ states, like Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe, 
had long ties with the UK. For many, the circumstances of departure, 
lack of travel documents and reliance on others for transport were 
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found in practice to limit any ‘choice’ of destination (Robinson and 
Segrott, 2002; Zetter et al, 2003; Crawley, 2010). The ending of Britain’s 
geographic isolation with the opening of the Channel Tunnel in the 
1990s, its strong economy and ease of access to the labour market, as well 
as increasing restrictions on access to other EU states, were nevertheless 
thought to be contributory factors (Gibney, 2004). A major plank of 
policy since the 1990s has rested on the premise that the opportunity 
to work or access welfare support made the UK a destination of choice, 
and that any such incentive must therefore be removed.
development of asylum policy
Britain had been a destination for those seeking a safe haven long 
before the arrival of Jewish people fleeing pogroms in Eastern Europe 
prompted the passage of the Aliens Act 1905. The anti-Semitism 
vocalised then and in relation to the arrival of Jewish refugees in the 
1930s somewhat belies a national perception that Britain’s record in 
‘providing hospitality to men, women and children fleeing persecution 
… is rightly a source of national pride’ (Hague, 2000). After the 
Second World War, uprisings against Soviet domination did lead to 
the acceptance of many thousands of refugees from Eastern Europe, 
decisions relying on executive discretion. Procedure for determination 
of refugee status was not standardised until the 1980s, a decade in which 
applications averaged less than 4,000 a year.
Occasions arose when the government succumbed to pressure 
from the international community to accept refugees from camps 
in regions of conflict, including a quota of  Vietnamese ‘Boat People’ 
in the early 1980s. Recently released cabinet papers record the then 
Prime Minister’s reluctance to agree and her insistence that it was 
‘wrong that immigrants should be given council housing whereas white 
citizens were not’, a foretaste of debates to come (Travis, 2009). The 
policy towards refugees that developed in the UK was not, however, 
focused on settlement programmes of that kind but a reaction to the 




When the annual numbers of applications rose to more than 26,000 
in 1990 and towards 45,000 the following year, the Conservative 
government responded with measures to ‘fast-track’ cases, returning 
some to a ‘safe’ country they came through en route without a full 
examination of the case or guarantee that that country would do 
so (Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993). In that reaction it 
preceded public concern (Gibney, 2004: 121). Meanwhile, welfare 
benefits for asylum seekers were set at 70% of standard levels. The 
1993 Act introduced compulsory fingerprinting of applicants, removed 
any requirement to house those waiting for a decision and provided 
a power to detain when an application was refused. It nevertheless 
brought the UN Convention on Refugees into UK law and provided 
an ‘in-country’ right of appeal against refusal. The time subsequently 
taken to resolve the growing volume of cases was then unacceptable 
for all concerned and the integrity of the process became a focus of 
political and media debate (Billings, 2006).
Within three years, the government legislated again to address the 
delays, expediting and truncating the determination process by deeming 
categories of applications ‘unfounded’, triggering an accelerated 
procedure with limited rights of appeal (Asylum and Immigration 
Act 1996). In so doing, it was not out of line with the practice of its 
European neighbours. It also took steps to deny welfare support to 
applicants who did not apply on entry and to those appealing against 
refusal, convinced that Britain was attracting ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, for 
which the evidence was the rejection of 81% of applications that year. 
Asylum seekers were portrayed as undeserving, a drain on a welfare state 
to which they had not contributed (Macdonald and Billings, 2007). 
NGO critics challenged the assumption that a ‘genuine’ applicant 
would necessarily declare their intention to apply on arrival (rather 
than wait, for instance, to get advice); that welfare entitlements drove 
migration; and that low success rates indicated that the majority were 
abusing the system, recalling the narrow criteria for entitlement to 
refugee status (Refugee Council, 1996).
The Conservative period also saw measures to prevent asylum 
seekers reaching the UK: the extension of visa requirements, as for 
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those from Yugoslavia during its civil war in 1992, and penalties 
on airlines and shipping companies that brought travellers without 
necessary documentation (Carriers’ Liability Act 1987). Labour, in 
opposition, argued that this would impede access to the UK of those 
in genuine need of protection who might have no choice but to use 
false documents to travel. Nevertheless it endorsed the perception 
that ‘bogus’ claimants were abusing the system, repeatedly using that 
‘rhetoric of disbelief ’ in debates on the Bill and contributing to a highly 
exclusionary discourse on asylum emerging across the EU (Spencer, 
1998; Bloch, 2000; Squire, 2009).
Labour, moreover, shared the Conservative view that public hostility 
to asylum seekers could harm race relations. Blair was later to say: 
‘unless we act to tackle abuses it could be increasingly exploited by 
extremists to promote their perverted view of race’ (Home Office, 
2005). Asylum policy in the 1990s was, in this way, ‘bolted on’ to 
figure 2.2: Asylum applications in the UK 1992–2009 (excluding 
dependants)
Source: Home Office Control of Immigration Statistics 2000 and 2009; House of 





























































the existing framework of immigration policy, its rationale and its 
policymaking system. Although firmly underpinned, as in no other area 
of migration, by international human rights law, asylum was subsumed 
within the existing immigration problematique as a challenge to border 
controls and good race relations. Parliament, moreover, continued to 
provide ‘blank cheques’ for the Home Office to fill in with secondary 
legislation – Labour’s subsequent Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 
alone containing 50 such provisions (Geddes, 2000: 135). The courts 
were less forgiving, the European Court of Human Rights ruling in 
1997 that the ECHR prohibited returning refugees to any country 
where the individual could face torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment.4
For the Conservatives in the 1990s, cutting asylum seekers’ access to 
welfare support resonated with their rolling back of the welfare state. 
The effect of their asylum reforms, opposed but later taken forward by 
Labour, was a short-term reduction in applications (Zetter et al, 2003) 
and a marked, ongoing inequality between asylum seekers and others 
living in the UK (Bloch, 2000). This also did not go unchallenged by 
the courts,5 however, which required local authorities to support those 
who would otherwise be destitute (under domestic law this time – the 
National Assistance Act 1948), shifting some of the cost of support to 
local authorities in the South East where most asylum seekers were 
living. In Scotland, local authorities were already shouldering some 
responsibility under similar provisions (the Social Work (Scotland) 
Act 1968).
policy under labour
This was the legacy Labour inherited in 1997, along with a highly 
polarised debate: ‘All asylum seekers are “bogus” to one group’, the 
new administration was to rue, ‘or almost all genuine to another’. It also 
inherited a backlog of 50,000 applications, some dating back to 1990, 
caused in part by a major computerisation failure. A further 20,000 
were in the queue for an appeal, then taking up to 15 months to list 
in London (Home Office, 1998: paras 8.5, 8.7). An election promise to 
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maintain tight controls on public expenditure meant no new resources 
to front-load the refugee determination system and the government 
was unwilling at that stage to fast-track the backlog through to refugee 
status. The lack of capacity to deal with the volume of applications 
meant that the backlog grew to 125,000 in 1999, drawing criticism for 
the cost to the taxpayer of supporting those waiting for a decision, then 
some £400 million a year (Home Office, 1998), and for the insecurity 
and hardship it meant for the individuals concerned.
As new applications rose to a peak of 84,000 in 2002, including 
many from Iraq, Zimbabwe and Afghanistan, the tabloid press and the 
Opposition put the government under intense pressure to bring the 
numbers under control, with little effective counter-pressure (other 
than the courts and NGOs’ vocal concerns) to protect the integrity of 
the asylum system. The perception that the system was out of control 
was compounded by the low number of refused asylum seekers 
subsequently removed from the UK. When in opposition, Labour had 
not highlighted the Conservatives’ ‘deportation gap’ as the thrust of 
its critique was that the government was too harsh on asylum seekers. 
With the shoe on the other foot, the Conservative Opposition felt no 
such compunction (Gibney, 2008: 155).
Media factor
It is difficult to overestimate the pressure ministers felt from hostile 
national and local press coverage during this period. Their concern was 
threefold: its potential electoral impact; the loss of public confidence 
in government to control ‘immigration’; and the threat hostile 
attitudes posed to public order at community level. Ministers and 
their special advisors speak of this period as ‘extraordinarily tense’; 
the ‘media onslaught unrelenting. By the end of 2002 the situation 
was unsustainable’, one special advisor said. ‘We were just getting 
slaughtered on asylum. It wasn’t unusual for there to be an asylum 
story on the front page of a tabloid everyday of the week’ (Spencer, 




“It was the Daily Mail factor. Despite Labour having a 
big majority, asylum exposed its political flank. Here was 
something that a lot of people thought was wrong and 
demonstrated a government unable to do anything about it. 
A demonstration of the powerlessness of government is never 
comfortable for a Minister.”6
A former Sun journalist, Roy Greenslade, argues that the tabloids were 
engaged in a ‘distasteful contest’ to boost their readership: the Daily 
Express for example, in one 31-day period in 2003 running 22 front-
page lead stories on asylum seekers and one popular columnist making 
88 disparaging references to them in the three years from January 2001. 
Alarmist stories, some exaggerated and others entirely fabricated (as in 
the Sun’s ‘Callous Asylum Seekers are Barbecuing the Queen’s Swans’ 
in 2003: Greenslade, 2005: 25), associated ‘asylum seeker’ with crime 
and welfare fraud so that a humanitarian label became a term of abuse. 
Public hostility is nevertheless not simply the result of what people 
read. Rather, ‘the press both reflects and enhances public attitudes and 
thereby sets up a chain reaction … until reality is buried under layers 
of myth and prejudice’ (Greenslade, 2005: 6). The four tabloids most 
prolific in running anti-asylum stories then had combined sales of 
7.5 million and a readership of 22 million, more than a third of the 
British population.
David Blunkett, Home Secretary from 2001 to 2004, said he feared 
the impact of asylum on a public already unsettled by the pace of 
change, fearful of crime and resentful of newcomers accessing resources 
they themselves needed. With an eye to growing support for right-wing 
parties in other parts of Europe, he saw a reduction in asylum numbers 
as essential to prevent such a drift in the UK. In failing to support him 
in that approach, Blunkett felt ‘grossly misinterpreted by the liberal 
left’ (Spencer, 2007: 343). The Prime Minister drove the agenda, giving 
asylum an extraordinary amount of his personal attention: more than 
50 meetings between 2001 and 2004, with some lasting three to four 
hours (Spencer, 2007: 359).
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The terms in which the Conservative Opposition criticised the 
government for a ‘chaotic system … both ineffective and unfair’ 
exacerbated the polarity of the debate: both through the sharpness of 
their criticism and in proposing unworkable but superficially attractive 
alternatives including detention of all asylum seekers in ‘reception 
centres’ (Hague, 2000; Ward, 2000). Nevertheless, there is a strong 
argument that government policy and the rhetoric with which it was 
delivered exacerbated its own predicament: a vicious circle in which 
government announcements reinforced public concern and thus 
increased the pressure it was under. Both Labour and its predecessor 
fuelled ‘the potent myth of the welfare-scrounging bogus asylum seeker’ 
that has polluted immigration-related political discourse, playing a key 
role in shifting public perceptions of refugees from people deserving of 
protection to abusers of Britain’s generosity (Geddes, 2000: 139–40). 
With the benefit of hindsight, a government special advisor later 
observed to the author that:
“the effect of the tough rhetoric was to wind up their 
concerns, not reassure them. We should have taken down 
the temperature and worked with local authorities and the 
local press to change attitudes. But the pressures at the time 
were immense.” (Cited in Spencer, 2007: 349)
A parliamentary inquiry in 2007 urged ministers to: ‘recognise their 
responsibility to use measured language so as not to give ammunition 
to those who seek to build up resentment against asylum seekers, nor 
to give the media the excuse to write inflammatory or misleading 
articles’ (JCHR, 2007: 367).
threefold strategy
Labour never failed to insist that it would honour the UK’s obligation 
to protect those in genuine need of sanctuary. Its stated rationale was 
the need to weed out those who could have sought protection at an 
earlier stage in their journey or who did not need protection at all 
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(Home Office, 2002). As numbers rose its focus broadened nevertheless 
from fraudulent claims to reducing the number of applications per se. 
To that end, its strategy was threefold:
•	 To raise the barriers to asylum seekers reaching the UK: through 
extension of ‘carrier sanctions’ and visa requirements, posting UK 
immigration staff at border posts abroad and providing protection 
in regions of origin.
•	 To disperse asylum applicants to designated local authority areas and 
extend restrictions on access to work and benefits as a deterrent to 
new applicants, to encourage refused asylum seekers to leave, and 
to assure the public that Britain’s largesse was not being abused.
•	 To speed up the throughput of applications and removal of refused 
asylum seekers through reform of the determination system and 
increasing detention capacity.
In this strategy, Labour did not change the direction of policy 
set in place by its predecessor but its approach was distinct in the 
extraordinary lengths to which it was prepared to go.
As we look now at the measures adopted we find that it is not only 
policy instruments found wanting but major failures in implementation 
that have thwarted government intentions and exacerbated their impact 
on the individuals concerned. This suggests, as we saw in Chapter 1, that 
it is only through studying the operation and politics of implementation 
that we can truly gauge the capacity of the state in this field (Ellerman, 
2006: 294).
barriers to arrival
The first arm of Labour’s strategy was thus to prevent would-be asylum 
seekers reaching the UK. As a special advisor told the author:
“The Government realised that if you want to get numbers 
down you have to prevent people arriving in the first place. 
You can do what you like to try to make life more unpleasant 
for people once they got here but that was never going to 
wilful betrayal or capacity constrained?
58
reduce the overall numbers.” (Special advisor, cited in Spencer, 
2007: 343)
Labour’s first years thus saw the further extension of visa requirements, 
a significant ‘upstream’ means of preventing asylum seekers from 
reaching the UK. Their application to citizens of Zimbabwe in 2003 
contributed to halving the number of Zimbabwean applicants of the 
previous year. Requiring protection is not accepted as grounds for a 
visa, assuming the individual is even able to reach a UK visa post. As 
there is thus no legal means of travel, those determined to do so use 
the same means as irregular migrants and face the same hazards.
Carrier sanctions were meanwhile extended to rail and road 
transport, with airlines already reported to be paying significant 
fines, although some passengers without proper documentation are 
subsequently found to be entitled to refugee status (Guiraudon, 2006). 
Carrier sanctions externalise the cost and responsibility for entry 
control to private carriers untrained to make informed decisions, 
preventing those with a legitimate claim from having it heard so that 
asylum seekers are forced to use forged documents or the services of a 
‘people smuggler’. This increases the criminalisation of migration and 
the industry of false documents, the existence of which is then used 
to justify further controls. A senior official at the time carrier sanctions 
were extended argues that it is the requirement in the Refugee 
Convention that government considers every claim that forced them 
‘to do things that were against the interests of genuine refugees because 
it meant they could never reach the UK’.7
There is a concern in relation to all external controls that there is 
no monitoring of who is stopped, whether they need protection or 
what happens to them; and that NGOs and the UNHCR are regularly 
denied access to the border areas where individuals are intercepted. 
Taken together these measures have the effect of transferring 
responsibility for refugees to regions of origin less equipped to provide 
the support they need (Reynolds and Muggeridge, 2008). Government 
has responded that it works through the Department for International 
Development (DfID) to improve protection for refugees in regions of 
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origin and in alleviating the poverty and conflict that create pressures 
to migrate (Home Office, 2005: 18).
The year 2004 saw visitors from some Asian and African countries 
required to provide fingerprints, justified as a response to asylum 
applicants destroying their travel documents after arrival or claiming 
false identities and heralded as ‘the next step in the Government’s 
phased roll out of biometric technology to tackle immigration abuse’ 
(Home Office, 2004). Meanwhile, to end nightly television pictures of 
would-be asylum seekers scaling fences to board trains bound for Dover, 
closure of the Sangatte refugee camp near Calais had been negotiated 
with France in 2002. Securing an agreement to post UK immigration 
staff in France and Belgium, and the use of technology to detect those 
travelling illegally in freight vehicles, were among measures credited 
in 2005 with reducing asylum applications by 67% from their peak in 
2002 (Home Office, 2005: 12).
Protection in regions of origin
Blair unsuccessfully sought EU agreement in 2003 to take external 
controls one step further: a system of protection centres in regions 
of origin (and ‘transit’ centres nearer the external borders of the EU) 
where claims could be assessed without claimants ever reaching the 
UK. Most controversially, asylum seekers arriving in the UK would 
be transported to such centres for ‘extra-territorial processing’. It was 
unclear which state would have responsibility for the application and, 
to deter spontaneous arrivals, applicants would have to be transferred 
to camps on a huge scale (UNHCR, 2006: 38). Consideration was 
also given to the possibility of ‘EU Reception Centres’, rejected by 
a House of Lords Select Committee that saw more merit in using 
resources to accelerate the handling of asylum applications, firmly 
believing that the quality of initial decision-making is the single 
most important component of an effective asylum system (HLSC on 
European Union, 2004: 108).
The EU did initiate a limited Regional Protection Programme from 
2005, assisting transit countries such as the Ukraine and Moldova to 
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set up systems for handling asylum claims. It is also suggested that 
protection in regions of origin could genuinely offer the prospect 
of honouring humanitarian obligations while reducing the pressure 
of numbers arriving in Europe: ‘protection is exported in order to 
maintain security inside’, with the two agendas moving forward hand 
in hand but occupying different spaces (Haddad, 2008).
curtailing access to work and welfare support
The second arm of the strategy was to ensure that access to work and 
welfare support provide no incentive to choose the UK as a destination, 
or subsequently to remain following refusal of any right to stay. It was 
also intended to send a signal to the public ‘that people who have not 
established their right to be in the UK should not have access to welfare 
provision on the same basis as those whose citizenship or status here 
gives them an entitlement to benefits when in need’ (Home Office, 
1998: 18). As in many EU countries by that time, welfare support 
would be separate from mainstream provision and at a lower level. 
The corollary was that decisions should be made more quickly and 
those refused entry removed from the UK. In practice it was easier to 
set that goal than to achieve it.
A concession that asylum seekers were allowed to work after six 
months was withdrawn (until, as we saw, the EU’s 2003 Reception 
Directive meant that principal applicants could again apply to work 
after 12 months). Labour was convinced this was essential to avoid 
making the UK more attractive than its European neighbours, despite 
public hostility to asylum seekers’ inactivity and its impact on the job 
prospects of those subsequently granted refugee status (Bloch, 2002). 
A Conservative-led think tank, no doubt mindful that the UK was at 
this time seeking to attract skilled labour migrants (Chapter 3), argued 
that it is ‘not only immensely damaging to an individual’s mental health 
but is also de-skilling very motivated and qualified workers who could 
be making a contribution to the UK economy and paying their own 




The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 paved the way for dispersal 
of asylum seekers in order to relieve ‘the burden’ on local authorities 
near ports and airports and in London, where the Opposition claimed 
that there were boroughs ‘spending more on supporting asylum seekers 
than on residential and nursing placements for elderly people’ (Hague, 
2000). Labour set up the National Asylum Support System (NASS, 
within what is now the UK Border Agency (UKBA)) to arrange 
accommodation and provide support directly rather than through the 
benefit system; support that is withdrawn if the asylum seeker leaves the 
accommodation provided. Home Secretary David Blunkett proposed 
an alternative system of accommodation centres housing around 3,000 
asylum seekers in total, and removing them from local health and 
education provision (Home Office, 2002). In this he was thwarted by 
the Treasury on cost grounds, by community opposition in the areas 
chosen and opposition from refugee NGOs on many grounds.
While some refugee organisations accepted the rationale for dispersal 
there has been widespread criticism of its implementation. Highly 
centralised with little consultation or buy-in from local authorities, 
the system was from the start beset with difficulties for local agencies, 
asylum seekers and community relations. Areas were chosen in part 
because of the availability of (often substandard) housing in areas 
otherwise lacking capacity to provide jobs or specialist services. Some 
local publics were unfamiliar with ethnic diversity and asylum seekers 
were not always well received by their neighbours. Whereas the skills 
and previous work experience of asylum seekers and refugees suggests 
that they could have contributed to the regeneration of these areas, 
their exclusion from employment has exacerbated existing levels of 
deprivation and, arguably, negative attitudes towards them (Phillimore 
and Goodson, 2006; Robinson and Reeve, 2006; PAC, 2009). At the 
end of 2009, 23,845 asylum seekers were being supported in dispersed 
accommodation across the UK and a further 4,670 were receiving 
subsistence support (Home Office, 2010: Table 2.6).
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Limited welfare support
Support was initially provided by NASS through vouchers, a system 
roundly condemned and largely replaced in 2002 with cash benefits. 
That support was subsequently removed from those who did not apply 
‘as soon as reasonably practicable after arrival’ (Nationality, Immigration 
and Asylum Act 2002, s 55), once again proving a step too far for the 
courts which required support to be restored to those who would 
otherwise be destitute in breach of the ‘inhuman and degrading 
treatment’ provision of the ECHR.8 Prior to that decision, s 55 cases 
led to a quarter of all judicial review cases lodged in the High Court 
(JCHR, 2007: paras 89–92).
Refused asylum seekers facing destitution may receive ‘Section 4’ 
accommodation and subsistence support (£35.39 per week in 2010). 
Intended as a short-term measure for people who agree to leave and 
are taking steps to do so, it is also used where UKBA accepts that 
return is not a viable option. Payment was switched from vouchers 
to a pre-payment card usable in a wider range of shops after the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) had judged vouchers to be 
‘inhumane and inefficient’, for failing to provide for basic living needs, 
and discriminatory on grounds of nationality (JCHR, 2007: para 110). 
NGOs are critical of delays in assessing claims and of a high rate of 
errors. Where support is refused it can fall to local authorities to provide 
it in order to avoid breaching the ECHR, leading to disagreement in 
individual cases over who should pay.
Steps have also been taken to exclude refused asylum seekers 
from free hospital treatment, endorsed by the Court of Appeal in 
March 2009, although health providers retain discretion to provide 
care if urgent and must do so if immediately necessary (DH, 2009). 
There is evidence of asylum seekers being denied access to care in 
hospitals because staff are uncertain as to their entitlement and the 
cost implications. Rather than saving public funds, however, this may 
prove more costly if the condition deteriorates to the extent that 
emergency treatment is needed (Macdonald and Billings, 2007). This 
issue is explored further in Chapter 5.
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The Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) criticised the speed with which 
support is withdrawn following the refusal of a claim. It found evidence 
that many asylum seekers ‘go underground into a world of illegal work, 
prostitution and destitution’ rather than apply for the limited support 
available with its condition of voluntary return attached. It deemed 
this ‘utterly inhumane’ but also counterproductive in that it provides 
no time to work with individuals to overcome their concerns about 
returning home. This contrasts to Sweden’s 82% success rate in securing 
voluntary returns (UK 21%) in 2008, and the UK’s overall low return 
rate compared to its European neighbours. CSJ’s then chair, later 
Conservative Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Iain Duncan 
Smith, argued that:
UK policy is still driven by the thesis, clearly falsified, that 
we can encourage people to leave by being nasty.  The result 
is that we rely heavily on forcible return, which is both 
very costly and time-consuming, and engages only a small 
proportion of those whose claims are refused. (CSJ, 2008: 4)
The CSJ advocated intense work with refused asylum seekers to 
identify and overcome their concerns about voluntary return, 
estimating that sufficient savings would be made by increasing the rate 
of return to enable financial support to continue for 16 weeks after 
refusal at no extra cost.
Use of destitution to deter?
Government is caught between public and media perceptions that the 
system is too generous and criticism that destitution is used deliberately 
to deter future applications and encourage refused asylum seekers to 
leave the UK. A JCHR inquiry concluded that by refusing permission 
for most asylum seekers to work and operating a system of support that 
results in widespread destitution, the treatment of asylum seekers in a 
number of cases reached the ECHR Article 3 threshold of inhuman 
and degrading treatment:
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We have been persuaded by the evidence that the 
Government has indeed been practising a deliberate policy 
of destitution of this highly vulnerable group. We believe that 
the deliberate use of inhumane treatment is unacceptable. 
(JCHR, 2007: para 120)
Evidence of destitution is substantial. A survey in 2008 by UKBA-
funded service providers, for instance, found widespread and long-
term destitution among refused asylum seekers. Although destitute 
people came from more than 40 countries, most were from countries 
where there is well-documented human rights abuse, persecution 
and/or conflict. Long-term destitution (more than two years) suggested 
that individuals are prepared to endure it for long periods rather 
than leave the UK (Smart, 2009). Further studies found destitute 
asylum seekers, some with professional backgrounds, sleeping rough 
and surviving on less than £5 per week (Lewis, 2009; Taylor, 2009). 
Labour disputed the evidence and rejected the suggestion that it used 
destitution as a means to deter (Woolas, 2010).
fast throughput to refugee status or removal
In the third leg of Labour’s approach, the goal was to speed up the 
decision-making process: ‘the key to restoring effectiveness to our 
asylum system and to tackling abuse is swifter determination of 
applications and appeals’ (Home Office, 1998: para 8.7). From an 
average of 22 months to resolve a case in 1997, it intended to complete 
most cases in six months by 2001; recommitting itself in 2007 to 
resolve 60% in six months by the end of 2008 and 90% by 2011 (HM 
Government, 2007: 9; Home Office, 2009: 41). The intention was to 
achieve this by fast-tracking ‘unfounded’ applications, introducing 
rule changes to limit times allowed for preparation of claims, making 
case management more effective and cutting back rights to appeal. 
Meanwhile capacity to detain applicants pending a final decision was 
expanded and steps were taken to increase the rate of removal, including 
bilateral agreements with source countries to facilitate return.
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Curtailing the refugee determination system
By 2006, asylum was deemed ‘the most fertile and controversial area 
of public law’ (Billings, 2006: 197, emphasis in original). Legislation 
in 1999 (the Immigration and Asylum Act) and 2002 (the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act) had extended the practice of categorising 
certain claims from ‘safe countries’ as ‘unfounded’, fast-tracking their 
processing through to removal with a right of appeal only after leaving 
the UK. The list of countries considered safe included some with 
a poor human rights record. Applicants who had passed through a 
‘safe third country’ were returned there for their application to be 
processed; EU cooperation (the Dublin Regulation and Eurodac 
fingerprint database) enabling around 200 people to be returned each 
month by 2005 (Home Office, 2005). This ‘burden-sharing’ places 
additional responsibility on states which, because of their geographic 
location, experience greater migratory pressures. Those subject to 
‘Dublin transfers’, for instance to Greece, cannot always access a fair 
determination system (Thielemann, 2009).
Access to judicial review was also curtailed, opening the way to a 
throughput of cases within days for those in detention. The government 
subsequently proposed ousting judicial review of tribunal decisions on 
removal entirely on grounds of speed and cost savings for the taxpayer, 
but refrained in face of substantial opposition from the judiciary 
(Billings, 2006). Meanwhile time given for submission of evidence 
in support of claims was reduced, resulting in a rapid increase in the 
number deemed non-compliant.
A single tier of appeal, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, was 
created in 2004, coupled with shorter time periods to lodge the 
appeal and restrictions on legal aid. The rationale was to limit the 
appeals process to eight weeks and reduce perceived exploitation 
of the system by applicants using an appeal to extend their stay. The 
repeated curtailing of appeal rights and in particular its reduction to a 
single tier has led to criticism that the system falls below government’s 
own insistence that mechanisms of dispute resolution should be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the claim (Thomas, 2005). Labour 
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sought to go further in its Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill 
2009, intending once again to limit access to the higher courts for 
judicial review, but backed down in face of Conservative opposition. It 
blamed the poor quality of initial decisions for the volume of appeals 
and argued: ‘Home Office failings must not be compensated for by a 
lessening of appeal rights in those complex cases’.9
Some critics have argued that there is a conflict of interest in UKBA 
having responsibility for the determination system given its role in 
enforcement, and that case-handlers’ judgement may be affected by 
the political pressure ministers are under to reduce the number given 
refugee status. Responsibility could be transferred to an independent 
body: with Canada the oft-quoted example of an independent system 
reported to work well (JUSTICE et al, 1997; CSJ, 2008).
Until 2005, those granted refugee status were given an indefinite 
right to settle. Since 2005, however, they have received leave to 
remain for five years with a view to requiring return to their country 
of origin if then deemed safe. This followed the practice already in 
place in Australia but has been criticised as extending the period of 
insecurity for those concerned and for adding to the cost of the refugee 
determination system (Macdonald and Billings, 2007).
Case handling
That decisions on cases must be taken more quickly was something 
on which all could agree. As rates of granting refugee status fell to 13% 
in 2000 and to 4% in 2004, however (with a further group receiving a 
discretionary right to stay), criticism mounted that greater speed was 
being achieved at the expense of the quality of decision-making. The 
number of those lodging an appeal grew from less than 7,000 in 1999 
to more than 74,000 in 2001, indicating that greater throughput at 
the front end was simply resulting in greater pressure down the line. 
In the decade to 2008, success rates in appeals averaged more than 
20%: applicants thus had a greater chance of success at appeal than in 
the initial decision. The Home Office increased its acceptance rate, 
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with 20% being granted refugee status in 2008, but the success rate at 
appeal that year was still 23% (Home Office, 2009: Tables 2.1a, 5.1).
The case handling system had been replaced in 2005 with a ‘New 
Asylum Model’, a better resourced ‘end-to-end’ management system 
in which a single ‘case-owner’ handles each application from start to 
finish. It cost £176 million in 2007–08 (including £80 million on 
accommodation and welfare support), but staff were still having to 
cope with separate computer systems that did not communicate and 
continuing use of manual records (NAO, 2009). The Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) found the management of applications improved 
but that the target of concluding 80% of cases within six months was 
not yet within reach. Noting that 70% of applicants appeal against a 
refusal and more than one in five appeals continued to be upheld, it 
was surprised to find little learning from successful appeals fed back 
to case-owners handling the initial decisions (PAC, 2009: 6).
Sensitive to criticism of the quality of decision-making, the Home 
Office allows the UNHCR to monitor and advise. In relation to 
unaccompanied asylum-seeking children (UASC), where the rate of 
granting refugee status is exceptionally low (just 11% in 2009), it found 
that not all staff had the skills required to determine a child’s claim. 
It recommended that each child have an independent Guardian to 
represent their interests, advice endorsed by the Children, Schools and 
Families Select Committee which thought that this would also address 
the particular vulnerability of these children to ongoing exploitation 
by traffickers (SCCSF, 2009; UNHCR, 2009; Home Office, 2010).
A key concern has been the limited legal support for applicants, a 
House of Lords inquiry concluding that ‘undue restrictions on legal 
aid and access to qualified legal representation are likely to lead to 
unfairness and more poor decisions’ (HLSC on European Union, 
2004: 147). A ‘Solihull Pilot’ project run by UKBA and the Legal 
Services Commission demonstrated that when applicants had legal 
advice before, during and after interview the results were impressive 
in terms of the quality of decisions, speed of resolution, lower number 
of appeals and a higher removal rate, deemed to benefit all parties 
(Aspden, 2008). There is no provision for legal representation for the 
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2,000 people a year who appeal to the Asylum Support Tribunal against 
refusal of welfare support. Legal representation of applicants, who are 
disproportionately poor and lack proficiency in English, significantly 
increases chances of success, the cost of which, Citizens Advice argues, 
could be met by improvements in the initial decision-making process 
(Dunstan, 2009).
Further issues arise in relation to unaccompanied children, more 
than 3,000 of whom applied for asylum in 2009. These children are 
entitled to greater welfare support than adults, leading UKBA and 
Social Services Departments to question the age of many applicants: 
no less than 1,130 cases were ‘age disputed’ in that year (Home Office, 
2010). Immigration Rules were changed in 2007 to allow the use of 
X-rays of teeth and wrist and collar-bones, criticised as unsafe by the 
British Medical Association (Hamm et al, 2008). The procedures used 
across the UK have been judged to be inconsistent, over-reliant on 
appearance and failing to recognise that there is no scientific process 
that can provide a sufficiently accurate assessment. There is also a 
potential conflict of interest between the requirement of Social Services 
Departments to undertake age assessments and their obligation to 
provide services to children in need (Crawley, 2007).
Backlog of cases
The backlog of applications awaiting an initial decision fell from the 
peak of 125,000 in 1999 to 5,500 in 2005, in part by fast-tracking 
through to refugee status those who had already been in the UK 
for many years (Home Office, 2009: Tables 2.1a, 2.2). There was no 
question of an ‘amnesty’, government insisted, which would be ‘seen 
as a reward for those who would abuse the system’; but long delays 
were no fault of the applicant, hence those that applied before a 
certain date would be allowed to stay (Home Office, 1998: para 8.29). 
The backlog of applications does not include a legacy of 450,000 
‘unresolved case records’ which UKBA promised to clear by 2011 
(HM Government, 2007: 9). These cases cost nearly £600 million 
in 2007–08, including accommodation and welfare support (NAO, 
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2009). UKBA’s Independent Inspector reported the 2011 target to 
be unachievable as only 4,500 cases were being resolved each month. 
The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, who handles 
complaints against UKBA, found the continuing delays to be ‘serious 
and far-reaching, both for the individuals caught up in the system and 
for society as a whole’ (ICIUKBA, 2010; PHSO, 2010).
Detention capacity and removal
Dogged by criticism that it was failing to remove from the UK those 
whose claims were rejected, government expanded the capacity to 
detain people outside the prison system, opening the first purpose-built 
detention centre, Oakington, in 2000. By 2009, there were 11 such 
centres, including Yarlswood, Campsfield House and Harmondsworth, 
but UKBA will not have the 4,000 places it says are needed until 2013, 
in part because of the number of foreign prisoners awaiting deportation 
(PAC, 2009) (Chapter 5).
Detention facilitates a severely truncated determination process of 
less than a month for ‘unfounded cases’ from which the rate of awarding 
refugee status is extremely low. Government justifies detention as 
essential to remove the risk that those refused will abscond. In the 
absence of data on the number who do abscond, that rationale is 
difficult to evaluate. Detention, and the rapid throughput of cases 
it facilitates, has undoubtedly been a major factor in higher rates of 
removal (Gibney, 2008). The legality and ethics of detaining people 
for administrative convenience when it is not necessary to prevent 
absconding is questioned, particularly for long periods (O’Nions, 2008). 
NGOs are concerned that some detainees, including unaccompanied 
minors, lack adequate legal advice as lawyers can be reluctant to take 
on cases where access to clients is difficult and clients’ potential for 
collecting evidence to support their case is limited.
Labour felt particularly vulnerable to criticism that it failed to 
remove those whose claims had been rejected. Removal targets offer a 
tangible way of signalling government success in getting asylum under 
control but when missed are a clear sign of failure: between 2001 and 
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2004 they were a ‘lightening rod for criticism as target after target was 
missed’ (Gibney, 2008). Blair famously committed his government in 
2004 to reach the ‘tipping point’ – more removals each month than 
‘unfounded applications’ – by the end of the following year. Numbers 
of removals rose but then declined, missing the tipping point target 
by over 20% in 2007. The majority, moreover, were from legacy cases 
and those held in detention, not from those handled by the New 
Asylum Model (NAO, 2009; PAC, 2009). I look further at detention 
and removal in Chapter 5.
Gateway programme
An alternative to the spontaneous arrival of asylum seekers and the 
enforcement issues to which they give rise is resettlement programmes 
in which states, in cooperation with the UNHCR, take a quota of 
refugees from the region in which they initially seek protection. The 
UK, like many of its European neighbours, Australia and Canada, 
agreed a modest ‘Gateway programme’ in 2004. Relying on local 
authority willingness to take part, the programme has only seen small 
numbers relative to asylum applications, rising from 150 arrivals in 
2004 to 750 in 2010, some 2,700 in total having been given refuge in 
that period (UKBA, 2010b). Those on the scheme receive permanent 
residence on arrival and an ‘integration package’ of housing, health 
care, education and casework support. Evaluation found the refugees 
glad to be settled in the UK but that many experienced the same 
barriers to integration, including verbal and physical harassment, as 
other migrants (Evans and Murray, 2009).
conclusion
The dramatic rise in asylum applications across Europe from the early 
1990s led to unprecedented measures to prevent and deter arrivals, to 
reform refugee determination procedures and remove asylum seekers 
from mainstream welfare support. In this, the UK was no exception. 
Labour did not change the direction of policy inherited from its 
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Conservative predecessor in 1997 but differed in the lengths to which 
it was prepared to go, not least in using exclusion from the welfare 
system as a tool of immigration control. In its anxious assurances that 
it would, with each new measure, finally bring asylum under control, 
Labour exacerbated its own predicament, reinforcing the public and 
media hostility that it sought to assuage.
The strategy, as yet continued by the Coalition government, has been 
threefold: to raise the barriers to asylum seekers reaching the UK; to 
disperse applicants to designated areas while extending restrictions 
on their access to work and benefits; and to hasten the throughput of 
applications in the refugee determination system and removal of those 
refused. In each case, the reforms and their implementation have given 
rise to substantial criticism while failing to satisfy those critics whose 
primary concern was that numbers should fall.
Illustrating the pressures and constraints that shape policy 
intervention, discussed in Chapter 1, we saw the impact of the UK’s 
obligations under the UN Refugee Convention and the ECHR on 
the extent to which government could restrict access to the asylum 
determination system and to welfare support. Successive court 
judgments and their anticipation curtailed, if only to a degree, the steps 
government could take. There is an irony that asylum, an institution 
established to serve humanitarian goals, nevertheless became the catalyst 
for enhancing the coercive powers of the state (Gibney, 2008: 167). 
Yet the impact of the courts and the inability of the administration to 
administer the system with the speed and efficiency it sought, or to 
remove most of those whose applications are refused, must qualify any 
analysis of ‘executive omnipotence’ in this field (Geddes, 2000: 135).
The polarisation of the debate provided an extraordinary context 
for policymaking: intense media pressure influential in the direction 
of policy and critical of failure to go further. NGOs provided an 
alternative critique, replete with evidence and proposals for reform 
but with little influence, according to a senior official, ‘because they 
didn’t help solve the problem as the government perceived it, which 
was one of numbers’.10 That these critics were joined by Conservative 
voices arguing for a more humane system with greater respect for due 
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process, may say more about the lengths to which Labour went to 
‘bring asylum under control’ than any indication that the Coalition 
government now in power will be willing to dismantle it.
Condemned for failing to control asylum, Labour understandably 
claimed success for its policies as applications fell after 2002. In broad 
terms, however, numbers rose because of the rise in refugee-producing 
conflicts and fell because those conflicts were, at least for the time being, 
contained. Policy has an impact on numbers but the relationship and 
the time-lag is not easy to establish (Zetter et al, 2003).
UK asylum policy stands out for an unusual degree of cooperation 
at EU level. Also notable is the extent to which implementation has 
been subcontracted to the private sector: transport providers enlisted, 
through threat of carrier sanctions, to filter out those without valid 
travel documentation and private firms contracted to run detention 
centres. The treatment of Unaccompanied Asylum-seeking Children 
and of children in detention has highlighted the gap between standards 
required by mainstream law and policy and those in the asylum system. 
Meanwhile, the 450,000 unresolved ‘legacy’ cases demonstrate both 
the immense administrative challenge that UKBA is still struggling to 
overcome and the excessive periods of insecurity applicants have to 
endure. Resisting any ‘amnesty’ while in practice allowing many to 
stay regardless of the strength of their claim helpfully illustrates that, 
in the regularisation debate (Chapter 5), there are shades of grey to 
be explored.
Some 24,500 people applied for asylum in 2009, low relative to 
labour migration, families and students and a dramatic fall from the 
numbers that dominated political debate on migration only a few 
years ago. Across the EU, the UK was second only to France in the 
number of applications but 13th if measured per capita. Of the decisions 
taken in that year, less than one in five were granted refugee status, a 
further 10% were granted a discretionary right to stay and 72% were 
refused. Just under 11,000 left voluntarily or were removed in 2009 
(Home Office, 2010: 3). Despite the fall in applications, the challenge 
of running a fair and effective asylum system thus remains.
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There is no shortage of suggestions for reform. Short of an 
independent determination system, higher levels of training for case-
owners, access to independent legal advice and representation from 
an early stage, abolition of the fast-track process in detention, non-
criminalisation of asylum seekers using false documentation, use of 
alternatives to detention and the ending of forced returns to countries 
still experiencing widespread violence are among the reforms sought 
by those working with asylum seekers (see eg Asylum Aid, 2007; RMJ, 
2009). For women it is argued that government should ensure that 
standards of care in relation to domestic violence and maternity care 
are raised to those for other women in the UK (Singer, 2009); and 
similarly for children that they should have a Guardian to protect their 
interests and be able to stay in foster care until 18, not be expected to 
cope alone after 16 (SCCSF, 2009). There is a further case for ensuring 
that policy on asylum seekers is more closely aligned with international 
development objectives (Castles and Van Hear, 2005; Barrow Cadbury 
Trust, 2009).
As we shall see in the next chapter, the political focus shifted from 
asylum to labour migration in 2004. The remaining backlog of legacy 
cases and barriers to removal, plus the ever-present possibility that an 
escalating conflict will lead to a rise in arrivals, means the Coalition 
government may nevertheless feel little incentive to look favourably on 
such reforms. Its predecessor’s concern that a rise in numbers would 
increase public hostility has to be taken seriously but be weighed 
against the costs, including the hazards for those fleeing without 
proper documentation and the probability that some who cannot 
reach safety suffer as a result (Gibney, 2004: 130). No substantive shift 
in policy can in practice be expected without steps towards a parallel 
shift across the EU and without a sea-change in the terms of public 
and political debate. NGOs must have a key role to play in building 
public awareness and support but government also needs to address 
the culture of disbelief, acknowledge that the definition of ‘refugee’ 
excludes many in genuine need of protection and welcome refugees’ 
economic and social contribution to the UK. There is some recognition 
that political leaders bear significant responsibility for the terms in 
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which the wider debate on migration is conducted (‘how we conduct 
this debate is as important as the debate itself ’; Brown, 2010), but there 
is no cross-party consensus that political leaders could or should seek 
to change the terms of debate on asylum that so significantly constrain 
the policy options they can pursue.
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3Migration for work and study
In this chapter I focus on those who enter the UK for work or study, closely related categories because many students also work part time 
or subsequently stay on to take up employment. While the rationale 
for attracting international students has not only been economic (‘they 
promote Britain around the world, helping our trade and diplomacy’; 
Blair, 1999), in both cases the last decade saw a rapid expansion to 
capitalise on their economic contribution only to be followed by 
cutbacks in face of recession, public resistance and the susceptibility 
of these entry channels to abuse. Yet demand from employers in some 
sectors, and from education providers for students, remains strong. In 
its commitment to cut net migration, the Coalition government faces 
a trade-off between the political gains from delivering a sharp drop in 
numbers and the economic price that employers, education providers 
and some of its own ministers are saying the country will have to pay.
It is of course not only those migrants who come through work 
and study entry channels who take up employment. It can be equally 
important for refugees and for those who come to join family (leaving 
aside those in other categories who are not allowed to work, but do). 
Together, the foreign-born comprise just over 13% of people working 
in the UK (in the third quarter of 2010; see ONS, 2010b). In this 
chapter we primarily focus on policy relating directly to work or 
study; but when we consider the labour market conditions that create 
demand for migrant workers, and in some cases their exploitation, the 
analysis can be equally relevant to those who were permitted to enter 
the UK for other reasons.
I look first at the evolution of the UK’s labour migration system, 
showing how selective skill and labour shortages in the late 1990s led 
to a marked shift in approach to a policy of ‘managed migration’ to 
maximise its economic benefits, and to allow immediate access to the 
83
labour market for European citizens from the enlarged EU in 2004. I 
note the factors that subsequently led to the introduction of a ‘Points-
Based System’ (PBS) for non-European workers from 2008, designed 
in a period of boom but implemented in recession, and look at the 
policy options for refining that system, for addressing ‘demand’ for 
migrant labour and for protecting migrants from exploitation.
In the second part of the chapter I go back to 1999 when Labour set 
out to capture a greater share of the English-speaking student market, 
and note the success of that campaign in raising student numbers 
and the associated economic benefits. I then follow the extension of 
policy objectives to include the retention of graduates to help fill skill 
shortages. We see that students were brought within the PBS in 2009, 
but rules for colleges and students were tightened before the ink was 
dry in order to reduce the number of students coming to the UK.
labour migration: ad hoc expansion pre-1997
A modern history of policy towards labour migration would start 
with Commonwealth immigration in the 1950s–60s (see Chapter 1) 
and the restrictive policies that accompanied the economic crises that 
characterised much of the 1970s–80s, where periods of economic 
growth did not translate into labour shortages of the kind that had 
encouraged immigration in those earlier decades. By the early 1990s, 
however, it was apparent that employers’ demand for skilled workers 
to enter on work permits, issued only where no suitable labour in the 
UK (or EEA) was available, had risen. Only 20,000 permits were issued 
in 1987 but this had risen to 30,000 five years later1 (Salt, 2001) and 
debate had begun on whether the restructuring of the labour market 
towards higher skills, coupled with an ageing population, meant the 
UK needed to be more open to labour migrants if it was to remain 
internationally competitive:
In the long run new skills can and should be produced as a 
result of adaptations to the education and training systems 
of the country, but in the short run and in the medium term 
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it is possible, and indeed probable, that skill shortages may 
occur in certain professional and managerial positions which 
could be filled to the benefit of the economy by qualified 
immigrants. (Findlay, 1994: 177)
In the world of politics that was at the time a heretical view, 
notwithstanding a de facto policy of allowing skilled labour migration 
to grow, but termed ‘mobility’ not immigration. The Conservative 
government quietly streamlined the work permit system to provide 
quicker access to overseas workers in face of demands from employers 
to cut red tape, including from multinationals seeking intra-company 
transfers of staff already employed abroad (Spencer, 1994a: 312). At that 
time, only employers could initiate entry for a labour migrant, while 
86% of work permit-holders also subsequently left the UK: a very 
different system to the migrant-targeting, points-based systems then 
in operation in countries like Canada and Australia, seeking to attract 
skills to their economy for the long term. Moreover, unlike countries 
such as Germany equipped with an evidence base on the economic 
impacts of migration, there was a dearth of evidence on which a UK 
labour migration strategy, as opposed to a reactive, employer-led policy, 
could then have been based (Findlay, 1994; Spencer, 1994b).
Despite the upward trend in work permits, labour mobility was 
not contentious. Hence the migration issue on which Labour was 
fundamentally to change the parameters of policy and debate earned 
no mention in its 1997 manifesto. Business complaints that the system 
remained cumbersome and expensive led initially only to steps by the 
then Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) to make 
more rapid decisions on applications and to reduce the skill threshold 
for posts eligible for a permit. It saw the number of permits, swelled by 
recruitment of IT and health professionals, rise to more than 85,000 
in 2000.
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demand for migrant workers
Responding to an employer’s application for a work permit, officials 
had limited means to check whether there was indeed a shortage of 
the skills needed in that occupation. Nor was there an appetite to 
second-guess employers deemed the best judge of their business or 
service needs. There was little focus then on the dilemma that exercises 
policymakers now: that migrant labour may be optimal for an employer 
but incur economic and social costs elsewhere.
Anderson and Ruhs argue that there are two underlying factors 
that must be understood if we are to unravel the nature of ‘demand’. 
First, the demand and supply of migrant workers do not operate 
independently but are mutually conditioning: ‘Employer demand for 
labour is malleable, aligning itself with supply: “what employers want” 
can be critically influenced by “what employers think they can get”’. 
At the same time, supply can in turn adapt to demand. Second, demand 
is shaped by ‘system effects’ beyond the control of individual employers 
but heavily influenced by the state: including levels of investment in 
skills training, enforcement of employment standards like the statutory 
minimum wage and welfare policies. These are key to understanding 
demand for migrant labour in times of economic growth and crisis, 
and yet are rarely part of the migration policy debate (Anderson and 
Ruhs, 2010: 16).
Demand for migrants shifts with changes in the structure of 
the labour market, including the expansion of low-wage service 
occupations. It is also shaped by employer preferences: for (or against) 
certain nationalities, for cultural capital or ‘soft skills’ valued in service 
delivery, for instance, and for workers willing to accept low pay. In low-
skill sectors such as agriculture, construction and hospitality, unfilled 
vacancies do not necessarily reflect a shortage of people looking for 
work in the localities where vacancies are located but an unwillingness 
to consider work at the pay and conditions on which it is offered. 
Migrant workers, in contrast, may be more open to accepting poor 
employment conditions. In their eagerness for work they may exhibit 
a strong ‘work ethic’ and offer greater ‘willingness’ to work anti-social 
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hours, particularly if (as often the case) they are agency workers with 
fewer rights than those directly employed, subject to immigration 
controls that restrict their job mobility, or have irregular migration 
status (see Chapter 5) (Anderson et al, 2006; TUC Commission on 
Vulnerable Employment, 2008; Anderson, 2010).
Employers can make jobs more attractive or accessible to those 
within the domestic labour force: they can invest in skills training, raise 
wages, improve conditions, provide access to childcare and flexible 
working hours; or they can change the production process to make 
it less labour-intensive in order to avoid reliance on migrant workers. 
Conversely, the nature of the work, the precarious profitability of a 
business or the funding source of a service (not least in the face of 
public expenditure cuts) may provide less scope for employers to 
make those choices, for instance in the social care sector (Cangiano 
et al, 2009; Moriarty, 2010). The government can also rebalance the 
equation by investing in training (as in the significant shift towards 
self-sufficiency of doctors in the past decade), by facilitating mobility 
of labour within the UK and helping job seekers reliant on benefits 
to make the transition into employment.
Whether steps will be taken to address demand for migrant workers 
and future vacancies will be filled from within the resident population 
lies at the heart of the current debate on the efficacy of a tight cap 
on entry of non-EEA workers. In the early years of the Labour 
government, however, the focus was less on the causes of demand for 
migrant workers and how it might be ameliorated than on the means 
to ensure that the demand was met.
shift to ‘managed migration’ to maximise 
economic gains
What had begun in the 1990s as cutting red tape in response to 
business pressure for flexibility on work permits was cast in a new 
light, in 2000, by an Immigration Minister keen to strike a markedly 
different tone on labour migrants from that currently dominating the 
headlines on asylum:
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We are in competition for the brightest and the best talents, 
the entrepreneurs, the scientists, the high technology 
specialists who make the global economy tick … the 
evidence shows that economically driven migration can 
bring substantial overall benefits both for growth and the 
economy. (Roche, 2000)
The notion that Britain might want to encourage migrants required 
some adjustment in the Home Office. It also needed an evidence base: 
a Cabinet Office study scoured the limited available data and concluded 
that migration could bring significant economic and social benefits, 
but more evidence was needed (Glover et al, 2001). The Home Office 
initiated its own research programme and, as we saw in Chapter 1, for 
the first time encouraged academics to engage (Home Office, 2001b).
The arrival of David Blunkett as Home Secretary in 2001, bringing 
responsibility for work permits with him from the DfEE, made it 
possible, in theory, to develop a more coherent, joined-up approach on 
entry and settlement policy. It also, however, brought labour migration 
to a department that itself had no capacity to address the conditions 
that shaped demand for those workers. Convinced, with the Treasury, 
that without substantial legal entry routes to work in the UK ‘our 
economy would be closed down’ and that the lack of legal channels 
for migrants to access job vacancies was an incentive to work illegally, 
Blunkett opened up new routes for skilled workers and a capped, 
low-skilled, ‘Sector Based Scheme’ for temporary work in hospitality 
and food processing to ‘undercut the people smugglers’ (Home Office, 
2002; Spencer, 2007).
Significantly, reform of labour migration did not require primary 
legislation, enabling rules to be relaxed under the radar of media 
interest and with tacit Opposition support. A Highly Skilled Migrant 
Programme (HSMP) now enabled skilled migrants to enter without 
a job offer (annual entry rising to 28,000 in 2007; see Salt, 2009), but 
the employer-led work permit system remained the core of the system. 
Figure 3.1 shows the rapid rise in applications approved in the heart 
of the period Labour was in power.
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Employers had to demonstrate that the job was on a skill shortage list or 
that the post had been advertised but they had been unable to appoint, 
and that they would pay the going rate for the job. Efficiency of delivery 
of permits was prioritised in an agency, Work Permits UK (part of what 
is now the UK Border Agency (UKBA)), reputedly completing 90% 
of applications in 24 hours by 2003. Meanwhile, restrictions limiting 
the employment of working holidaymakers were lifted as were those 
on international students (see later). In a rare divergence in this non-
devolved area of policy, the Scottish Executive secured agreement 
from the Home Office to establish a ‘Fresh Talent’ scheme allowing 
international students graduating in Scotland to remain to work for two 
years. This was successful in attracting additional students to study and 
work in Scotland, the population of which was in decline (Cavanagh et 
al, 2008; Kyambi, 2009). Research indicated that migrant workers were 
a net benefit to the UK economy, bringing significant gains for firms 
and public services otherwise unable to get staff. ‘Our public services’, 
the Prime Minister stated,  ‘would be close to collapse without their 
contribution’ (Blair, 2004; see also Kempton, 2002).





















figure 3.1: Work permit applications approved 1998–2008*
Note: * Includes extensions and changes of employment.
Source: Salt (2009), table 5.1
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impact on source countries
The rationale for labour migration was, in part, to fill a skills gap until 
the domestic workforce could be trained to do the jobs. The NHS 
Five Year Plan was explicit, for instance, in anticipating that many of 
the 9,500 additional doctors and towards 20,000 nurses would have to 
come from abroad until an expansion in training places would make 
that unnecessary (DH, 2000: para 5.22). This heightened concern, 
however, that recruitment of health professionals was denuding 
developing countries of staff for whose training they had paid and 
whose skills they needed in order to provide care for their own 
population.
As recruitment of migrant health professionals rose in the 1990s, the 
UK had faced criticism for ‘poaching’ staff from countries experiencing 
their own skill shortages (Bach, 2003: 21). The response was a modest 
shift in NHS recruitment policy. Guidelines in 1999 on recruitment 
from South Africa and the Caribbean were developed into a Code 
of Practice for the Active Recruitment of Healthcare Professionals in 
2001, globally the first code of its kind. Limited to active recruitment by 
the NHS and lacking effective monitoring, it was strengthened in 2004 
but remained voluntary for recruiters in the private sector (DH, 2004).
The relationship between labour migration and development is, 
however, more nuanced than one of brain drain: source countries can 
benefit from remittances that generate jobs and from the return of 
trained staff who bring skills and fresh ideas (UNDP, 2009). Whether 
labour migration enhances or impedes development reflects differing 
circumstances, and development policies that operate in tandem can 
help to shift that equation (SC International Development, 2004; 
Malmberg et al, 2006: ch 15; Chappell and Glennie, 2009).
new workers from the european union
It was in the heady days of economic growth during Labour’s second 
term that the decision was taken to allow workers from the newly 
expanded EU to work in the UK from 1 May 2004 (forgoing the 
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right to curtail that freedom until 2011). As we saw in Chapter 1, 
free movement of European citizens had long been a condition of 
membership of the EU but had earlier led only to limited numbers 
coming to work in the UK. Estimating that arrivals from new member 
states would again not be high, the government foresaw them helping 
to address shortages in low-skilled sectors and limiting any future need 
for the Sector Based Schemes.
Notwithstanding the decision of most other EU countries to delay 
access to their labour markets, the plan initially aroused little political 
interest. Only as 1 May approached did media anticipation that these 
new EU citizens might live on benefits rather than work lead to a 
hastily constructed Workers Registration Scheme (WRS) to monitor 
the employment of those from the largest eight of the 10 accession 
states (hence ‘A8’), coupled with a bar on access to benefits or social 
housing in their first year.2 While that exclusion led to significant 
hardship for a minority unable to find work (eg see Homeless Link, 
2009) it did not stem arrivals, some 205,000 registering in 2005 and 
228,000 the following year, considerably more than the number of non-
Europeans who came on work permits but largely heading for low-
skilled occupations. The majority came from Poland (UKBA, 2009b).
A8 workers found work in sectors experiencing labour shortages such 
as construction, agriculture and food processing, with an employment 
rate of 81.8% (in the first quarter of 2009) compared to 74.1% for the 
UK-born (MAC, 2009a: table 3.5). Government research suggested 
that their impact on the economy was positive (Gilpin et al, 2006). The 
numbers arriving and their impact at the community level, for which 
no preparation had been made (see Chapter 6), contributed, however, 
to a heightened political focus on labour migration, for which in 2004 
there had been a further cause: the exposure of fraudulent applications 
for entry to work from Bulgaria and Romania (then outside the EU). 
Leading to the resignation of an immigration minister, the issue served 
to expose the complexity of a labour migration system that, coupled 
with weak enforcement mechanisms, left it vulnerable to abuse.
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points-based system
A ‘top-to-bottom’ review led to a new five-year plan three months 
before the 2005 general election which promised to streamline more 
than 80 separate channels for entry to work into a five-tier Points-
Based System (PBS). With more than 600,000 vacancies in the labour 
market and unemployment at ‘historically low levels’, ministers were 
in no doubt that more labour migrants from beyond the EU would 
be needed to sustain economic growth:
Skilled migrants bring new skills, ideas and attitudes to 
the UK, and help meet skill and labour shortages, easing 
inflationary pressures and increasing productivity. They 
make an important contribution to our broader government 
objectives to increase innovation, to respond to the challenges 
of global economic change, to shift towards a high-skill 
economy and to deliver high-quality public services. (Home 
Office, 2005: 13)
Over the next two years, while the PBS was in the planning phase, the 
reaction to A8 migration nevertheless ensured that no similar freedom 
to work was accorded to the Bulgarians and Romanians who joined the 
EU in 2007, granted only limited access to work in food processing or 
agriculture (Home Office, 2006b). Meanwhile the automatic right of 
those on the HSMP to apply to extend their stay after four years was 
withdrawn in 2006 when it was found that many were not working in 
high-skilled jobs. The courts, in a rare intervention in this dimension 
of migration policy, deemed the retrospective application of the rule-
change unlawful and ruled that the terms of the original scheme must 
be honoured (Travis, 2008).
The core rationale for the PBS was to attract and manage the entry 
of highly skilled workers from beyond Europe: to be more efficient, 
transparent, objective and easier to enforce and thus increase public 
confidence that the system was not being abused (Home Office, 
2006a). In establishing the scheme, the UK was not constrained by 
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international or EU law in the way that we have seen in relation to 
asylum and family categories, although it did need to comply with the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which restricted its 
capacity to limit intra-company transfers (see MAC, 2009a:  para 2.54).
Replacing previous labour migration and student entry routes from 
outside the EEA3 with five entry channels, the PBS arguably ‘simply 
“scoops” the existing schemes into five new boxes’ (Somerville, 2007: 
187). What this system does offer, however, is the capacity to fine-
tune entry criteria to reflect changing circumstances or evidence 
on outcomes: simply by changing the number of points awarded for 
different migrant characteristics and the conditions that employers 
must fulfil.
Five tiers of the PBS
The labour migration part of the PBS has been dominated by two 
entry channels:
•	 Tier 1 is for the highly skilled, replacing the HSMP and Scotland’s 
‘Fresh Talent’ scheme. This is a supply-side entry channel in which 
non-EEA migrants (with dependants) can enter to look for work 
if they receive sufficient points: awarded for qualifications, prior 
earnings, prior experience in the UK, age, English language skills 
and funds to meet maintenance requirements. A post-study route 
allowed graduates to remain to take up employment and a channel 
was retained for investors.
•	 Tier 2, in contrast, is for skilled workers with a job offer from 
an employer licensed by UKBA to ‘sponsor’ applicants: where 
advertising has identified no suitable EEA worker, the occupation 
is on a shortage occupation list or the worker is on an intra-
company transfer. This demand-led route replaced the work permit 
system. ‘Skilled’ has been flexibly interpreted to include not only 
professionals but also butchers, sheep-shearers and care assistants 
where the government has been convinced the jobs will not be 
filled from within the EEA.
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In the first six months of operation, 60% of  Tier 2 permits (‘certificates 
of sponsorship’) were for intra-company transfers, 32% for jobs unfilled 
after advertising (dominated by health, social work and education) and 
8% for those on the shortage list (MAC, 2009a). Migrants get points for 
a job offer but must also demonstrate sufficient competency in English 
to qualify. When the scheme was set up, an accompanying spouse or 
civil partner was allowed to come, and to work.
Tier 3, for low-skilled workers to enter on a temporary basis, was 
suspended from the outset in the hope that it would never be needed. 
Other temporary categories such as people in sports and the creative 
arts were grouped into Tier 5. A Youth Mobility Scheme, replacing 
the Working Holiday Scheme, now required sponsorship by the young 
person’s own government and reciprocal arrangements for UK citizens 
in that country. The remaining Tier 4 is for students.
The PBS is predicated on the value of selecting skilled migrants and 
admitting the low skilled only where unavoidable, on the grounds that 
it is those with high skills who complement (rather than displace) the 
existing workforce, that their fiscal benefits are likely to be greater 
(contributing more to the public purse and relying less on services 
or benefits) and that they are more likely to contribute to long-term 
growth (MAC, 2009a: para 8.4). It has been argued that, for this reason, 
governments may choose to provide a more generous package of 
entitlements to those whose skills are in greater demand than to those 
they are less keen to attract (a ‘numbers versus rights trade-off ’; see 
Ruhs, 2010). This was indeed the case when the PBS was established, 
the most skilled (in Tier 1) having greatest freedom of choice in the 
labour market for instance and only skilled workers allowed to be 
accompanied by their families.
Workers who enter under the PBS are not generally entitled 
to support from public funds but through National Insurance 
contributions become eligible for contributory benefits. Workers 
in Tiers 1 and 2 could (with some exceptions) become eligible for 
permanent residence and citizenship, a link some argued should be 
severed in order to limit population growth (Balanced Migration, 
2010), while those in the other three tiers cannot. A Tier 2 worker who 
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wants to change employer must reapply and the employer must first 
advertise the post unless it is on the shortage occupation list. Like the 
restriction on access to benefits, this makes it difficult for the worker 
to leave an abusive employer: their immigration status, right to work 
and livelihood are at risk if they resign (Ryan, 2007).
distinct uK model
In designing the UK model, the government had many examples 
from which to draw inspiration, but no clear indication that reliance 
on particular criteria or a balance between employer-led (Tier 2) and 
migrant-led (Tier 1) entry channels would prove of greatest economic 
benefit. Nor are lessons from abroad necessarily transferable. Countries 
that operate variations on points-based systems have differed in the 
extent to which they have taken into account attributes such as 
language ability; previous work experience or qualifications obtained 
in the country; ‘ability to settle’ (New Zealand); adaptability (as in 
Denmark, assessed by past experience of education or work in an 
EEA country); health and police records; and in whether points are 
given for an existing job offer. Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 
anticipating that those who enter will remain in the long term, also 
give points for having close relatives in the country: a crossover to the 
family migration channel absent in the UK model (MAC, 2009b). 
Comparative research has found success in attracting migrants is also 
significantly affected by the way in which schemes are administered 
and enforced (Cerna, 2008).
Within employer-led schemes (as in Tier 2) there are variations in 
the process of matching migrants to jobs. While the UK opted for both 
a shortage list and resident labour market test, Australia uses only the 
former and Norway the latter. Some countries require employers to 
obtain a certificate confirming that the requirements of the test have 
been met, as in Ireland, whereas UK employers have to attest that 
they have advertised with Jobcentre Plus. Systems vary in whether the 
permit is issued to the migrant or, as in the UK and US, tied to the job. 
Some countries have minimum pay thresholds (Sweden, Germany), 
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others allow trade unions to contest the need for recruitment from 
abroad (Denmark, Iceland). Requirements vary for where jobs must 
be advertised, for how long and whether local applicants must be 
interviewed: some requiring employers to explain why they cannot 
hire local candidates, or precluding any redundancies of local workers. 
Differing requirements can ‘leave a substantial margin for discretion 
and subjective opinion’ and impose significant burdens on employers 
(MAC, 2009a: para 5.41). Conditions under which intra-company 
transfers are allowed also vary, with states seeking to allow companies 
reasonable access to their own staff while avoiding misuse of this 
entry channel.
There is considerable scope for debate on which approach is most 
likely to be optimal in matching supply to demand, relative to the 
burden placed on employers to demonstrate that vacancies cannot be 
filled from the existing workforce. Migration Watch found the PBS 
fundamentally flawed in allowing migrants to take up employment 
without the job always having to be advertised. Insisting that Tier 1 
should be suspended, along with the shortage occupation list route, 
it also argued that graduates and the dependants of labour migrants 
should have to apply for a work permit and that intra-company transfers 
should be allowed only if the employee had worked for the company 
for two years, not six months (Migration Watch, 2008). The British 
Chambers of Commerce in contrast argued that requiring businesses 
to advertise jobs for four weeks at Jobcentre Plus is onerous (BCC, 
2009), demonstrating the infinite scope for debate on fine-tuning the 
schemes depending on levels of confidence that the resident labour 
market will be able to deliver the workers required.
The Liberal Democrats in opposition proposed a regional PBS ‘to 
ensure that migrants can work only where they are needed’ (Liberal 
Democrat Party, 2010). A UK sufficiency of labour may indeed mask 
significant regional differences as has been recognised in allowing 
variations in the shortage occupation list in Scotland. The Scottish 
Government believes that population growth is an economic necessity, 
reflecting analysis of the GDP growth differential (in 2007) between 
Scotland and the UK as a whole which found nearly half of the gap 
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to be due to the UK population growing at a higher rate (Cavanagh 
et al, 2008). The Equality and Human Rights Commission in Scotland 
fears that Scotland ‘will be a retirement home’ unless measures are 
taken to attract and retain new migrants so that the country remains 
competitive (Adams, 2009). The differing objectives of the UK and 
Scottish governments in this respect have raised the question whether 
Scotland needs more direct control over migration or whether its 
differing needs could receive greater recognition within the existing 
system, notwithstanding a need to ensure that it did not simply become 
a gateway to the rest of the UK (Kyambi, 2009).
differing views on economic impacts
As government brought the PBS into operation in 2008 it remained 
confident that labour migration was good for the economy, a 
view shared by the Confederation of British Industry (migrants 
‘undoubtedly brought economic benefit to the UK’; CBI, 2008) and 
the Trades Union Congress (migrants make ‘a substantial contribution 
to Britain’s economy and some sectors would collapse if they were 
removed overnight’; TUC, 2007). The evidence had indeed suggested 
that migration had a positive impact on economic growth without 
displacing UK workers (Coats, 2008); an overall, small positive effect 
on wages (but potentially negative for the low paid) (Dustmann et al, 
2007); that migrants make a stronger contribution to the public purse 
than non-migrants (Sriskandarajah et al, 2005) and had not increased 
unemployment (Wadsworth, 2007; Lemos and Portes, 2008). Migrants 
had made ‘a significant contribution’ to the growth of Northern 
Ireland’s economy, one third of employers saying that migrants had 
helped their organisation to survive. Their presence may nevertheless 
have discouraged employers from training other staff and potentially 
slowed a transformation from low-skilled occupations to a higher-value 
economy (Oxford Economics, 2009).
An inquiry by the House of Lords Economics Committee came, 
however, to a more sombre conclusion. The claim that migrants had a 
positive impact on GDP was, it argued, ‘irrelevant’, the apposite measure 
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being impact on income per capita, which it found to be limited. It 
was dismissive of the ‘small’ fiscal benefits and of the argument that 
migrants are needed to pay for the pensions of an ageing population, 
arguing that raising the retirement age is the only viable approach to 
that challenge. While many firms and services made use of migrants, this 
did not mean that they were indispensable and migrants’ contribution 
must be weighed against broader impacts including demand for housing 
and the implications for cultural diversity and cohesion. The fact that 
employing migrants was in the interests of particular employers and 
of migrants themselves did not mean that it was in the interests of the 
economy per se, nor indeed of low-paid workers whose wages were 
depressed (HLSC Economic Affairs, 2008). The government, however, 
was not deterred, sending a 37-page rebuttal and implementing the 
PBS which, it argued, would ensure, as the Committee sought, that 
only those labour migrants with the skills and talents to make a positive 
contribution were admitted (Home Office, 2008b).
Migration advisory committee
In order to be confident that the PBS reflected shifting demand for 
migrant labour, and sensitive to criticism that its assessment of the 
economic benefits was inflated, Labour sought access to expert advice 
on fine-tuning the system and political cover for the hard choices that 
this would entail. The Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), five 
senior academics with a remit to advise on sectors and occupations 
that can ‘sensibly’ be filled by migration, has advised to a level of detail 
and on the basis of a more authoritative evidence base than had ever 
been available before. Moreover, in taking evidence from employers, 
trades unions and others with a keen interest in extending or shrinking 
channels of entry, it has served to deflect some of the pressure on 
government and provide subsequent decisions with greater legitimacy.
As the economy moved from growth to recession in the second 
quarter of 2008, leading to a rise in unemployment and a fall in 
job vacancies, the question for government was whether significant 
adjustments were needed in the PBS model. The number of non-EEA 
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migrants entering on work permits had fallen in 2008, having peaked 
in 2006 (see Figure 3.1), and National Insurance data also showed 
a 32% fall in migrants from the EEA (MAC, 2009a: para 3.28). The 
government nevertheless raised the qualifications threshold for migrants 
to qualify for Tier 1, extended advertising requirements for jobs in Tier 
2 and triggered a skills review of occupations on the shortage list with 
a view to upskilling existing workers to reduce future dependency on 
migrant labour (Home Office, 2009b).
Research suggested, however, that the downturn in demand would 
be temporary (Somerville and Sumption, 2009). The underlying drivers 
of migration would remain and, as we saw in Chapter 1, migration is not 
governed only by economic considerations. The MAC advised that the 
fall in demand for labour through Tier 2 was likely to be short-lived. As 
this entry channel is employer demand-driven, it could be expected to 
respond naturally to the UK’s changing economic circumstances; thus 
any refinements such as extending the duration of advertising should 
apply regardless of the economic cycle (MAC, 2009a: para 4.45). Later 
in 2009 it similarly advised on Tier 1, examining the pros and cons of 
10 potential refinements from closure of this entry channel entirely 
(advising strongly against) through to changes in qualifications, prior 
earnings or maintenance capacity. Significantly for our consideration 
of policy on international students, the MAC had reservations about 
the extent to which students should be able to stay after their course, 
‘one of the most generous schemes of its type in the world’ (MAC, 
2009b: 8) – but hesitated to recommend that it be curtailed:
This would risk making UK higher education somewhat 
less attractive to students from abroad. Any reduced financial 
contribution from overseas students may mean that our 
universities and colleges cannot afford to train as many British 
students as they do at present: the flow of new British human 
capital could be eroded’ (MAC, 2009b: 2).
The Coalition government, as we shall see, did not agree.
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annual cap on non-eea labour migrants
The Conservatives’ 2010 manifesto commitment to reduce net 
migration from 196,000 in 2009 to ‘tens of thousands’ included a 
specific commitment to cap labour migration from outside the EEA, 
thus excluding migrants who ‘do jobs that could be carried out by 
British citizens’ (Conservative Party, 2010a, 2010b). The Coalition 
government took immediate steps to implement an interim cap on 
Tiers 1 and 2 and to consult on the level and form of a long-term 
measure from April 2011. The interim cap was modest, demonstrating 
some hesitancy in saying no to employers before assessing the scale 
of opposition to a substantial cut at a time when the economy and 
employment rates might be expected to be growing once again 
(UKBA, 2010a, 2010c).
The interim cap nevertheless had an impact. Local authorities 
unable to recruit social workers were among those anticipating a 
damaging impact on services, and the Mayor of London was critical 
of the effect on the competitiveness of the capital city (Reid, 2010). 
The Immigration Minister insisted it was unfair to blame the cap for 
recruitment difficulties as ‘the ability of employers to fill vacancies is 
affected by a wide range of factors including their own training policies, 
pay and conditions and corporate reputation’ (Green, 2010a). UKBA’s 
Impact Assessment on the interim cap nevertheless concluded that, as 
fewer migrant workers would be available:
there may be negative impacts in the short term on businesses 
and the labour market, particularly in sectors where there are 
higher volumes of migrant workers. Over the longer term 
we expect businesses to adapt to the changes by adjusting 
production. (UKBA, 2010b)
The key question, of course, is whether that expectation – not only 
for business but for public services at a time of severe expenditure 
cuts – is justified.
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Critics anticipated that a cap would put the objectives of limiting 
migrant numbers and population growth above that of economic 
performance; the British Chambers of Commerce, for instance, insisting 
that shortages remain even in recession, that just under a quarter of all 
UK businesses employ migrant workers and that they must continue 
to be able to recruit the people they need (BCC, 2009). The challenge 
for government was that a cap set high enough to enable the economy 
to flourish post-recession would not satisfy those who wanted to see 
a significant fall in migrant numbers. Government could, alternatively, 
end the right of skilled workers to bring their families but this would 
affect capacity to compete for their talents. A cap that reduced net 
migration to the level of the 1990s could have a profound effect on 
firms, public services and even football teams dependent on people 
from abroad. Moreover, if job vacancies remained unfilled, the outcome 
could be to increase irregular migration – people entering lawfully 
but staying on to work without permission. The government could 
impose tighter restrictions on settling in the UK, but skilled migrants 
might then choose to offer their skills to a country like Canada that 
did provide the option of citizenship. A rigid cap could prove a political 
own goal if acute skill shortages meant pressure to exceed the cap 
proved irresistible. No Home Secretary would want to raise the cap, 
regardless of changing economic and demographic circumstances 
(Mulley, 2010).
Post-election splits in the cabinet illustrated the competing objectives 
at stake, the Business Secretary and the Universities Minister concerned 
that significant restrictions on entry could exclude skilled workers 
and students which the UK needs. The Prime Minister also found 
himself obliged to assure India that it would be consulted, its concern 
reportedly threatening agreement on terms for UK investment in 
Indian financial services and defence: illustrating the implications 
of curtailing migration for foreign and trade relations that we saw 
in relation to Commonwealth immigration four decades earlier 
(see Chapter 1) (Asthana, 2010; Watt, 2010). These exchanges have 
demonstrated publicly, in a way that has been too rare in migration 
policy, that each option to curb migration can have costs attached.
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The government nevertheless proceeded to implement a cap from 
April 2011, limiting Tier 2 to 20,700 places (2011/12) and Tier 1 to 
entrepreneurs and no more than 1,000 ‘persons of exceptional talent’ 
(Labour’s original intention for its precursor, the HSMP), a study having 
established that many in Tier 1 were working in low-skilled jobs such 
as supermarket cashiers (UKBA, 2010d). By contrast, in the year to 
September 2010, 32, 065 people had been given visas to come through 
Tier 1 and 68,675 through Tier 2 (ONS, 2010a). Intra-company transfers 
were also curtailed, notwithstanding concern from foreign-owned firms 
such as car manufacturers that restrictions would prevent transfer of staff 
to support the launch of new products (Webb, 2010). ‘We need employers 
to look first’, the Home Secretary said, ‘to people who are out of work 
and who are already in this country’ (May, 2010).
Hitting a cautionary note, the MAC had advised that Tiers 1 and 
2 accounted for only half of the non-EEA migrants who came for 
work in 2009, and that those who came for work were in turn only 
one in five of all non-EEA migrants. Even closure of Tiers 1 and 2 
entirely would thus be unlikely to achieve the low net migration the 
government sought. It would need to cut not only student numbers but 
also family migration if it wanted to achieve that goal (MAC, 2010b: 
1). Meanwhile, the Home Affairs Committee also concluded that the 
cap would make little difference to net migration but could do serious 
damage to the economy. It was concerned at the impact of any steps 
that might therefore be taken to cut entry through alternative routes 
(SC Home Affairs, 2010).
protection within the labour market
Before turning to international students, we need to consider one 
further aspect of policy towards labour migrants which is central to 
any analysis of demand: protection of their rights in the workplace. 
There has long been evidence that some employers pay below the 
going rate (including below the minimum wage), require excessive 
working hours, treat migrants less favourably than other workers and 
house them in unacceptable living conditions (eg Anderson and Rogaly, 
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2005). This is not only bad for the migrants concerned but means 
that they are undercutting the domestic labour market. Moreover, it 
creates a demand for irregular migrants working without permission 
(see Chapter 5).
The drowning of 23 Chinese cockle-pickers in Morecombe Bay 
in February 2004, for whose manslaughter their gangmaster was later 
convicted (GLA, 2009), provided the political momentum to set up 
the Gangmasters’ Licensing Authority (GLA) to regulate the operation 
of labour providers in agriculture and food processing (but not to 
overcome resistance to its extension to other sectors). By summer 
2009, the GLA estimated there were some 300 providers still operating 
unlawfully outside its licensing system (BIS, 2009: para 12). Such moves 
to address exploitation have been closely related, however, to efforts to 
tackle illegal working (CLG, 2008). Coupled with the low visibility of 
employment enforcement agencies, this suggested that government’s 
first priority was not to protect vulnerable workers.
Migrants were nevertheless one focus of a cross-government strategy 
launched in 2007 to enforce workplace standards and of a Vulnerable 
Workers Enforcement Forum that reported in 2008. There was now 
recognition of a need to promote awareness of employment rights 
and access to enforcement bodies: for better agency coordination; 
collaboration with business, unions and advice agencies aware of the 
issues on the ground; and for higher-profile, targeted enforcement 
(BERR, 2008). There was a 50% increase in the budget for enforcing 
the minimum wage from 2007/08 and a doubling of the number of 
Employment Agency Inspectors (Home Office, 2008b: paras 3.6, 4.23). 
Public expenditure cuts and the Coalition government’s ambition to 
curtail state regulatory activity may now cast doubt, however, on the 
future impact of this programme.
An inquiry by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2008–
10) found that existing safeguards had not prevented the widespread 
mistreatment and exploitation of workers in the meat and poultry 
processing sector where one third of staff are migrants, including 
physical and verbal abuse, lack of proper health and safety protection, 
and the treatment of pregnant workers found to be a particular concern. 
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Workers had little knowledge of their rights and feared complaints 
would lead to dismissal. There were frequent breaches of the law and 
of licensing standards. Firms that treated their staff well benefited from 
retention of well-motivated and increasingly skilled workers. It was 
not in immigration law that the Commission saw solutions, but action 
by supermarkets to improve their auditing of suppliers and resourcing 
of the GLA to extend its reach (EHRC, 2010). The earlier House of 
Lords inquiry on the economic impact of migration had seen stricter 
enforcement of employment regulations as the key means to ensure 
that employers did not give preference to cheap migrant labour over 
the resident labour force (HLSC Economic Affairs, 2008).
Migration for study
Although opportunities to study bring significantly more people to live 
in Britain than any other entry channel, policy towards international 
students only recently became the focus of political and media 
attention. Nor was government policy a major factor in the early 
growth of student numbers. In the past decade, however, recruitment 
has, like that of labour migrants, been actively promoted because of 
benefits to the UK. Within government, it has at times been marked 
by the involvement of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
and in the direct engagement of the Prime Minister: not, as for asylum, 
in face of a crisis but here spearheading a global recruitment drive. 
Blair launched a successful campaign to secure 25% of the English-
speaking university student market in 1999 before the philosophy of 
‘managed migration’ had even been articulated. Only later did concern 
that access channels for study were being abused put students on the 
political agenda and, coupled with the recession, lead to restrictions 
which have implications not only for education but for sectors of the 
labour market in which students work.
In the 1960s–80s many international students were supported by 
government scholarships or technical assistance schemes, policy towards 
non-EU students primarily motivated at this stage by international 
development and relations objectives. International student numbers 
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rose in the 1970s but a sharp rise in tuition fees for non-EEA students 
to full cost in 1980 led to a fall in those coming to the UK. This 
prompted the British Council to market the benefits of UK education 
across the globe during the following decade and the FCO to launch 
its Chevening Scholarship Scheme: competition had begun. The Times 
Higher Education Supplement urged universities to have the confidence 
to make a powerful case for international students to government: 
arguing that they foster an internationalist outlook among British 
students, make it viable to teach rare subjects, introduce different and 
challenging intellectual traditions, test the quality of higher education 
against world standards and contribute to research (cited in UKCISA, 
2008a: 19).
As in relation to labour migration, scholars have explored the nature 
of the demand driving student mobility. Social demand theorists 
have emphasised the power of social and cultural capital in parental 
motivations to get places for their children in universities that will 
enhance their career prospects. Other scholars have focused on the 
supply-side financial interests of education providers and of states keen 
to expand human and cultural capital in their knowledge economies. 
Together, both are ‘powerful players in structuring the patterns of 
student flows’ (Findlay, 2010: 5). As with labour migration there are 
winners and losers: between those education institutions that are 
successful in attracting international students and the wealth that they 
bring and those that are not; and for the source countries to which 
the students may or may not return with the knowledge and skills 
they have acquired.
European students
In contrast to the competition characterising the market for non-
European students, within Europe the arrangement is intended to 
be one of mutuality. Students from EU countries (extended, as usual, 
to EEA nationals) are able to take up places to study in any member 
state and pay the same fees as domestic students. The EU’s Erasmus 
Programme to promote mobility, established in 1987, had an annual 
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budget of more than €440 million by 2009, with 90% of universities 
in the EU taking part and hosting in excess of 180,000 students a year 
(European Commission, 2009). For the UK, expansion of the EU 
in 2004 meant students from 10 additional countries now benefited 
from lower fees, Cyprus and Poland rising into the top 10 source 
countries for EU students in higher education by 2008/09 (HESA, 
2010). The increase in East European students has benefited the post-
1992 universities in particular (Thorp, 2008: 66). It is calculated that 
the economy also benefits substantially from EU higher education 
students during and after their education: an estimated £866 million 
in fees and living expenditure per annum with a further £100 million 
fiscal gain (2004/05) from those remaining to work after graduation 
(Vickers and Bekhradnia, 2007).
campaign to increase the uK’s market share
During the 1990s, non-EEA student numbers rose significantly (Home 
Office, 2001a) but competition intensified, not least from the USA. UK 
marketing was largely organised by education providers with British 
Council support. Blair’s initiative, launched in June 1999, was overt 
in its intention to make it ‘easier to apply, easier to enter’ in order to 
boost university student numbers by 50,000 and further education 
numbers by 25,000 by 2005. Removing a requirement on students to 
get permission to work enabled students to support themselves while 
studying, a step that made the UK ‘a far more attractive destination’ 
(UKCISA, 2008a: 25). ‘UK Education’ was now marketed with a new 
brand and streamlined visa procedures. ‘More open doors’ to students, 
Blair argued, would increase income for universities and to the public 
purse and enable UK students to ‘gain a window on the world’, while 
helping trade and diplomacy (Blair, 1999). Significantly, there was no 
intention at this stage that students should remain in the UK to work 
after studying: they were refused entry if they indicated that this was 
their aspiration.
Higher education students would nevertheless be in the UK for 
a number of years and those on shorter courses for months. So it is 
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striking that this initiative was launched without a glance towards 
the simultaneous development of policy on another group of arrivals 
who were in some cases from the same countries, asylum seekers, 
who by 1999 were already the focus of intense political and media 
debate. In that year, 71,000 people sought asylum compared to the 
entry of 272,000 non-EEA students (Home Office, 2009a: Table 1.3). 
For the government, these were entirely distinct categories of entry, 
one contributing to the exchequer and the other supported by it. 
As a government special advisor was later to acknowledge, however 
(Spencer, 2007: 349), and research was to confirm (Lewis, 2005), these 
distinctions were less apparent to the public.
The campaign, meanwhile, was a success, the British Council 
reporting in 2004 that the UK had achieved a 25% share of the 
English-speaking university student market. The top source countries 
were China, Greece, the USA, Germany and France. Women made 
up 48% of the students (British Council, 2004). Overseas students as a 
whole now made up over 13% of students in higher education; non-
EU university student numbers having grown by 72% in the five years 
to 2004 compared to a 19% increase in domestic students. University 
fee income from non-EU students rose from £672 million to £1,275 
million over that five-year period: international fees for undergraduates 
even then ranged from £7,600 to more than £22,000 per annum 
(2004/05). There was also a significant rise in the number of British 
people studying abroad, the UK being just one player in the broader 
globalisation of education (Findlay, 2006; Universities UK, 2010).
Need to maintain momentum
Global demand for international student places was expected almost 
to treble by 2020 but so was competition, including from European 
universities providing courses in English. The UK student ‘industry’ 
depended on too few countries and there was a perception among 
potential students that the quality of education and value of UK 
qualifications did not always compare well to the offer elsewhere. 
Analysts suggested that the UK might also compete less favourably in 
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future because of improvements in education in source countries such 
as China and Malaysia, the expansion of English as the language of 
instruction in countries with lower living costs and greater access to 
employment than in the UK, and because of harmonisation of higher 
education standards across the EU (British Council, 2004; Cemmell 
and Bekhradnia, 2008).
There was a need to diversify markets, support education providers 
in expanding their offer and retain contact with alumni to extend 
the UK’s influence. Phase two of the Prime Minister’s Initiative for 
International Education was thus launched in 2006: a £35 million 
investment to attract a further 70,000 students to higher education and 
30,000 to further education by 2011, with the intention of doubling 
the number of countries sending more than 10,000 students a year. A 
new focus on improving the quality of students’ experiences reflected 
awareness that, in an expanding international marketplace, students 
could choose to go elsewhere. Funding from the initiative made it 
possible to produce the information, guidance and orientation material 
that has been lacking for other new arrivals (see Chapter 6) (UKCISA, 
2008a: 30). Once again it is striking that, in launching the initiative, 
there was no read-across to parallel developments in migration policy, 
by now focused on the impacts of migration at the local level. Despite 
being the largest group of recent migrants in the UK, students were 
not a focus of that debate (see Chapter 6).
By 2008/09, 10.5% of all students in higher education (251,310) 
were from non-EU countries. One third came from China and India, 
followed by Nigeria, the USA and Malaysia. A further 4.9% came from 
within the EU, so that in total 15% of the UK’s university students 
(including 34% of postgraduates) were now from overseas. The off-
campus expenditure of overseas students was estimated to be some 
£2.3 billion (2007/08), generating 27,600 jobs and contributing 
£1.51 billion to the UK’s GDP. The contribution of non-EU university 
students is particularly significant because it includes their higher fees, 
contributing £3.42 billion to the UK balance of trade in that year 
(Kelly et al, 2009; HESA, 2010). A further 76,785 international students 
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were studying in further education (FE) in 2007/08, a little over half 
from within the EU (British Council, 2009).
points-based system tier 4 
Meanwhile student policy had taken an interesting turn in Scotland 
where, as we saw, the Scottish Executive wanted international graduates 
to fill skill shortages and, in 2005, persuaded the Home Office to allow 
students to remain after completion of their studies as part of its ‘Fresh 
Talent’ initiative (Scottish Executive, 2005). A shortage of people with 
science and engineering skills led to a more limited UK-wide scheme 
to allow graduates to remain for 12 months, extended to all graduates 
in 2007. Significantly, universities now used future access to jobs as 
a selling feature (Findlay, 2010). The rationale for government policy 
had evolved from its benefit to the education sector ‘to being a rich 
source of global talent’ for the UK, contributing to the amassing of 
human capital for its knowledge-based economy (Findlay, 2006: 24).
Less apparent has been the contribution made by those working 
part time during their studies. Work not only makes it possible for 
many students to study but helps to fill low-skill vacancies, as in the 
care sector (Cangiano et al, 2009). A third of international FE students, 
for instance, were working part time in 2006, with non-EU students 
on average working 16 hours a week (UKCOSA, 2006). Taken 
together with work after graduation, student policy was thus now 
inextricably linked with the labour market. The government, however, 
had become concerned that access for study was being used by those 
whose primary intention was access to the labour market, facilitated by 
‘bogus colleges’. It moved in 2004 to allow only accredited colleges 
to receive international students, a step the national advisory body for 
international students, UKCOSA (UK Council for Overseas Student 
Affairs), had long recommended for students’ own protection.
It was only with the advent of the Points-Based System (PBS) that 
the education and labour dimensions of student policy were formally 
brought together. In making provision for students within the PBS, 
the government stressed the contribution that international students 
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make to the economy – £2.5 billion per annum in tuition fees and an 
estimated £8.5 billion in total (2003/04) – as well as the cultural value 
of their ‘ideas, attitudes and experiences’. Moreover, as students rise 
to positions of influence in their own countries, they may look to the 
UK for technology, trade and investment (Lenton, 2007; UKBA, 2008).
The rationale for inclusion in the PBS was that the system needed to 
be ‘simpler and more robust’, with greater objectivity and transparency 
on entry decisions and a stronger role for education providers in 
‘vouching for the students they want us to allow into the UK’ (Home 
Office, 2006a: 31). Tier 4 applicants apply for a Student Visa (or Student 
Visitor Visa for short courses), for which the fee was raised to £199 in 
2010. As with labour migrants, students must pass a points threshold 
to be accepted (points being awarded for acceptance on a course at a 
sufficiently advanced level by an approved education provider) and have 
funds to cover the course fees and living costs. Those on Student Visas 
were allowed to work part time during term time for up to 20 hours per 
week and full time during the vacation, and to bring their dependants 
if they could provide for them without any recourse to public funds. 























figure 3.2: Non-EEA students* given leave to enter 2000–2009
Note: *Data includes student visitors (short courses) but excludes dependants, 
rounded to the nearest thousand
Source: Home Office Control of Immigraton Statistics (2009, Table 1.4)
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accompanying children could attend state schools. At the end of a 
course of a year or longer, the student could, as we have seen, apply 
for a Post Study Work Visa (part of Tier 1, PBS) enabling them to stay 
and work for two years. Student Visitors must leave at the end of their 
short course and may not work during their stay.
Some education providers are heavily dependent on international 
student income: 50% of students at the London School of Economics 
(LSE), for instance, were from beyond the EU in 2009, their tuition 
fees amounting to one third of its income, with a further 20% of its 
students from EU countries. Non-EU students contribute nearly 8% 
of all university income (2007/08) and sustain departments which 
would otherwise struggle to remain financially viable. Courses such 
as engineering and computer science can be particularly reliant on 
their contribution. A major snarl-up in the administration of student 
visas or drop in student numbers for other reasons would thus leave 
forensic holes in some disciplines (Home Affairs Select Committee, 
2009a: para 24; Universities UK, 2009; Kelly et al, 2009).
Critics have challenged the reduction of education to an export 
market in which students may be valued more for their economic 
than their academic or cultural contribution (De Vita and Case, 
2003; Coate, 2009). A requirement that tutors monitor and report to 
UKBA on students’ attendance, moreover, threatens to damage the 
relationship of trust between them. There has been some criticism that 
the PBS system in practice is expensive for users, causes late arrivals 
through long delays in processing visas and is unpredictable in its 
refusal of visas (Hartwich, 2010). Migration Watch, from an alternative 
perspective, argues that the scheme reduced scrutiny of applications by 
immigration officers, giving too great a say to institutions that have a 
strong financial interest in attracting students and too little expertise to 
detect fraudulent applications: ‘Student visas have long been a serious 
loophole in immigration control; the PBS makes a bad situation 
considerably worse’ (Migration Watch, 2009). Yet there are very high 
rates of refusal of student visas, some 32% in 2008/09. Low refusal rates 
from the Americas, moreover, mask the 61% of refusals from African 
countries and from countries such as Pakistan (71%) (UKBA, 2009a).
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Rules tightened
Within a year of the roll-out of Tier 4, Labour’s Prime Minister 
announced a review, focusing on courses below degree level deemed 
most at risk of abuse by colleges and students. Inspection of further 
and higher education providers had already led to a severe cutback 
in the number of approved sponsors (Brown, 2009). In January 2010, 
all applications from India, Nepal and Bangladesh were temporarily 
suspended pending an investigation of suspected fraudulent applications, 
bringing criticism from the Indian government and concern from UK 
universities about the impact on genuine applicants for the coming 
academic year. By February, the Home Office had announced it would 
allow only ‘highly trusted sponsor’ institutions to sponsor students for 
many courses below degree level. It cut the amount of time a student 
at that level was able to work in term time to 10 hours per week and 
removed the right of their dependants to work, on penalty of removal 
from the UK (see Chapter 5). The stated rationale was to weed out 
those whose primary aim was not to study but to gain access to work 
for themselves and their spouse (Home Office, 2010a). It is known, 
however, that students unable to find a job can have financial difficulties 
as a result (UKCOSA, 2006). In practice, student working hours are 
extremely difficult to enforce.
Language testing became compulsory for many of those planning to 
study below degree level, but English language providers successfully 
challenged, on procedural grounds, a ban on students with little 
English coming to take a language course. The High Court agreed 
that the change should have been laid before Parliament. English UK, 
representing 440 schools and colleges, argued that the ruling had saved 
more than 3,000 jobs in language schools and more than £600 million 
a year in overseas income (Gabbatt, 2010). The Home Office had sought 
to go further and ban entry of all non-EEA students below degree level 
but pulled back in face of protests from private education providers 
and from universities that feared the loss of thousands of students each 
year who do A-levels or foundation courses before staying on to do 
degrees (Farthing, 2009; Morgan, 2010).
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The year 2009 nevertheless saw the number of non-EEA students 
admitted up by 25% on 2008,4 suggesting that fears (or government 
hopes) that the pre-2010 changes would cut student numbers were 
unfounded (Home Office, 2010b). The UK’s share of the global 
market for all international students has nevertheless fallen in recent 
years, while that of competitors such as Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada has grown (Cemmell and Bekhradnia, 2008). There is some 
limited evidence to suggest a level of dissatisfaction with the offer in 
the UK: many students finding the new application process for visas 
and extensions to be slow, complex and expensive and 10% having to 
apply more than once before being successful (UKCISA, 2009, 2010). 
Of non-EU students at universities in England in 2006/07, 30% were 
dissatisfied with the value for money of their course (Bekhradnia, 
2009). Students have also expressed some dissatisfaction with their 
broader experiences, including lack of social contact with UK students 
(UKCOSA, 2006). If students are to continue to want to choose to 
come to the UK, it has been suggested that government should ensure 
that immigration and employment regulations ‘demonstrate the fairness 
and efficiency for which the UK would want to be known abroad’ 
and that support services (such as pre-departure advice, orientation 
programmes and assistance with accommodation) should be resourced 
to keep pace with numbers (UKCOSA, 2006; UKCISA, 2008b).
Prior to being elected, the Conservatives argued that the student 
visa system was ‘the biggest weakness in our border controls’ and 
suggested they would require some students to pay a bond of up to 
£2,000, repayable after they had left the UK (Conservative Party, 2010b; 
Wintour, 2010). Post-election it was clear that student numbers would 
need to be severely cut back if the Coalition government’s low net 
migration target was to be met. This immediately raised the concern 
not only of education providers but of the Education Secretary and 
Universities Minister, reportedly arguing within government that severe 
cuts could both hit the competitiveness of the UK education sector 
and the UK’s reputation among international students (Travis, 2010). 
At the very time that universities believe they face a funding ‘valley of 
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death’ (Smith, 2010), their financial lifeline from international students 
may, to achieve a quite different political objective, be curtailed.
Towards half of students entering through Tier 4 are, however, en 
route to courses below degree level and it is those providers who 
are likely to be hardest hit, albeit access for Student Visitors to short 
courses will remain. It is likely that university students will no longer 
be allowed to work at all (except on campus) during the week, that 
dependants will only be able to accompany those on longer courses 
and will themselves have no access to work. The post-study Tier 1 
route into employment will close and students will be expected to 
leave when they complete their course – bringing policy back full 
circle to the early days of the Labour government a decade ago: ‘This 
government wants high-calibre students with a genuine desire to 
study to come to our country for temporary periods’, the Coalition 
Immigration Minister said, ‘and then return home’ (Green, 2010b; see 
also UKBA, 2010e).
conclusion
Tasked with advising on the level at which a cap on non-EEA 
migration should be set, the MAC articulated the question that now 
lies at the heart of labour and student migration policy: how should 
it ‘trade off, prioritise, and balance the economic, public service and 
social impacts of migration’ and how should it measure and assess those 
impacts? (MAC, 2010a: 15). The answer is not straightforward. An 
essential contribution to an employer, service user or even the public 
education system may not equate to benefit for the population as a 
whole. Nor is the evidence base available in many respects on which 
to make that judgement call.
In this chapter we have looked at the two categories of migrants 
actively sought by the UK in the past decade because of economic and 
broader benefits, before the recession, perceptions of abuse and public 
resistance reversed that trend. In contrast to policy on asylum and family 
migrants, the pressure on government to resist tighter regulation has 
been largely economic: articulated by employers in sectors facing skill 
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and labour shortages and by education providers anxious to retain and 
expand income from international students.
On labour migration, a laissez-faire policy of expansion in the 
1990s was transformed into an overt intention to make the UK 
competitive in the global market for talent: first easing restrictions, 
then streamlining entry channels into a Points-Based System open 
to fine-tuning when demand for labour fell. Channels of entry for 
low-skilled workers, opened up to reduce the incentive to work 
illegally, could conveniently be cut back when free movement for A8 
workers provided an unexpectedly plentiful supply. Having chosen 
not to restrict their entry in 2004, and despite evidence of a positive 
economic contribution, the government now found its inability to 
limit their numbers to be its Achilles heel as labour migration took the 
place of asylum in the heated politics of immigration control. Labour 
migration policymaking has been distinct in the impact of membership 
of the EU; in requiring little primary legislation (thus enabling rules on 
non-EEA workers to be relaxed without parliamentary debate); in the 
limited constraints imposed by international agreements or the courts; 
and, since 2007, in having the MAC to provide a more authoritative 
evidence base and a forum in which the voices of sectoral interests 
could be heard at one remove from government itself.
Lack of consensus on the economic benefits of migration were 
apparent before the recession hit in 2008, but the downturn strengthened 
the voices of sceptics and those questioning the broader impact of 
migration on public services, local communities and population growth. 
For skill and labour shortages, there is little disagreement that the goal 
should be to upskill the existing workforce and to encourage employers 
to pursue alternatives to low-skilled migrants from abroad. Given the 
complex relationship between employer demand and supply, however, 
it cannot be assumed that cutting off the supply of migrants will see 
jobs filled by UK or EEA workers.
Even if the door to non-EEA labour migrants were firmly shut, 
family migrants and refugees would remain in the labour market and 
vulnerable to exploitation unless employment regulations – quite 
separately from immigration control – are more effectively enforced. 
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Where employers’ preference is for workers willing to accept pay and 
conditions below the going rate, we saw that the answer is thus to be 
found less in immigration controls than in employment policy: in the 
enforcement of the minimum wage, health and safety rules and broader 
labour market regulations. Reducing the UK’s reliance on migrant 
labour will primarily require changes to the structural and systemic 
factors that create that demand, not simply changes to migration policy. 
We explore this further in Chapter 5.
In relation to students we saw that a policy initially driven by a desire 
to maximise the UK’s share of the global student market, sprinkled 
with internationalism, took on the additional objective of meeting 
UK skill shortages: students once told they could not enter if they 
intended to stay, later encouraged to deploy their skills as graduates in 
the labour market. Evidence of some abuse by ‘bogus’ colleges and by 
students more intent on work than study latterly led to a clampdown 
on ‘rogue’ colleges and, in the economic downturn, to more limited 
access for students to the labour market.
Policy development, during its expansive phase, was distinct in the 
leadership of the Prime Minister and, as for labour migration, in the 
limited role of the courts. Despite the significance of student numbers, 
the lack of read-across to simultaneous policy development on asylum 
or on the local impact of migrants stands out as a striking example of 
Whitehall policy silos. The fact that most students eventually leave does 
not detract from their significance while in the country. The fact that 
they have not been a focus of the local impact debate (Chapter 6) may 
suggest that the information and support role played by colleges is a 
success from which lessons could be applied more broadly. Alternatively, 
the public and service providers may not be identifying this group 
of migrants separately from labour migrants or asylum seekers when 
they express their views.
The value of international students to the education sector, unlike 
the impact of labour migrants, is largely accepted. Their engagement in 
employment, during and after their studies, has been more contentious. 
Here the government is caught in a bind as many students need to work 
in order to support themselves while studying, and if they cannot work 
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may choose to study in a country where they can. Low-skilled sectors 
of the labour market are affected, moreover, when work restrictions 
on students are imposed. The line between entry for study and for 
work is not an easy one to regulate. It is, moreover, difficult to enforce.
Student numbers have, to date, continued to rise, but the UK has 
lost ground in the global market and analysts predict competition will 
become more intense. As the recession has put a premium on jobs for 
UK residents, the balance for government has tipped in favour of tighter 
controls, higher visa fees and a fall in student numbers. For education 
providers facing cutbacks in public expenditure, however, and perhaps 
for a Foreign Office seeking to retain the UK’s global influence, the 
need to continue to attract international students has never been more 
important. In labour migration and student policy it is apparent that 
each policy option carries costs. Policy choice depends on priorities 
and, knowing the costs, deciding where they should fall.
Notes
1 Includes first permissions and the Training and Work Experience 
Scheme but not extensions or changes in employment.
2 These measures remained throughout the seven-year transition period 
permitted by the EU, closing on 30 April 2011.
3 As we have seen in other chapters, policy relating to EU citizens 
extended to those in the larger European Economic Area (EEA): that 
is, to include Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein.
4 Including Student Visitors.
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4family migration
Family members often come to the UK as a consequence of earlier migrations or by accompanying today’s labour migrants, students 
and asylum seekers. Hence we explore family migration here after 
chapters on those topics. We should not forget, however, that family 
members also migrate to join British citizens in the UK, so policy in 
this area can directly affect those who themselves have no migration 
background.
In family migration we revisit some themes that have emerged in 
other chapters including the multiple challenges governments face 
in trying to regulate entry and the indirect and sometimes covert 
methods used in attempts to do so. Picking up on the early history in 
Chapter 1, we see a consistent pattern of reactive initiatives to address 
‘abuse’ rather than a coherent strategy with clear objectives, and the 
close relationship that has developed between controls on entry and 
internal controls on access to services and benefits. It is here too that 
we find perhaps the clearest race and gender dimensions, in policies 
and practices impacting disproportionately on Black and Asian family 
members and the divided families and genuine hardship that can be 
the consequence of their operation. As in relation to asylum policy, 
we see policy repeatedly challenged by the courts under European 
human rights law.
We look first at what is meant by family migration and at the 
changing relationships recognised in migration policy over time. In the 
UK, as across Europe, some people have the right to be accompanied 
or joined by family members while others do not. We see that the 
definition of family members and the conditions that have to be met 
in order for them to enter the UK have progressively tightened (in 
most respects) as successive governments have sought to restrict those 
entitled to come and to stay. Finally, we look at the complex pattern of 
129
rights and restrictions attached to family members’ conditions of entry 
and their access (or not) to employment, social housing, services and 
welfare benefits: conditions that might be thought highly significant to 
integration processes but are rarely considered in that light (Chapter 6).
three modes of family migration
Kofman has helpfully categorised family migration into three forms:
•	 family reunification: where an individual is already in the country and 
is subsequently joined by their partner, children and, more rarely, 
parents or extended family;
•	 family formation or marriage migration: where an individual has chosen 
a partner from abroad; and
•	 whole family migrates together: as when a skilled labour migrant is 
allowed to be accompanied by ‘dependants’, or a refugee family arrive 
together on a resettlement programme (Kofman, 2004).
The number of non-European (EEA) people coming to the UK 
for family reunion and formation is low relative to those coming to 
work or study: a total of 36,500 people in 2009 compared to 161,000 
labour migrants (which, however, includes 32,700 dependants) and 
270,100 students1 (including 21,000 dependants) (Home Office, 2010e: 
Table 1.3). Policy towards family migrants today is thus significant for 
those coming to study and to work, not only for UK residents hoping 
to be joined by existing or new family members.
For those interested in the long-term implications of family 
migration, however, there is a key distinction to be made between 
permission to enter temporarily and permission to settle. While the 
number of family members who enter is low relative to workers and 
students, family members are significant among those given the right 
to settle in the long term. In 2009, 72,000 non-EEA people were 
granted the right to settle on the basis of family formation or reunion 
but that rises to 120,000 if we include the dependants of people who 
first came to work or (in a minority of cases) as refugees (Home 
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Office, 2010e: Table 4.4). It is in part because of this expansion of 
those arriving and settling as dependants of labour migrants (who 
would once have returned home once the work permit had expired), 
and until recently of asylum-related dependants, that it is not only 
the numbers of family members settling in the UK that have risen 
(Figure 1.2) but their diversity in terms of countries of origin, gender 
and skills (Kofman, 2004).
capacity to restrict entry
Family migrants have historically been a significant component of 
long-term migration in Europe and an entry channel that has remained 
at least partially open when governments have sought to close other 
doors. In periods of recession, family migration has at times exceeded 
labour migration, so that migration numbers in total are less sensitive 
to an economic downturn than might otherwise be expected (OECD, 
2009: 47–8). This has been of somewhat less concern to traditional 
countries of immigration and to Southern European countries which 
have seen family members as making a positive contribution to social 
integration; the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
2001, for instance, cites among its objectives ‘to see that family are 
reunited in Canada’ (Canadian Government, 2001: s 3(d)). Northern 
European states, in contrast, have tended to view family migration as 
an unfortunate consequence of the ‘primary’ immigration of those 
allowed to enter for other reasons and in some respects as an obstacle 
to integration and open to abuse. As a result, their governments have 
made successive attempts to restrict entry, in which the UK is no 
exception (IOM, 2008).
We saw in Chapter 1 that international human rights obligations, 
and more broadly the accepted ethics within a liberal democracy, are 
among the constraints on government’s capacity to control migration 
flows. Here, the wide acceptance that people should be able to choose 
their marriage partner and that children should be able to live with 
their parents, values enshrined in international law, do indeed impose 
some limits on the steps that government can take. Those expecting to 
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find government significantly held back by Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in its protection of the right 
to respect for private and family life may, however, be disappointed. 
If a family member is refused entry, that right is largely deemed to be 
breached only if there are no insurmountable obstacles to the family 
living together abroad, even if that involves some hardship (Jackson 
et al, 2008: 162).
In some EU states, as in the UK, the overall number of family 
members allowed to enter depends on the shifting number of applicants 
who fulfil the entry criteria. More rarely there is an annual quota, thus 
excluding even nuclear family members once the quota is met (EMN, 
2008). In the UK, a cap on family members was considered in 2005 but 
rejected because ‘a rigid quota would cause considerable hardship and 
is not acceptable’ (Home Office, 2005: 24). At the time of writing, the 
focus of the Coalition government’s cap is on non-EEA labour migrants 
but we saw in Chapter 3 that the cost of scaling back labour migrants 
and students makes it difficult to reduce net migration sufficiently if 
cuts are applied to those categories alone (Home Office, 2010c).
The UK is constrained, as in labour migration, by EU law, here in 
relation to the entry of family members of EEA nationals. An EU family 
reunification Directive also set down minimum standards in relation 
to the families of third-country nationals in 2003 (2003/86/ED). A 
number of states took the opportunity to downgrade their standards 
to the minimum allowed while imposing new conditions such as 
pre-entry language tests and mandatory integration courses (Kraler 
and Kofman, 2009). The Directive does not directly affect the UK as 
it chose to opt out, arguing that it could clash with future changes in 
policy, but UK policies were deemed in 2008 to be ‘generally consistent’ 
with its provisions (EMN, 2008; Wright and Larsen, 2008).
One significant feature of UK policymaking in this field is the huge 
discretion that the Home Office has been granted to change entry 
criteria, procedural requirements and subsequent entitlements via a 
constant evolution of Immigration Rules with scant parliamentary 
scrutiny. It has often done so on the basis of limited evidence either 
on the practice it was trying to change or subsequently on the impact 
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on the lives of those affected. It is, nevertheless, one area of migration 
policymaking in which the voices of minority ethnic communities 
have been raised and, to a limited extent, influenced policy reform.
limits on who can be joined by family members
The first lever government can use to limit family migration is to 
say that only some people in the UK, or who are planning to come 
to the UK, have the right to be accompanied or joined by family 
members. EU law, binding in this instance on the UK, determines 
the rights in this respect of EEA nationals, including those whose 
family members are not themselves European citizens. While the EU 
right to free movement was granted to facilitate mobility for work it 
was recognised that allowing families to be together was a necessary 
corollary. The only exception to this in the UK is for EU citizens from 
the accession (‘A8’ and ‘A2’) countries who initially face restrictions on 
being joined by family members who are not themselves EEA nationals. 
Those temporary exceptions are the only ways in which the UK can 
restrict entry to the family of EEA nationals; a matter that received 
little political attention until families of A8 nationals began to arrive 
and their children entered state schools after EU enlargement in 2004.
This right under EU law to be joined by family members can in some 
respects be more generous than the rights Europeans enjoy under their 
own national laws. One key difference is that parents benefiting from 
EU rights may bring in children up to the age of 21 rather than only 
up to 18 as under UK law. This anomaly means that if a UK citizen 
works in another EU country and is joined there by family members 
from abroad they can subsequently all come to the UK under EU 
rules (known as the ‘Surinder Singh route’ from the test case from 
which it arose). Otherwise they are subject to the more stringent UK 
provisions that apply to those who have never worked elsewhere in 
the EU (Wright and Larsen, 2008: 27).
The area where UK policymakers have most room for manoeuvre 
is in relation to the family members of non-European migrants 
who are living in the UK only temporarily or have not yet acquired 
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the right to settle. For those with temporary status, policy has been 
relatively generous to those whom government wants to attract to 
Britain – recognising that being allowed to bring family members can 
be significant in their choice of destination – while denying that right 
to others. Thus skilled workers have been allowed to be joined by their 
families, as have international students (except those on short courses), 
while low-skilled workers and working holidaymakers have not.
For those already living in the UK, the right to be joined by family 
members or fiancé(e)s depends on their current immigration status, 
how long they have been resident and the length of their relationship 
with the individual(s) concerned. UK citizens and those who are 
‘settled and present’ in the UK have the right to be joined by eligible 
family members where they intend to make the UK their permanent 
home. Refugees may also be joined by their family immediately, 
whereas others must wait until they acquire settled status. These highly 
complex requirements are set out in Chapter 8 of the Immigration 
Rules (UKBA, 2010a).
redefining who counts as family
The second means by which governments can change patterns of 
family migration is by restricting (or extending) who counts as a family 
member. As a result, the definition does not necessarily coincide with 
the family’s own perception of those relationships, nor match domestic 
policy. Across Europe, states have increasingly restricted access largely 
to the nuclear family with little or no flexibility in relation to other 
family members.
When the UK government first set out to regulate who might enter 
as a family member in the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 (see 
Chapter 1), it cannot have foreseen how many times it would return 
to that definition, first to narrow it down to the core nuclear family, 
and later to include cohabiting and same-sex partners. In the 1960s, 
the door was thus quickly closed to nephews and cousins, for instance, 
and the rules changed again in 1968 to limit eligibility to be joined 
by children, a move that led to a sharp drop in the number arriving 
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from Pakistan. Rule changes were similarly all that was needed in 1980 
to restrict access for elderly parents who now had to show they had 
no relatives in their own country to support them, that they lived at 
a standard of living substantially below the average and were mainly 
dependent on their offspring in the UK (Spencer, 1997). As it now 
stands, the rules – in exceptional, compassionate, circumstances – do 
allow the entry of parents below the age of 65 and of more distant 
relatives such as siblings, aunts and uncles. Nevertheless, of all those 
granted settlement in 2009, less than 1% were elderly parents and 
grandparents (Home Office, 2010e).
For those not fortunate enough to benefit from EU law, the entry 
of unmarried children under the age of 18 is allowed, but only if both 
parents are in the UK or the UK-based parent has ‘sole responsibility’ 
for the child. The latter is one of many instances where the small print 
of the rules can create numerous hurdles for applicants to overcome. 
The exclusion of adopted children from a country whose adoption 
procedure is not recognised by the UK is a further example, however 
well intended. In the case of polygamous marriages, however, although 
only one spouse is permitted, the children of another spouse will not 
always be barred. Notwithstanding that occasional flexibility, the limited 
conceptualisation of a Eurocentric nuclear family on which the rules 
are based has been criticised by scholars for taking little account of 
cultural differences in family relationships, and for limiting the support 
that families can receive from grandparents, and the care that can be 
provided to them at a distance (Kofman, 2004).
In relation to spouses, the UK has acknowledged some need to 
modernise the rules by allowing entry for a long-term cohabiting 
partner since 1985; a concession that included same-sex couples from 
1997 following lobbying by Stonewall and others, until their rights 
were formally recognised in the Immigration Rules in 2000 and 
following the Civil Partnership Act 2004. As with heterosexual couples, 
the rules require that the couple intend to live permanently together 
and, as we shall explore later, that they have suitable accommodation 
and can support themselves without help from public funds. Those not 
in a civil partnership (or marriage) must show that their relationship 
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is of at least two years’ standing and that any previous relationship has 
irrevocably broken down (Wright and Larsen, 2008). It has been argued 
that these rules are based on a narrow perception of ideal relationships 
and are intrusive in the proof of intimacy that couples are required to 
provide (Simmons, 2008). Yet in 2008 there were still three EU states 
(Greece, Latvia and Romania) that made no provision at all for the 
entry of same-sex partners (EMN, 2008). In the following year, 725 
men and 205 women were allowed to settle in the UK on the basis 
of a civil partnership or same-sex relationship, just 1.7% of all grants 
of settlement to non-EEA partners (Home Office, 2010e: Table 4.5).
curbing entry on the basis of marriage
Particularly contentious have been a succession of measures to prevent 
not only the fraudulent use of marriage to evade immigration controls 
but entry of a spouse or fiancé(e) if one motivation for the marriage 
is deemed to be entry to the UK, even if the marriage is genuine and 
the couple fully intend to live together. Academic and legal critics 
have argued that this fails to recognise that prospective couples quite 
legitimately take many considerations into account when deciding 
whether to marry, including their financial prospects. The fact that 
immigration status may add to a potential spouse’s attractions should 
not therefore be a reason to deny entry (Charsley, 2006; Wray, 2006). 
Baroness Hale argued in a House of Lords case:
There are many perfectly genuine marriages which may bring 
some immigration advantage to one or both of the parties 
depending on where for the time being they wish to make 
their home. That does not make them ‘sham marriages’.2
A series of overt attempts were made in the 1960s and 1970s to curb 
marriage migration from the Commonwealth, including an outright 
ban on husbands and fiancés from 1969 to 1974 unless there were 
‘special features’ such as cultural differences that made it difficult for the 
woman to live in her husband’s country of origin, an argument with 
wilful betrayal or capacity constrained?
136
which white women had more success than their Asian counterparts. 
Bolstered by a Select Committee report hostile to marriage migration 
(SC Race Relations and Immigration, 1978), the Conservatives 
were elected in 1979 on a manifesto that included a promise once 
again to stop the admission of foreign husbands, while continuing to 
allow the entry of wives. Normal practice in Indian society, the new 
government argued, was for wives to move to live with their husbands; 
hence the practice of husbands coming to the UK through arranged 
marriages was an abuse of immigration control (Sachdeva, 1993: 64). 
Downing Street papers reveal that the Home Secretary promised the 
Prime Minister in 1979 that the new restrictions would be ‘a kind of 
steeplechase designed to weed out South Asians in particular’ (Travis, 
2009). The government’s intention was subsequently modified to allow 
UK-born British women to bring in their spouse, thus ensuring that 
this right became largely the preserve of white women. Successfully 
challenged as sex discrimination at the European Court of Human 
Rights in 1985,3 the government responded by making the rules for 
wives as tight as those for husbands (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 230). 
However, by then the government also had a significant new tool in 
its arsenal to restrict entry, the ‘primary purpose rule’.
Primary purpose rule
The primary purpose rule, introduced in 1980, went far beyond a 
ban on sham marriages, requiring foreign nationals to prove that 
the primary purpose of the marriage was not to obtain entry and 
settlement in the UK. Couples found themselves questioned on their 
sex lives and, in one illustrative case, were refused on the grounds that 
their letters to each other sounded insufficiently affectionate for the 
marriage to be genuine. Instructions to immigration officers in 1983 
said the applicant ‘should not be given the benefit of the doubt’. In 
that year, 47% of husbands and fiancés from the Indian subcontinent 
were refused entry, 73% on the basis of the primary purpose rule 
(Bhabha et al, 1985: 69–70).
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The courts intervened to mitigate some of the harshest effects of 
the rule but it remained the grounds for excluding many thousands 
of people over the next decade. Critics argued that this was not only 
unjust, dividing couples or forcing the UK partner to join their spouse 
abroad, but discriminatory, rarely if ever affecting white couples. Under 
pressure from ethnic minority constituents, Labour’s manifesto in 
1997 included a commitment to abolish the rule, which it honoured, 
reiterating in 2008 that it would never reintroduce a measure ‘which 
did so much to keep loved ones apart’ (UKBA, 2008: 4).
The law nevertheless retained provisions that require entry officers 
to judge, from what they are told of the couple’s relationship and such 
factors as their relative ages, whether there is a genuine intention to 
live together. Politely put, this is a process in which it is suggested that 
‘decision-makers sometimes demonstrate an uncertain grasp of the 
standard of proof ’ (Wray, 2006: 312). The unpredictability of entry 
decisions has consequences: the continuing risk that the husband of 
a British Pakistani wife may not be allowed to enter, for instance, has 
been found to be a factor in some married couples choosing to delay 
cohabitation until the husband has obtained entry, thus avoiding the 
woman having a child without a resident father and, if necessary, 
enabling the marriage to be annulled (Charsley, 2006).
Arranged and forced marriages
One of the criteria for entry to marry in the UK is that the couple 
have already met, effectively excluding those arranged marriages in 
which the couple do not meet until their wedding day. Underlying 
concerns about arranged marriages involving a partner from abroad 
are assumptions that young women in particular do not enter such 
arrangements willingly, but this is not necessarily the case. For women 
in the UK, a husband from abroad may limit otherwise onerous 
obligations to his parents (while having less congenial implications for 
some ‘unhappy husbands’; Charsley, 2005) and her level of education 
and knowledge of the UK may give her the upper hand. For some 
women abroad, emigration to the UK means a degree of liberation 
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from the constraints in which they have lived in their country of 
origin. Nevertheless, ‘choice’ and ‘voluntary’ are relative words and 
policy has also been criticised for making a clearer distinction between 
arranged and forced marriages than can always be justified in practice 
(Kofman, 2004).
Concern to prevent individuals being forced into marriage (and 
arguably to contain the growth of Islamic communities) has led some 
European states to take a series of measures including raising the age at 
which a spouse or fiancé(e) can enter: in the case of Denmark in 2003 
to 24 years, leading some young Danes wanting to marry a foreigner 
to move elsewhere in the EU (Hedetoft, 2006). In the UK, the age 
was raised to 18 then 21 in 2008, the legal age of marriage being 
16. NGO critics argued that this made it more likely that the forced 
marriage would take place abroad where victims would have no means 
of support or redress and that, in seeking to prevent abuse, the age 
limit also prevents the marriage of two willing parties (JCWI, 2008).
A joint Home Office–FCO Forced Marriage Unit was established 
to help prevent forced marriage and ensure effective services for 
victims. In 2009, the unit reported providing advice or support in 
1,682 cases, 86% relating to females (FCO, 2010). Legislation in 2007 
(the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act) provided additional 
civil law protection and remedies, following unsuccessful attempts by 
the government to make forced marriage a criminal offence. While 
these measures have attracted significant support, some argue that 
forced marriages should not attract specific offences but be tackled 
through mainstream legislation in which the focus should equally be 
on those forced marriages in which both parties are already in the 
UK (Kofman et al, 2008a). The disproportionate impact of marriage 
rules on South Asian couples, set against a history of measures to 
limit entry through marriage rules, prompted some scepticism that 
government’s ‘new-found’ concern for the plight of South Asian 
women in forced marriages ‘belies a deeper structure of racism’ and is 
in part motivated by a desire to police communities, an approach with 
colonial roots (Wilson, 2007). The Home Affairs Select Committee, 
however, concerned by evidence that visas were being approved 
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because reluctant spouses would not give evidence, argued that 
evidence should therefore be accepted from a third party and that more 
women should be interviewed before granting a visa to their fiancé; 
demonstrating the fine line between measures to protect victims and 
unacceptable intrusion into applicants’ private lives (SC Home Affairs, 
2008: paras 119–22).
Marriage within the UK
For marriages within the UK, measures in 1999 included instructions 
to marriage registrars to report any suspicions they might have that 
the intended marriage is not genuine. The UK is not alone in this 
approach, Dutch, Austrian and German marriage registrars also being 
enlisted to assist in detecting the fraudulent use of marriage to obtain 
entry (EMN, 2008: 15). A subsequent ban in 2002 on switching from 
a temporary immigration status to a right to remain through marriage 
was also introduced in part to curb sham marriages. The fact that 50% 
of those who asked to remain on the basis of marriage did so within six 
months of entry suggested to the government either that the marriage 
was ‘bogus’ or that the couple had ‘lied about their intentions to the 
entry clearance officer’ (Home Office, 2002: para 7.11). The possibility 
that the couple might have needed time together to see how their 
relationship developed before making that long-term commitment, 
making work or study in the UK an attractive option meanwhile, is 
not considered, immigration rules leaving little room for overlapping 
motivations of that kind. In practice, the ‘no switching’ rule now 
requires anyone in these circumstances to return to their country of 
origin to reapply, a step that can be costly and, in less stable parts of 
the world, involve personal risk.
Rules were again amended in 2005 to require couples, if either 
individual does not have permission to be in the UK for more than 
six months, to get a Home Office ‘certificate of approval’ to marry 
or register a civil partnership unless, anomalously, the wedding was 
to take place in an Anglican church. A certificate cost £295 by 2007 
and £590 for a couple both subject to immigration control. In the 
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first 14 months in which the rule was in operation, 1,805 applications 
were refused.
The High Court found the breadth of the rules to be unlawful 
in 2006: a disproportionate interference in the right to marry and 
discriminatory in giving preference to marriages in an Anglican church. 
This was to prove a telling example not only of the way in which the 
courts have intervened to curb rules that infringe fundamental human 
rights but also of government’s reluctance to comply when they do so. 
The Home Office amended the rules to allow couples with shorter 
leave periods to apply (in so doing requiring proof that the marriage 
was genuine, such as letters and photographs; UKBA, 2010b). It did not 
concede without a fight, however, unsuccessfully appealing the ruling 
through to the House of Lords in July 2008.4 It was then required 
to suspend the application fee to which the Law Lords had objected 
(waiting almost a year to comply). In January 2010, however, the UKBA 
website still advised those planning to marry in an Anglican church 
that no certificate of approval was required, noting that:
the policy of excluding these religious ceremonies from the 
certificate of approval scheme was declared unlawful by the 
High Court. The Government has indicated it will change 
the rules to bring such marriages within the scope of the 
scheme. The date of this change has not yet been determined. 
(UKBA, 2010b: 6)
The Coalition government took an early decision to abolish the scheme 
in 2011 to comply with the court but also, it argued, because the 
changes had weakened the scheme so that it is ‘no longer an effective 
method of preventing sham marriages’ (UKBA, 2010d). It is not yet 
clear if, and with what, it may be replaced.
Although there continues to be concern expressed by some marriage 
registrars that many thousands of sham marriages take place each year, 
evidence substantiating the level of abuse is not available and, in the 
case of the certificate of approval in 2005, was insufficient to satisfy a 
parliamentary committee that it was necessary. While 2,251 ‘suspicious 
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marriages’ had been reported by registrars in the first six months of 
2004, the committee was not satisfied that this represented a genuine 
increase on the previous year and questioned why only 37 had led to 
criminal charges. Taking other factors into account, it concluded that 
while the prevention of sham marriages was a ‘legitimate aim’, the 
government’s proposals were ‘disproportionate’ and hence incompatible 
with the right to marry protected by the ECHR – one of a number 
of occasions when the committee has found immigration rules to be 
wanting (JCHR, 2004: paras 57, 68). The conviction of a Sussex vicar 
in July 2010 for conducting more than 350 sham marriages over a 
period of four years (itself not an isolated case) indicates nevertheless 
that concern that marriage can be used inappropriately to secure 
residence in the UK and, by its procurers, for profit, is not entirely 
without foundation (Barkham and Davies, 2010; BBC, 2010a).
further conditions attached
Whether family members can in practice enter or secure the right 
to settle in the UK is dependent on fulfilling a further set of entry 
and post-entry conditions. Here again we find that the goalposts have 
moved as successive governments have sought to prevent entry for some 
categories of people and to limit their impact on public expenditure. 
Ideas for new criteria are never far from the policy agenda.
Across the EU, states require evidence that those who sponsor family 
members have sufficient income to support them and often that they 
have health care insurance. The precise terms differ: Germany waives 
the income requirement for skilled migrants, for instance, and the 
Netherlands does not specify capacity to accommodate per se. The 
conditions imposed for those seeking to settle in the UK require the 
individual who sponsors prospective family migrants to demonstrate 
that he or she has sufficient income and accommodation to provide for 
them without ‘recourse to public funds’. There is no fixed minimum 
income, officials having discretion to decide whether the income 
available will be sufficient (although minima are set for the dependants 
of students and labour migrants). The conditions apply equally to 
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elderly relatives who may not access benefits or local authority housing 
for five years unless the relative who brought them to the UK dies.
This requirement that the sponsor be able to support and 
accommodate their relatives can effectively exclude those on low 
incomes from the right to family reunion. No statistics are published, 
however, on the number of applications turned down on those grounds. 
Directions to immigration staff say that rejection of spouses on these 
grounds will be rare (UKBA, 2009: para 4.6) but advice agencies have 
suggested in the past that families are divided on this basis (Citizens 
Advice Bureau, 1996).
Applicants also have to be able to afford the application fee, no small 
matter. A dependent relative applying to enter the UK paid £585 for 
that privilege in 2009/10, raised to a staggering £1,680 for 2010/11. 
Meanwhile the fee for an application for settlement made within the 
UK was to be raised to £1,930, although the cost of administering it 
is estimated to be only £256. Justifying this discrepancy when laying 
the fees before Parliament, Labour’s Immigration Minister said that 
setting fees above the cost of the service generates revenue that is used 
to fund broader objectives, including the roll-out of ID cards for foreign 
nationals (see Chapter 5) and the Migration Impacts Fund (abolished 
in 2010) (Home Office, 2010a).
A family member of long standing may be given the right to settle 
as soon as they arrive but most get initial permission to stay for two 
years before being eligible to apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain. 
Access to that status has, since 2007, also been subject to a level of 
proficiency in English (or Welsh or Scottish Gaelic) and knowledge of 
life in the UK, except for those under 16 or over 65. Again, the UK 
has not been alone in adding these additional conditions: Germany, for 
instance, requires those over 16 to have a command of German unless 
their previous education and way of life suggest they will nevertheless 
be able to integrate successfully. The UK government argued that its 
intention was ‘to ensure that migrants have an understanding of life in 
the UK and the requisite skills to allow them to play a full and active 
part in society’ (Wright and Larsen, 2008: 29). EEA nationals and 
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their family do not need to demonstrate that knowledge unless they 
go one stage further and apply for British citizenship (see Chapter 6).
From November 2010, another hurdle was introduced: non-
Europeans applying to come to join a partner in the UK have to provide 
evidence with their visa application that they have already passed a 
basic spoken English language test (by an approved test provider) to 
‘help promote integration, remove cultural barriers and protect public 
services’ (UKBA, 2010c) (see Chapter 6). A legal Opinion sought by 
Liberty found this pre-entry test likely to breach Article 8 of the ECHR 
in keeping families apart, as well as discriminatory in its effect on a 
number of grounds (Singh and McColgan, 2010). It may, therefore, 
yet be challenged in the courts.
procedural barriers to entry
Even if family members and their sponsors fulfil all of the entry criteria 
they can face procedural barriers that delay or prevent entry to the UK. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, extended delays in processing applications for 
family members in the Indian subcontinent became so contentious that 
they were recorded separately in the immigration statistics. Refusals, 
nearing 50% in the early 1980s, reportedly relied in many cases on 
discrepancies between answers given by family members on details of 
the marriage or family life in the country of origin, such as the colour 
of the bride’s dress or where the family drew their water (Wray, 2006). 
By 2002, those applying in the subcontinent for settlement could still 
wait up to nine months for their first interview, with intermittent 
‘fast-track’ arrangements to clear the backlog (Home Office, 2003: 
Table 2.6). More recently, the Public Accounts Committee found that 
applications to remain on the basis of marriage had in some cases been 
outstanding for a period of over four years or more and urged UKBA 
to eradicate this backlog ‘with the same degree of effort and in the 
same timescales as the legacy asylum cases’ (PAC, 2009: 14).
Checks on the identity of those seeking entry have also proved 
highly intrusive, including examinations at ports of entry in the 
1970s to establish if Asian women and girls were virgins and thus (in 
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the eyes of policymakers) genuine prospective brides or dependent 
children (Dummett and Nicol, 1990). DNA tests are carried out now 
on children to establish their parentage, the UK being one of five EU 
states to do so (EMN, 2008). In 1997, 1,400 DNA tests were carried 
out in the subcontinent. In around 90% of cases the child was found 
to be related to both parents (Home Office, 1998), no doubt with 
serious implications for the mother, aside from immigration control, 
in the 10% of cases where this was found not to be the case.
impact of restrictive conditions of stay
Those who fulfil the entry criteria and overcome the procedural 
hurdles are then subject to varying restrictions within the UK on access 
to jobs, social housing and benefits for varying periods of time. The 
resulting pattern of restrictions in each case reflects a classic trade-off in 
migration policy, albeit not often spelt out in policy debates. Exclusion 
from jobs, services and benefits protects access to scarce resources for 
existing residents, limits public expenditure and reassures or appeases 
public opinion (depending on your point of view). On the other hand, 
access to jobs and services may be granted to dependants in order to 
attract those migrants whom the country wants, to meet humanitarian 
needs, to protect public health (eg by ensuring access to health care 
for transferable diseases) and to promote integration. Underlying the 
political debates that periodically surface in the UK in relation to social 
housing in particular is a tension grounded in differing views on the 
basis of entitlement (explored further in Chapter 6).
Thus, fiancés and fiancées may not work or have access to public 
funds for the first six months, for instance, during which time they 
are expected to marry; while many spouses are subject to a two-year 
probation period during which they may work but not have recourse 
to public funds. The impact of the ‘no recourse to public funds’ rule 
can be profound but it does not cover all services or benefits. While 
it has barred those affected from a growing list of welfare benefits in 
the past decade, those who are working may be able to access benefits 
based on National Insurance contributions; while all migrant children 
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are, for instance, entitled to free education in state schools (Wright 
and Larsen, 2008: 34).
Asylum applicants and their families are in most cases excluded from 
work, mainstream benefits and social housing but may use the National 
Health Service (NHS). EEA nationals, in contrast, have greater access 
to benefits and social housing, with the exception of A2 nationals in 
their first year after arrival. Immigrants who are ‘habitually resident’, 
including British emigrants who have returned to the UK after many 
years, can use the NHS. This is a hugely complex picture; hence 
service providers, employers and migrants alike are often confused as 
to what their entitlements are (Audit Commission, 2007: 10). In most 
cases, moreover, there is surprisingly little evidence on the impact of 
this pattern of entitlements and restrictions to inform policymaking.
As we saw in Chapter 3, the spouses of skilled workers and of 
students in the UK for more than 12 months have in the past been 
allowed to work largely without restrictions to ensure that the primary 
migrant is not deterred from coming to the UK. The Migration 
Advisory Committee (MAC), which advises the government on some 
of the labour market dimensions of immigration policy, was asked to 
review this approach, a task it found difficult in the absence of almost 
any evidence on the jobs that these partners are doing, their labour 
market impact or the significance of access to work for the individuals 
concerned. It found that around half of spouses and partners are in 
employment but that, even though a significant proportion are highly 
qualified, the majority were in unskilled occupations. It had no reason 
to conclude that greater restrictions on working rights for dependants 
would be better for UK workers or for the UK economy but could 
form only a tentative conclusion due to the very limited evidence 
base, deeming this an area ‘ripe for further data collection and research’ 
(MAC, 2009: para 8.16).
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Impact on victims of domestic violence
One outcome of the ‘no recourse to public funds’ rule on which there 
is evidence is the impact of the two-year probationary period before 
a marriage or civil partner is entitled to remain in the UK in their 
own right. The threat of losing their right to stay if the relationship 
fails ties women (in most cases) to the marital home and the lack of 
welfare support should they leave prevents many from using refuges, 
which cannot accommodate them without reimbursement. Research 
and the work of support groups have revealed the genuine hardship 
to which this has led (eg Sundari et al, 2008). As a result, rules were 
modified in 2002 to enable victims to remain in the UK if they can 
provide evidence of the abuse: 745 people were given the right to stay 
on this basis in 2009, of whom 35 were men (Home Office, 2010e).
Critics have argued that the length of the probationary period, the 
nature of the evidence required to establish abuse and the exclusion 
from the concession of the spouses of students and children who have 
experienced violence also need to be addressed (Kofman et al, 2008a). 
Moreover, in the 7–12 months that the UKBA takes to make a decision, 
women still ‘face a stark “choice” between living with life-threatening 
ongoing violence or facing destitution’. Case law under the National 
Assistance Act 1948, Human Rights Act 1998 and Children Act 1989 
has established that children and adults may be entitled to support 
if otherwise destitute or they have community care needs but local 
authorities have no obligation to provide support in other cases and 
practice is inconsistent (Anitha, 2008). The Coalition government has 
committed itself to finding a long-term funding solution to ensure 
protection for victims of domestic violence in these circumstances, 
within a broader commitment to end violence against women (Home 
Office, 2010d).
Costs incurred in providing such support are currently not 
reimbursed by central government. Nevertheless, the local authority 
No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF) network found that, in 
2007–08, 48 local authorities were providing support to 3,910 
individuals with no recourse to public funds, costing £33.4 million, 
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an increase in expenditure of 8% over the previous year. While the 
majority of those supported appear to be asylum seekers whose claim 
has been rejected (see Chapter 2), the expenditure includes support to 
spouses and children who came for family union and reunion. Local 
authorities were concerned that this increase in demand meant funds 
being diverted from core services but that the alternative was destitution 
and its social consequences (Price and Fellas, 2008: 6).
family visitors
Many family members are not seeking to settle in the UK but merely 
to visit for holidays, weddings and funerals on a family visitor visa 
that allows entry for up to six months. Refusal of visas on suspicion 
that the visitor might remain in the country has long been a source of 
frustration to ethnic minority families and a right of appeal for family 
visitors was reinstated by the Labour government in 1999. Migration 
Watch, critical of the number and cost of appeals, argues that the range 
of eligible family members is far too widely drawn, that only British 
citizens should be able to sponsor family visitors and that access to an 
appeal should be subject to a fee: ‘There is no reason why the British 
tax payer should pay the costs of appeals by foreign visitors’ (Migration 
Watch, 2010).
A proposal that families might be required to pay a bond, returnable 
when the visitor left the country, ‘proved controversial and highly 
unpopular with ethnic minorities’ and was dropped (Home Office, 
2002: para 7.15). Labour later considered a formal sponsorship scheme, 
limited to British citizens and those with settled status, with stiff 
penalties for the sponsor if visitors failed to leave. Residents would 
face checks on their finances, criminal record and immigration status 
before being allowed to sponsor family members and be subject to a 
fine of up to £5,000 if the visitor failed to leave, or up to 14 years in 
prison if they were deemed to have facilitated the visitor remaining 
illegally. The government anticipated that the new arrangement, if 
implemented, would lead to a fall in the number of family visitors 
(Home Office, 2008: 25–6).
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conclusion
Family migration policies have evolved in reaction to historical 
flows and to perceptions of abuse rather than as a coherent strategy 
to achieve clear objectives. Within a series of constraints, including 
European and domestic law and the values placed in a liberal democracy 
on allowing individuals to marry or live with whom they choose, 
successive governments have sought to limit entry numbers and 
the impact of family members on the public purse. Parliament has 
granted huge discretion to the Home Office to change the rules on 
who can enter and on what conditions, policy reform often relying 
on a severely limited evidence base. Definitions of family have been 
narrowed for the purposes of immigration control (while extended 
to same-sex and cohabiting partners), and the conditions with which 
family members must comply have been progressively tightened. 
The measures used to regulate entry and establish identity have at 
times been highly intrusive, discriminatory on grounds of race and 
gender, and consistently challenged in the courts. Family members 
have nevertheless remained a significant component of those given 
the right to settle. In this trajectory, UK policy reform has in recent 
years largely mirrored that of other EU states and the requirements of 
the EU Directive on family reunification, notwithstanding the UK’s 
decision to opt out of its provisions.
Concern that family migrants do not always speak English has 
recently translated into a requirement that they should be required to 
demonstrate ‘a basic command’ of spoken English before being granted 
a visa to enter on the basis of marriage or civil partnership, in effect 
keeping partners apart where this condition is not met, potentially 
in breach of the ECHR. Officials have indeed estimated that it will 
lead to 10% fewer successful applications (mostly from the Indian 
subcontinent). The government argues that this pre-entry requirement 
will ‘help promote integration, remove cultural barriers and protect 
public services’ (BBC, 2010b; Home Office, 2010b). As we shall see 
in Chapter 6, however, there has been no broader discussion of any 
need for an integration policy for family members.
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We saw that across the EU states apply rules designed to limit the 
impact of family migrants on the public purse by restricting the entry 
of those who might be reliant on benefits, and precluding ‘recourse 
to public funds’ by those allowed to come. A highly complex pattern 
of rights and restrictions attached to conditions of stay, limiting access 
to work, social housing and welfare benefits (while more generous to 
the families of migrants whom the UK wants to attract), illustrates the 
kind of trade-offs that we have found throughout this book. In the 
response from those local authorities that support victims of domestic 
violence despite receiving no recompense, we see conflicting priorities 
within the state, as we shall when we look at responses to irregular 
migration in Chapter 5.
Despite the significance of family members among those allowed to 
settle, and notwithstanding the extent of the measures taken to limit 
their access to services and benefits, we know almost nothing about the 
impact of family members on the labour market, their civic engagement 
for instance, or (with the exception of victims of domestic violence) a 
great deal about the impact of post-entry controls on their well-being. 
Without that evidence we cannot know whether what government 
achieves by curtailing access to benefits and services is outweighed 
by the impact it has on individuals and on integration. The UK is not 
alone in relying on a thin evidence base for policymaking in this field, 
a recent European review concluding that ‘Little attention is paid to 
the consequences policies have on the persons affected by them. Nor 
is enough made of whether policies and measures actually attain their 
objectives’ (Kraler and Kofman, 2009: 1). In relation to the former, 
some of the evidence is there but ‘buried in casework records’ of those 
concerned (Kofman et al, 2008b).
The economic and social significance of this area of policy and 
its implications for the individuals concerned suggests that it is long 
overdue for review. Policy on entry and on post-entry access to services 
and benefits does require difficult choices on which reasoned, evidence-
based decisions must be taken, underpinned by compliance with the 
letter and the spirit of the UK’s international human rights obligations. 
The right to be joined by family members will not be without limits 
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in immigration law but could nevertheless be directed towards positive 
goals, as in the Canadian Act cited (Canadian Government, 2001). As 
I shall argue for migration policy as a whole, identifying the strategic 
goals to which it is directed is one essential step towards public 
ownership of the multiple and sometimes competing objectives that 
any migration policy has to fulfil.
Notes
1 Not including the further 198,000 shorter-stay ‘Student Visitors’.
2 R (Baiai and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 
UKHL 53 (Admin).
3 European Court of Human Rights, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali 
v UK, decision of 28 May 1985 (1985) 7 EHRR 471.
4 R (Baiai and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 
UKHL 53 (Admin).
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In this chapter we turn to irregular migration: why and how migrants acquire irregular status, the consequences and the strategies deployed 
to address it. ‘Illegal’ migrants were thrust high onto the UK political 
and policy agenda by a series of tragic incidents including the death 
of 58 Chinese migrants smuggled into the UK in June 2000 and later 
through association with organised crime (Geddes, 2005). Nevertheless, 
the extent of irregularity and the challenges it poses are both far broader 
and in many respects less severe than those associations suggest.
Contrary to popular perception, there is no single category of ‘illegal 
immigrant’’ but differing modes of irregular status, from the person 
who evades passport control by hiding in the back of a lorry through 
to the university student working more than their permitted hours per 
week. Key to identifying appropriate policy levers is to understand that 
complexity and the contexts in which irregularity occurs.
No less than in other chapters, we find that for policymakers at 
central and local level there are conflicting interests at play, not least 
an economy that relies on rapid transit across borders of people and 
freight. At the core of the contradictions is a labour market that selects 
workers by price and skill and a welfare system for which the criteria 
for inclusion is need, each militating against exclusion on the basis of 
immigration status. Thus economic and social spheres can be accessible 
to migrants whether their stay is authorised or not (Boswell, 2008). 
An international comparative analysis of migration policies concluded 
that when policymakers cannot effectively address the structural factors 
driving migration, they redouble their efforts to impose controls by 
investing more heavily in border enforcement and pursue initiatives 
that restore the appearance of control (Cornelius et al, 2004: 5). In 
that experience, the UK has been no exception.
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Why ‘irregular’?
European states often use the term ‘illegal’ but the literature abounds 
with alternatives: undocumented, clandestine, unauthorised, sans papiers 
and trafficked. ‘Irregular’ is popular because it is not associated with 
any particular policy position. It helpfully connotes that there may be 
differing modes of irregularity and differing degrees of departure from 
legal status. Those involved, as we shall see, may or may not have acted 
in a clandestine manner. ‘Undocumented’ emphasises the vulnerability 
of those without legal status but can be a misnomer if the migrant has 
partial legal status or documentation that is borrowed, stolen or forged. 
‘Illegal’ firmly suggests that the law has been broken, whereas irregular 
status may be associated with breaking lesser rules. Likewise, illegality 
may suggest that solutions are to be found in stricter enforcement of 
the law, where irregularity implies that a wider panoply of approaches 
may be needed. Finally, illegality reinforces a public perception of threat 
that, if accurate for those of criminal intent, does not match the full 
spectrum of migrants living outside the rules. ‘Irregular’ is the term used 
by the principal international agencies in the field, the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) (Koser, 2005; Carens, 2008).
causes: understanding the context
A popular perception of ‘illegal migrants’ attributes causality to 
migrants themselves: rule-breakers intent on living and working in 
Britain without permission. Others see them as victims of exploitation 
by traffickers and unscrupulous employers and landlords. The reality 
is more complex. Explaining irregular migration (as we saw for all 
migration in Chapter 1) requires an understanding of the structural 
factors in sending and receiving countries that drive and shape this 
persistent global phenomenon: the role of the intermediaries who 
facilitate it; the role of individual and family decision-making; and the 
impacts of policy intervention (Koser, 2010).
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From the literature, there are four key points on causality we should 
note. First, the context in which irregular migration persists globally 
on a significant scale is that of the broader dynamics of migration: 
the demographic, democratic and economic disparities that provide 
powerful reasons to move (Duvell, 2008). For those trapped in 
poverty or displaced by conflict who are unable to secure legal entry 
to another country, migration through irregular channels may seem 
their only option, entailing law-breaking where the mobility itself had 
no criminal intent (Lee, 2005). Within UK policy there has indeed 
been recognition in this context of the need, through the Department 
for International Development, to support the efforts of developing 
countries to promote economic growth and social development, 
eliminate poverty, improve governance and reduce conflict (Home 
Office, 2002: para 5.46). Challenging conditions in source countries 
may nevertheless have little in common with the reasoning of the 
young overstayers from rich countries who decide to continue working 
after their visa has expired. Understanding the causes of irregular 
migration as the basis of appropriate policy interventions needs to 
extend across its many differing forms.
Second, it is states that set the terms on which an individual’s entry, 
residence and employment is lawful, creating a plethora of differing 
statuses characterised by varying restrictions and entitlements. States 
can increase or reduce the propensity for irregularity through their 
design of entry channels and the conditions attached (De Genova, 
2002). Those working with migrants in the UK, for instance, report 
that the high cost of renewing a visa and the requirement to provide 
evidence of savings has now priced some migrants out of the market. 
Curtailing channels of legal entry, meanwhile, with no commensurate 
reduction in demand for migrant labour, increases the incentive to 
enter or stay without permission and the demand for the services 
of those who facilitate it (MRN, 2009: 5). A countermeasure is the 
extension of legal channels with the overt intention to ‘undercut 
the people smugglers’, as Labour did in its second term, recognising 
that ‘the apparent availability of illicit work … acts as a pull factor 
for more would-be migrants’ (Home Office, 2002: para 5.7; see also 
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Chapter 3). Where demand is met by legal workers from within the 
European Economic Area (EEA), demand for irregular workers will 
increasingly be confined to employers operating outside of the rules; 
but if a cap is set on legal migration without simultaneously meeting 
demand in other ways, the demand for migrants to work without 
permission will be enhanced (Koser, 2010).
Third, irregular migration serves an economic function: there is a 
demand for low-skilled labour employed under precarious conditions 
(see Chapter 3). Irregular migrants provide a cheap source of labour 
offering ‘dependency, invisibility and availability’ (Morice, 2004). 
They can also be more compliant and easier to lay off in an economic 
downturn (Gibney, 2009). In the UK, research has shown how 
semi-compliance (migrants working in violation of the restrictions 
attached to their immigration status) can equally serve a function for 
both employers and migrants: allowing each to maximise economic 
benefits from employment while minimising the risk of sanction, as 
semi-compliance is difficult for the state to control. Such irregular 
employment can be a strategic choice of both employers and migrants, 
but the complicity of each party varies. The employer may not know 
the migrant is not allowed to work or choose not to know. Alternatively, 
the employer can be fully aware but think, as can migrants, that this is 
‘bending’ rather than ‘breaking’ the rules. Understanding the functions 
that illegality serves and how it operates helps to explain its persistence. 
Unless its economic rationale is properly understood, efforts to manage 
irregular migration are unlikely to succeed (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010).
Finally, it is not only employers and migrants who benefit. There 
is a highly lucrative global business of facilitating irregular migration 
which exists because of the market for its services (Salt and Stein, 1997). 
Evidence compiled for the Home Office found demand for cheap and 
malleable labour to be a key driver, for instance, of trafficking to the UK 
(Dowling et al, 2007) and trafficking to Europe for sexual exploitation 
alone is estimated to be worth €2.5 billion each year (UNODC, 2010: 
49). Policymakers draw a distinction between people smuggling, the 
procuring of illegal entry for material gain and trafficking involving 
coercion or deception. That distinction is helpful in reminding us 
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that a migrant may choose to use the services of a people smuggler 
as a travel agent; but the extent to which migrants exercise consent 
or become the victim of exploitation during or after their journey is 
less clear-cut in practice. Smugglers and traffickers range from large, 
bureaucratic, criminal organisations to small kinship groups. Illegal 
entrants have been found to have paid as much as £22,000 to facilitate 
a journey from China, a loan to be repaid on arrival. Paying for false 
documents without transport was considerably cheaper (Black et al, 
2006). It is thought that within the ‘hierarchies of mobility’, more men 
are able to pay smugglers while women may be more vulnerable to 
traffickers (Lee, 2005).
is irregular migration a problem?
States cannot be complacent about irregular migration. There is, first, 
a significant political cost: the perception that there are people in 
the country without permission reinforces concern that migration 
is out of control. Moreover, if irregular migration is extensive, it is 
not unreasonable for voters to ask why more migration is required 
(Koser, 2010: 190).
Second, lack of legal status makes adults and children vulnerable 
to poverty, social exclusion and exploitation both in and beyond the 
workplace (MRN, 2009). While irregular migrants are still entitled to 
fundamental human rights, their need to avoid detection and removal 
means they cannot easily exercise those rights in practice. Their status 
excludes them from access to most services and welfare benefits with 
not only individual but social costs. It is necessary to recognise, however, 
that not all irregular migrants live on the margins of society. Among 
overstayers and the semi-compliant are people in regular jobs who may 
continue largely as before. Irregular migrants can feel a greater need 
to conceal themselves in some countries and contexts than others; 
with some able to make themselves known to some authorities while 
avoiding contact with others, and living ‘a relatively normal, even 
“quasi-legal” life’ (Duvell, 2008: 490).
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The third reason states cannot ignore a significant presence of 
irregular migrants is that capacity to curtail criminal activity and protect 
national security is undermined. In practice, there is no indication that 
irregular migrants in the UK have any greater propensity to criminal 
activity and evidence from the Netherlands for instance has found little 
crime among those embedded in the labour market (Engbersen and van 
der Leun, 2001). While some of those engaged in terrorism may have 
irregular status, there is no causal connection, and some of the principal 
actors have indeed been British-born. Measures to detect irregularity 
may overlap with those related to terrorism, but it would be a mistake 
to allow perceptions of irregularity and its solutions to be coloured 
by that association, not least if the support of migrant communities is 
to be secured in detecting those of ill intent (Papademetriou, 2005).
Finally, there is an economic cost for the state and for displaced 
workers. Where migrants work without permission and are willing 
to work for less than the going rate for the job, they may undercut 
and displace other workers. This can lead to resentment and negative 
fallout for legal migrants. For the state, there is a loss of tax and National 
Insurance revenue, although there is evidence that some irregular 
migrants do pay these in the normal way (Anderson et al, 2006). 
Estimates of the additional revenue to be gained if irregular migrants 
were to be granted legal status (‘in excess of £1 billion per annum’; 
ippr, 2009) may therefore be inflated.
For these reasons, governments cannot ignore irregularity; nor, 
however, should they allow the response to be disproportionate. 
Irregular migrants in the UK are a small proportion of the population 
and, as we shall see, most entered lawfully but have overstayed. The 
threat to personal security would seem to be substantially greater for 
the migrants themselves than for the rest of the population.
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irregular migrants in the uK
There are four means of acquiring irregular status:
•	 Illegal entry: those who enter the country without permission, 
whether by evading immigration control or by deception (use of 
false documents, for instance, or not telling the truth about reasons 
for coming). We can include here those who obtain a new legal 
status by deception once in the country, for instance through a 
sham marriage.
•	 Overstay: a diverse category of those who enter legally as a visitor, 
labour migrant or asylum seeker, for instance, but remain after their 
permission to stay has expired.
•	 Semi-compliance: those who enter and remain legally, but who are 
acting in breach of the conditions attached to their immigration 
status, working without permission or for longer hours than 
permitted, for example (Ruhs and Anderson, 2009), or accessing 
welfare support to which they are not entitled.
•	 A child born in the UK to parents who are not in the country legally: 
thereby having irregular immigration status without having crossed 
any border (Duvell, 2008).
Irregular status for adults and children may be a conscious decision, 
unintentional (through ignorance of complex rules), involuntary as the 
victim of trafficking or the result of administrative inefficiency if an 
application to stay is lost in the system (MRN, 2009: 6). Irregularity 
may not be a permanent status but subsequently change if the rules 
are amended, a refusal of permission to remain is rescinded or the 
migrant’s country joins the EU: for accession nationals working in the 
UK without permission in 2004, enlargement of the EU was in effect 
an amnesty. ‘Illegality’ can thus be one of a shifting range of statuses 
that non-citizens move through, rather than an end state (Bloch et al, 
2009; Koser, 2010; Anderson and Ruhs, 2010).
These differing forms of irregular status compound the difficulty 
of estimating numbers and understanding their economic and 
163
irregular migration
social significance. The Home Office found itself caught between 
unwillingness to estimate the size of the irregular population, given 
the impossibility of collecting verifiable data, and the need to avoid 
the ignominy of admitting it did not know. After much reluctance, it 
commissioned a study that concluded that the number in 2001 was 
within the range of 310,000 to 570,000 (midpoint 430,000, some 0.7% 
of the then UK population of 59 million), but warned ‘over-reliance 
must not be placed on the results’ (Woodbridge, 2005). A more recent 
study (Gordon et al, 2009), this time including children, estimated that 
there were between 417,000 and 863,000 irregular migrants in 2007 
(midpoint 618,000), of whom 412,000 had been in the UK for more 
than five years. More than two thirds were thought to be in London. 
Significantly, neither estimate included the third category of irregular 
migrants: those in the UK legally but living in breach of their conditions 
of stay. This has been estimated at an additional 165,000 people (ippr, 
2009), based only on students working full time and nationals from 
the eight EU accession countries (A8) not registered under the Worker 
Registration Scheme.
Among irregular migrants are 85,000 young people under 18 
(Gordon et al, 2009). Policy has tended to assume that those in the 
UK without their parents are the victims of trafficking, overlooking 
the agency of young people for whom migration can bring benefits 
(O’Connell Davidson and Farrow, 2007). Children with irregular status 
create a tension between two policy agendas: child protection on the 
one hand and enforcing immigration control on the other (Sigona 
and Hughes, 2010).
The evidence suggests that most irregular migrants in the UK 
enter the country legally, but overstay. Among overstayers, the Home 
Office itself reports ‘many are thought to be young and from countries 
with reasonably high GDP per capita and perhaps with high levels of 
education’ (Home Office, 2007a: 10). In the year to March 2010, around 
700 ‘victims of trafficking’ were identified by agencies in the UK of 
whom 74% were female and a quarter were minors. China, Nigeria, 
Vietnam and Slovakia figure prominently among their many countries 
of origin (UKHTC, 2010a). Notwithstanding the seriousness of this 
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practice, claims that it is ‘behind three-quarters of illegal immigration 
to this country’ (Home Office, 2007a) are thus grossly exaggerated.
In the EU as a whole, it is estimated that there are some 4–8 million 
irregular migrants, half of whom are overstayers, with some migrants 
remaining long term but others seeking only to work for a temporary 
period. Some countries (such as France) have more irregular residents 
than others (such as Sweden), in some cases dominated by certain 
nationalities (eg Albanians in Greece) in contrast to the diversity in 
the UK (Duvell, 2008).
inflexible legal framework
UKBA has been explicit that some forms of illegality have more harmful 
consequences than others and should be prioritised. Overstaying a visa 
and working illegally are categorised as ‘local-level crime’, with some 
people overstaying ‘inadvertently’ and harm deemed to lie principally 
in ‘undermining the integrity of the system’ (Home Office, 2007a: 
10–13; UKBA, 2010a). Smuggling, manufacture of false documents, 
operation of bogus colleges and arranging sham marriages are more 
serious at level 2, and are a priority for regional Immigration Crime 
Teams staffed by UKBA and the police; while trafficking, at level 3, 
is considered the most serious, requiring a high level of international 
and internal agency cooperation.
The legal framework set 40 years ago in the Immigration Act 1971 
fails, however, to reflect these differing forms of irregularity. Unlike 
many other EU countries where lesser breaches of immigration rules 
are not criminal offences, UK law does not differentiate between illegal 
entry, overstaying and breaches of conditions of stay. Categorised in 
each case as ‘illegal entry’ (on the grounds that those not complying 
with conditions have breached the terms of their entry), they attract up 
to six months imprisonment or a heavy fine and are subject to removal 
from the UK (UKBA, 2010a: 30). Nor is this an idle threat: UKBA’s 
now daily press reports on ‘illegal workers’ detected include recent 
cases of a student ‘detained pending removal’ for working longer hours 
in a care home than permitted, for instance, and another for working 
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‘in breach of a working holiday maker visa’ (UKBA, 2010c, 2010d). 
Categorising serious criminal offences alongside such rule-breaking of 
significantly less import has distorted the lens through which irregular 
migrants are viewed and made it more difficult to focus debate on a 
wider array of solutions than reliance on law enforcement.
policy drivers
While the legal framework was set in 1971, tackling irregular migration 
became a major focus of activity only in the past decade. The call to 
arms was the determination to deter asylum seekers reaching the UK 
and to remove those refused refugee status, the latter deemed irregular 
migrants and emblematic of government failure to manage migration 
effectively (see Chapter 2). Individuals facing persecution often use the 
same channels of transport and entry as others who lack a visa to travel 
through legal channels. Thus policy measures have targeted asylum 
seekers alongside irregular migrants and these categories have been 
elided in public and political debate (Geddes, 2005). Further drivers 
of the heightened focus on enforcement were concern that sham 
marriages were being used to secure entry (see Chapter 4), evidence of 
irregular working and of the vulnerability of some irregular migrants in 
the workplace, and abuse of the student entry channel (see Chapter 3).
Labour’s period in office thus saw the extension of powers and 
penalties in relation to illegal entry including offences related to 
destroying travel documents; an increased focus on people trafficking; 
expansion of the ‘detention estate’ and greater efforts to remove those 
detected. It also saw a step-change in reliance on new technology 
and ‘identity management’ in border and internal controls and a 
strengthening of penalties for employing migrants not permitted to 
work. Many of these changes, announced in a constant stream of White 
Papers and enforcement strategies, could be introduced merely by 
changing the Immigration Rules. Others were authorised by legislation 
including the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, UK 
Borders Act 2007 and Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 
2009. Resources for enforcement staff, technology and data-sharing 
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were substantially increased and high-profile raids were carried out 
on businesses suspected of employing irregular workers in order to 
ensure the visibility of enforcement activity (Home Office, 1998, 2002, 
2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b; Thorp, 2007; UKBA, 2008a, 2008b, 2010a).
inter-agency focus on enforcement
The need to demonstrate a visible force at the border saw 
immigration staff issued with new uniforms and the Immigration 
and Nationality Department transformed into the firmer sounding 
‘Border and Immigration Agency’ in 2007. Overt in the strategy was 
communication via the media to build public confidence that effective 
enforcement action was being taken (Home Office, 2007a). There was 
no mention of any pre-testing or subsequent evaluation on whether 
these messages served to reassure as intended or, in emphasising the 
need to counter a threat, had the opposite effect.
In 2008, responsibility for migration, visas and customs’ border staff 
was brought together as the UK Border Agency (UKBA) whose staff 
now had powers to address each dimension. A Select Committee had 
earlier been highly critical of poor levels of coordination (SC Home 
Affairs, 2006: para 127). UKBA then had 25,000 staff of whom 9,000 
were the ‘border force’, some based abroad in 135 countries (UKBA, 
2009b). Exchange of data with external agencies, in particular the 
police, customs, tax and the Driving and  Vehicle Licensing Agency 
(DVLA), has been enhanced, as has cooperation with local authorities 
and health care providers (with training for vicars to spot sham 
marriages; see UKBA, 2010b). The private sector is involved in the 
design and provision of technology, in checking passengers’ right to 
travel and in providing data on passenger movements.
Notwithstanding its inclination to opt out of EU agreements, this 
is one area of policy (as with asylum) where the UK has been keen 
to cooperate with its EU partners bilaterally (as recently re-endorsed 
with France; see UKBA, 2010e) and under the auspices of the EU: in 
strengthening external borders, sharing data and fingerprints (2000 
Eurodac regulation), and signing readmission agreements with source 
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countries. Although not a full member, it has taken part in the activities 
of the EU Borders Agency, FRONTEX, charged with enhancing the 
integration of border security through coordination of operations, 
shared intelligence, technical cooperation and training. FRONTEX’s 
operational role has expanded since 2007 with the establishment of 
Rapid Border Intervention Teams, albeit without its own operational 
staff (HL Select Committee on the EU, 2008).
One effect of this inter-agency collaboration has been to consolidate 
irregular migration firmly within a criminal law-enforcement paradigm. 
Labour’s 2010 strategy, Protecting Our Border, Protecting the Public, argued 
that the UK ‘faces a complex and constantly evolving array of threats 
from terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration which left 
unchecked can cause untold harm’. It positioned UKBA as a ‘law 
enforcement partner’, ‘our first line of defence against the smuggling 
of drugs, weapons and people into the UK’ (UKBA, 2010a: 4). There 
was no mention in this strategy, even in passing, of enforcement of 
the minimum wage or broader employment standards to reduce 
demand for irregular workers. Rather, impact was to be enhanced by 
more effective partnership working, sharing intelligence, developing 
more robust identity management systems and ‘biometric storage and 
matching capability’ (UKBA, 2010a: 16–17). The early months of the 
Coalition government have seen a high public profile given to such 
enforcement activity (a ‘UK-wide crackdown’), with press notices 
providing a day-by-day account of numbers detected and detained.
e-borders and ‘identity management’
As the Labour government felt the pressure to step up controls, 
considerable emphasis was placed on new technology. A 2005 
commitment to fully integrated pre-entry, border and in-country 
controls was to be delivered by fingerprinting all visa applicants, 
checked against UK police, immigration and security databases, and 
by biometric residence permits for (non-EEA) foreign nationals living 
in the UK. An ‘E-borders’ programme would provide an audit trail 
on all passengers, checking and recording the entry and exit of each 
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person against a watch list and their conditions of entry. By December 
2010, 95% of passenger movements were expected to be covered by 
E-borders with 100% covered by 2014.
Between 2005 and 2010, the audit trail had already collected details on 
141 million passengers and crew movements and resulted in 4,800 
arrests, including for offences unrelated to immigration, and in more 
than 950 people being refused entry (UKBA, 2010a: 9). UK and EEA 
citizens can, through registering for iris recognition, bypass the queues 
at passport control when arriving at airports equipped with that facility. 
A key benefit of exit controls is that UKBA will know if an individual 
does not leave when their visa expires, and the number of overstayers 
in the UK at any one time; but that information in itself will have no 
impact unless there are resources and the political will to detect and 
sanction those concerned.
In its haste to implement the system, UKBA was criticised for giving 
insufficient weight to the costs and practical difficulties it imposes 
on private carriers, for being slow to recognise the data protection 
implications of the transfer of personal information and the possibility 
that, in impeding the mobility of EU citizens, it could breach EU 
law (SC Home Affairs, 2009: 49; 2010a). The privacy implications of 
enhanced surveillance are broader, moreover, than those of data transfer. 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission is among those who 
consider that high-definition body-scanning, a ‘virtual strip-search’ 
trialled at UK airports from 2009, may be unlawful under the Human 
Rights Act (BBC, 2010). A draft EU regulation authorising their use 
was withdrawn after protest by the European Parliament in 2008 
(Gregory, 2009).
Requiring foreign nationals to have biometric identity cards is 
intended to facilitate internal controls on access to jobs and services (see 
later), making it harder to live in the UK without legal status. While ID 
cards for UK citizens have been cancelled by the Coalition government, 
those for foreign nationals will remain. Critics argue that any benefits 
must be set against social costs including the danger that it will 
exacerbate risks of racial profiling and a culture of suspicion towards 
those visibly perceived to be from a minority ethnic background 
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(NIHRC, 2010), while warning that the surveillance capacity of the 
national register of personal data will increasingly reach across national 
borders as databases are harmonised and integrated (Lyon, 2007). 
Failure to replace a card if lost or circumstances change can lead to a 
fine of up to £1,000 or the curtailment of length of stay. It is unclear 
how effective identity cards will be as a means of detecting irregular 
migrants when only they are required to have them.
trafficking
Within enforcement, we saw that trafficking has been accorded the 
highest level of priority, the aim being to target and penalise more 
severely the organised criminal gangs responsible, with multi-agency 
operations to develop intelligence and detect and detain traffickers in 
the UK and abroad. In 2006, the UK Human Trafficking Centre was 
established to improve coordination. Trafficking is criminalised under 
the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and successive Immigration Acts and 
carries a sentence of up to 14 years’ imprisonment. Internationally, 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) 
promotes cooperation between states, with a focus on law enforcement. 
The UK later ratified the Council of Europe’s Convention against 
Trafficking in Human Beings, underpinned by a clearer human rights 
focus. It encourages awareness-raising among potential victims, who 
must be offered a minimum of 30 days’ support (UKHTC, 2010b). 
In the UK, each victim is entitled to 45 days of support, including 
accommodation and health care, and will not be removed during 
that period, while some are given longer residence to give evidence 
as a witness in court. Victims nevertheless remain fearful of reporting 
crimes in case it leads to enforcement action against them. The Crown 
Prosecution Service argues that it needs more victims to testify if it is 
to secure convictions (MRN, 2009: 11; CPS, 2010).
Academic analysis of the evidence has suggested a ‘moral panic’ on 
trafficking is diverting attention from the actual structural and systemic 
causes of abuse, obscuring the need for a broader range of policy 
solutions and justifying increases in police powers and surveillance of 
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migrant workers. The exploitation by traffickers is not always distinct 
from that experienced by low-wage workers in legally tolerated 
employment contracts, or in abusive relationships in the sex trade or 
domestic work, unrelated to migration. It is the existence of those 
spaces that makes it possible for individuals to exploit the labour of 
people who have been trafficked (or not), and tackling their continued 
existence would address the market for trafficked migrants. There is, 
however, no consensus that these areas of the labour market should 
be subject to more regulation (Anderson and O’Connell Davidson, 
2002; O’Connell Davidson, 2006; Anderson, 2007: 11; 2008; Mai, 
2009). States’ reluctance to address the structural demand for irregular 
labour lays them open to the accusation that, despite the rhetoric, 
they informally tolerate it in order to ensure a continued supply of 
cheap labour, using enforcement action only to address ‘excess supply’ 
(Taran, 2004).
The vulnerability of irregular migrants at work has been found 
across Europe to be exacerbated by their fear of detection, making 
them unwilling to report abuse or an employer’s failure to pay what is 
owed (McKay and Wright, 2008; MRN, 2008). Workers thus need to 
be able to access their employment rights without fear of enforcement 
action against them. To deny that security is to give priority to 
immigration control over the need to protect the victims of forced 
labour. A review of practice across Europe shows that some countries 
do provide irregular migrants with legal rights to redress, for instance, 
for payment of wages due, but the extent to which they can exercise 
those rights in practice is less clear (Le Voy et al, 2004; Carens, 2008).
Notwithstanding greater resources attached to enforcement of 
employment standards in the later years of the Labour government 
(see Chapter 3), the weakest link in the strategy to address irregular 
migration is the continuing capacity of unscrupulous employers 
to avoid compliance with employment law. The UK model of 
enforcement is largely to rely on workers making a complaint to a 
tribunal, problematic for those whose status is vulnerable. Were there 
a greater reliance on inspections and intelligence-led investigations, 
including a broader remit and more resources for the Gangmasters 
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Licensing Authority (Chapter 3), information from third parties such 
as unions and NGOs could be used to greater effect (Anderson and 
Rogaly, 2005).
employer sanctions
Concern about illegal working did lead to the imposition of 
sanctions on employers of irregular migrants in 1996 (the Asylum 
and Immigration Act), the UK being one of the last EU countries 
to do so. Concerned to minimise the burden on employers, the law 
required only that checks on eligibility were seen to have been made 
and enforcement was limited (Ryan, 2008). Substantially tougher 
penalties were introduced a decade later (in the Immigration, Asylum 
and Nationality Act 2006, in force from 2008): a ‘civil penalty 
regime’ imposing on-the-spot fines of up to £10,000 per employee 
or, for knowingly employing someone lacking permission to work, 
imprisonment for up to two years. Employees have to provide verifiable 
documents establishing their right to work and employers are expected 
to check each year on their continuing eligibility.
The civil penalty scheme ‘vastly increased’ the pressure on employers 
to ensure that employees are entitled to work and has the advantage 
for UKBA of enabling action against employers without recourse to 
the courts (Jackson et al, 2008: 1051). The Home Office estimated it 
would cost businesses £27 million to prepare for compliance. To avoid 
targeting ethnic minority employees inappropriately, employers are 
advised to check all staff. Businesses nevertheless remained concerned 
that if they act too hastily and dismiss an employee they may be accused 
of race discrimination, but if they give the employee the benefit of 
the doubt they risk being fined by UKBA (Garcia, 2007). The British 
Chambers of Commerce resented the implication that businesses were 
responsible for irregular working. It argued that the real issue was a 
shortage of sufficient skilled people within the UK, requiring resort 
to migrant labour (Frost, 2006).
In 2008, 7,460 operations to detect illegal working were carried 
out (compared to 1,600 in 2004), leading to 6,050 arrests. In the first 
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10 months after the measures came into force, 1,100 fines (totalling 
some £11 million) were issued to employers (Home Office, 2005; 
UKBA, 2009b). Only 37 employers had been found guilty under the 
previous legislation in the decade from 1997 to 2006. The tougher 
regime now in force has led employers to deny jobs to people in case 
their status is later found to be irregular, making it more difficult for 
legal migrants to find jobs and marginalising irregular migrants into 
the further reaches of the informal economy (McKay and Wright, 
2008). Yet the Chief Inspector of Immigration says UKBA has only 
collected a small proportion of fines due, being ‘too accommodating’ 
towards employers willing to cooperate to reduce penalties (ICIUKBA, 
2010). While migrants have felt the impact of the tougher rules, it does 
not necessarily make them more likely to leave the UK (ippr, 2009).
As in the US, enforcement falls to the immigration service and not 
to the agency responsible for compliance with National Insurance and 
the minimum wage, HM Revenue and Customs. This contrasts with 
the system in France where enforcement is integrated into the wider 
work of labour inspectors; in effect treating employer sanctions as a 
dimension of labour market regulation. That approach is said to enjoy 
broader acceptance than that in the UK and US where it is perceived 
as part of immigration control (Ryan, 2008).
The introduction of licensing for employers and education providers 
prior to their sponsoring migrant workers or students to enter under 
the Points-Based System (see Chapter 3) provides a further means to 
ensure that only those operating appropriately continue to participate. 
This form of regulation will only have an impact, however, if UKBA is 
resourced to make sufficient checks; and the system will retain support 
only if due process ensures sponsor status is not withdrawn unfairly.
controls on access to services
Although there is limited evidence that access to services has been 
a factor in irregular migration, government has faced criticism that 
the ‘absence of effective controls’ on access to the NHS and on the 
immigration status of children applying for school places is an incentive 
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that must be addressed (Migration Watch, 2006b). The government 
does expect some service providers to check the status of service 
users, the intention being to deter health tourism, to make it difficult 
for irregular migrants to live in the UK and to detect those who do. 
Those not prioritised for enforcement, UKBA argues, ‘should be 
denied the benefits and privileges of life in the UK and experience 
an increasingly uncomfortable environment so that they elect to leave’ 
(Home Office, 2007a: 17).
Arrangements for the NHS to charge ‘overseas visitors’ for hospital 
care were set up in 2004 but excluded key services on public health 
grounds: treatment for most highly infectious diseases, emergency 
treatment and treatment that is ‘immediately necessary’. General 
Practitioners, meanwhile, have discretion as to whether to register 
overseas visitors and treat them without charge. It can in practice be 
difficult to collect charges due, particularly where the individual has 
left the country, and the government has considered making health 
insurance obligatory for some migrants and visitors. Significantly 
for a key theme of this book, the Department of Health is explicit 
in acknowledging the competing objectives at stake: ‘maintaining a 
policy that balances cost, public health, migration and humanitarian 
principles is challenging’ (DH, 2010: 1). Health professionals argue that 
some irregular migrants are denied care that they should be given and 
that others are deterred from seeking it (Cole, 2009; Medact, 2009).
In contrast, the Education Act 1996 requires local education 
authorities to provide free education to all school-age children 
regardless of immigration status. There is nevertheless an exchange 
of data between schools and UKBA on the ostensible grounds that 
children of parents seeking to avoid immigration controls may need 
support. It is not known to what extent this deters parents from sending 
their children to school (as has been found to be the case abroad; see 
Sigona and Hughes, 2010). UKBA also trains local authority staff to 
identify false documents, reporting that this has resulted in the denial of 
access to council services, prosecution and enforced removal (UKBA, 
2010a: 18).
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The introduction of identity cards for foreign nationals is intended 
to make it easier for service providers to know if they are entitled to 
the service. Foreign nationals can be required to provide biometric 
information such as fingerprints to establish if they are the rightful 
owner of the card (Thorp, 2007). Parliament’s Joint Committee on 
Human Rights considers it ‘highly likely’ that members of Black and 
minority ethnic communities will be disproportionately required to 
prove their immigration status and hence that the effect of the checks 
will be racially discriminatory (JCHR, 2007: para 1.26).
Those working with migrants argue from experience that the 
consequence of internal controls will not be that people leave the UK:
It is more likely that they will cause irregular migrants to 
reduce their contact with mainstream structures and systems. 
By moving further out of the public eye, the vulnerability of 
irregular migrants to exploitation, forced labour or criminal 
activity would be increased. (MRN, 2009: 18)
Barring access to services is perhaps the most controversial dimension 
of policy; devolving responsibility for immigration control to those 
whose primary responsibility is to provide services to those in need. 
Some health and education professionals have indeed proved reluctant, 
doctors arguing that: ‘A refusal of treatment could lead to serious 
public health consequences, as well as significant knock-on costs where 
conditions deteriorate to such an extent that they require expensive 
emergency interventions’ (Hamm et al, 2008). Denying access to 
services may also have broader consequences if failure to take up 
vaccinations puts public health at risk, children are kept out of school 
or witnesses feel unable to report a crime (Carens, 2008). Enforcement 
action against pupils in the UK has led teachers, for whom pupils are 
children first and migrants second, into implicit or overt opposition 
to immigration policy (NCADC, 2003; Arnot et al, 2009).
Critics argue on human rights grounds that it is wrong to deny 
essential services to any individual, regardless of their immigration 
status, if to do so means that their basic needs are not met. Requiring 
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health and education providers to pass on information ‘has the effect 
of taking away with one hand what was granted with the other, 
reducing the legal protection of the basic human rights of irregular 
migrants to a nominal entitlement stripped of any substantive effect’ 
(Carens, 2008: 168).  To prevent this, states need to put up a firewall, 
preventing the transfer of information collected by those responsible 
for human rights protection to those responsible for immigration 
control. Where fundamental rights are not at stake, however, Carens 
argues that the balance of argument may lie the other way, in favour 
of immigration control.
detention and removal
We saw in Chapter 2 that criticism of the failure to remove refused 
asylum seekers drove significant expansion of capacity to detain 
(including at Harmondsworth, now Europe’s largest removal centre) 
and steps to facilitate removal. Many other migrants are also detained 
before being removed or deported. While deportation remains the 
procedure for those foreign (and dual) nationals whose presence is ‘not 
conducive to the public good’, usually as a result of criminal activity or 
a threat to national security, irregular migrants have since 2000 been 
subject to administrative removal, carrying fewer procedural safeguards.
While most EU countries set a time limit on detention, from 32 
days in France to 18 months in Germany, there is no limit in the UK. 
It opted out of the EU Returns Directive that imposes an 18-month 
upper limit. Of those detained on 30 September 2010, 130 people had 
been held for more than 18 months (Home Office, 2010d). Critics have 
questioned the ethics of this use of detention, a sanction normally used 
only for those convicted of a crime; have argued that detainees include 
people who are de facto stateless and cannot be returned; and have 
questioned whether the central role of private companies in running 
many of the centres gives them a commercial interest in opposing any 
reduction in the use of detention (Bacon, 2005; HL Select Committee 
on the EU, 2006: 60; ERT, 2010).
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Inspections of removal centres have found both good practice 
(‘an essentially safe place, with good relationships between staff and 
detainees, plenty of activity’) and ‘wholly unacceptable’ conditions 
(HMI Prisons, 2010a, 2010b). Evidence suggests that the impact of 
detention on children can be particularly detrimental for their mental 
and physical health, education and access to legal advice – concerns 
endorsed by the Scottish and English Commissioners for Children. 
In 2009, 1,120 children were detained, of whom many were not 
subsequently removed from the UK (Home Office, 2010c). The Royal 
College of General Practitioners argued that the evidence on physical 
and mental health consequences made the detention of young people 
unacceptable and that it ‘should cease without delay’ (RCGP et al, 
2009). The Labour government insisted that children were detained 
to avoid separating them from their parents for whom detention 
was essential for removal to be enforced (Home Office, 2010a). The 
Coalition government made an early commitment to end this practice 
but at the time of writing it is unclear with what it will be replaced.
There are alternatives to detention used to good effect in other 
countries. A study for UNHCR found provision of competent legal 
advice and concerned case management (serving as non-intrusive 
monitoring) to be among options more cost-effective in reducing 
absconding than detention; while for children guardianship and 
specialised group homes run by NGOs were among the successful 
alternatives (Field, 2006). Others have highlighted ‘incentivised 
compliance’ schemes used in Sweden and the USA combining 
advice, representation and information from the beginning of the 
determination process with supervision and risk assessment as well 
as information on opportunities for voluntary return (Crawley and 
Lester, 2005). The Home Affairs Select Committee advocated use 
of electronic tags, reporting requirements and residence restrictions, 
arguing that a low risk of absconding was ‘a price worth paying to 





Removal is beset with difficulties leading to a gap in Western countries 
between those eligible to be deported and actual removals. Globally, 
states attribute this to cost, public resistance to surveillance and 
removals, human rights constraints and an unwillingness of source 
countries to accept returnees (Koser, 2005). In 2009, 67,215 people 
were removed from the UK or left ‘voluntarily’, of whom almost half 
were refused at a port of entry. A further 11,000 were asylum cases so 
it would appear that fewer than 28,000 other irregular migrants were 
detected in-country and removed in that year (Home Office, 2010c), 
low relative to the 618,000 irregular migrants we saw estimated to 
be living in the UK but on a par with recent years (see Figure 5.1).
Gibney finds three explanations for the deportation gap: that the 
individual has become socially integrated, ‘lost’ or ‘unreturnable’ 
(Gibney, 2008). Where social relationships have been formed, removal 
may be vocally opposed, with a public eager for more removals resisting 
implementation when faced with its human cost (Ellerman, 2006). 
Others become ‘lost’ when they go underground to avoid removal, 
figure 5.1: Removals and voluntary departures from the UK  
2000–09
Source: Home Office Control of Immigration Statistics 2009, Table 3.1  
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during or after receiving a decision (whether because the original 
purpose was to secure access to the labour market or for fear that their 
genuine need for protection will not be recognised). Tracking them 
down is expensive and time-consuming.
Return also requires the cooperation of another state, which may 
be reluctant, Gibney explains, because of the loss of remittances, 
the undesirability of a particular individual or the lack of evidence 
demonstrating their citizenship. To overcome that resistance Labour 
pursued a rash of readmission agreements, insisting that ‘we will leave 
our partners in no doubt that accepting return of their nationals 
is a duty and failure to do so will have implications for our wider 
relationship’ (Home Office, 2005: 30). Readmission agreements, 
as successfully concluded with China, Vietnam, Pakistan, India and 
Turkey for instance, in particular help to resolve situations where travel 
documents have expired or been lost or destroyed (Home Office, 
2007a). The UK has also benefited from EU readmission agreements.
A further constraint has been a bar imposed by the courts on 
return to countries where the individual may be subject to torture 
(eg Chahal v UK in 19971) in breach of Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Labour government 
sought to overcome this in relation to terrorist suspects through 
indefinite detention, which was also ruled unlawful, and subsequently 
through control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. 
Memoranda of Agreement with governments that torture would not 
be used were criticised as unreliable, while suspects could still pose 
a threat to UK citizens and interests abroad (Thorp, 2007). There 
are further cases where government and those representing irregular 
migrants disagree as to whether the country is safe for return. EU states 
have themselves taken opposing views on whether Iraq, for instance, 
has been a safe destination (HL Select Committee on the EU, 2006: 
para 35). The Coalition government quickly found itself under fire 
from the UNHCR for returning refused asylum seekers to Iraq, given 




The National Audit Office has calculated that the cost of an enforced 
removal is between £7,900 and £17,000 for a single adult (NAO, 
2009b: Table 3), on the basis of which it is estimated that it would 
cost up to £12 billion to remove all irregular migrants from the UK 
and take at least 25 years to achieve at the current rate of departures 
(ippr, 2009).
Cost has been one factor encouraging government since 1999 to 
fund schemes for voluntary return. They also avoid the controversy 
of the use of force. Globally, take-up of such opportunities is often 
low: migrants have reasons not to want to return or may be unaware 
of the scheme. There are differing views on what kind of package to 
offer, whom to target and whether a generous scheme would simply 
encourage others to come illegally to benefit from it (Koser, 2005). 
In the UK, separate schemes have been run for irregular migrants 
and asylum seekers, managed by the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM). The latter scheme includes financial assistance with 
reintegration (for business start-up, education or training; see Home 
Office, 2010b). After the war in the former Yugoslavia, a ‘look and 
see’ scheme enabled refugees to judge whether their area was safe to 
return to. It has been argued that the only way of truly judging whether 
precarious residence is a choice is by offering genuine options for 
return that enable successful reintegration, hence the UK is ill advised 
in making this option available only to those who have sought asylum 
(and to victims of trafficking), perhaps those least likely to feel able to 
return (Gibney, 2009). The NAO finds voluntary removal to cost up to 
£3,400 less than forced removal for a single person and £14,600 less 
for a family (NAO, 2009a: para 2.33). A financial incentive to return 
could thus be an investment well spent.
Foreign prisoners
The year 2006 saw the explosion of an issue that has no relation to 
immigration offences per se but has nevertheless become one plank 
wilful betrayal or capacity constrained?
180
of the enforcement agenda: the deportation of foreign nationals. 
Disclosure that, through administrative error, over a thousand foreign 
national prisoners had been released over the previous seven years 
after serving sentences for serious offences without any consideration 
given to deportation prompted the resignation of the Home Secretary, 
Charles Clarke. The incident led to a rapid rise in deportations and, by 
changing the law (the UK Borders Act 2007), to automatic deportation 
of any foreign national who has been sentenced to 12 months in prison. 
EEA nationals are largely excluded, as are refugees.
Deportation in these circumstances breaches the principle that no 
one should suffer a second punishment for the same offence, severing 
people from their homes, families and livelihoods. Nevertheless, some 
thought the government should go further: that for a second conviction 
the ‘trigger’ should be a six-month sentence, that the courts should be 
able to make deportation part of the sentence itself and that proceedings 
should commence at the beginning of a sentence to avoid any delay 
(Thorp, 2007).
reality check
Notwithstanding the stepping up of enforcement over the past decade, 
it would be ‘naive’ to assume that government aims to eliminate or even 
significantly reduce all forms of illegality given competing pressures 
that include the economic necessity of facilitating cross-border traffic of 
people and freight, the cost of enforcing immigration and employment 
law, public resistance to intrusive surveillance, and the barriers to 
removing those found in breach of the law (Ruhs and Anderson, 2009).
Border security is in essence a risk management process: 100% 
effective controls are not practical because of the volume of passenger 
journeys and the economic benefits from that movement. Each year 
30 million international tourists bring more than £16 billion to 
the tourism industry, our third-largest export earner. The Coalition 
government intends to attract an additional 4 million visitors over 
the next four years, generating £2 billion in additional spending and 
50,000 jobs (Hunt, 2010; HM Treasury, 2011: para 2.310). In 2006, it 
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was estimated that a 10-minute rise in UK passport clearance could 
represent an opportunity cost of £400 million a year. Government 
cannot afford to jeopardise that income and the livelihood of many 
small businesses. In 2008, Home Office plans to cut the time limit on a 
visitor visa from six to three months were reportedly dropped on those 
grounds (Travis, 2008). In its agreements with private-sector carriers, 
government has been explicit in seeking ‘to balance the potentially 
conflicting demands of rapid transit systems with the need for risk 
minimising measures’ (Gregory, 2009: 5; see also Cabinet Office, 2007).
Within the UK there is a direct tension between the level of 
regulation and inspection of the labour market necessary to limit 
spaces for illegality and the preference of successive governments for a 
light-touch approach. Intrusive border and internal controls, moreover, 
have the potential to infringe privacy, alienate employers, disrupt 
business and service provision, deter students from choosing the UK, 
and damage relationships between tutors and students (Chapter 3). In 
excluding irregular migrants from services, we saw that controls risk not 
only their well-being but also that of the public. Such considerations 
have influenced both the direction of policy and the extent to which 
it is enforced.
Data on enforcement suggests, moreover, that despite the plethora 
of new powers, initiatives, inter-agency cooperation and greater 
resources deployed over the past decade, government is not highly 
successful in preventing, detecting or removing irregular migrants. In 
that experience, the UK is not alone. Much has been written on the 
limited effectiveness of enforcement action in the US and in other 
parts of Europe and on its unintended consequences: encouraging 
those already in the country to stay rather than risk being unable to 
return; diverting migrants into more hazardous means of entry; fuelling 
demand for the services of smugglers; and marginalising irregular 
workers into the least regulated sectors of the labour market. Control 
policies do not change the structural causes of irregular migration and 
thus cannot alone address it.
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restoration of legal status
Even if it were possible to detect all irregular migrants they could not 
all be removed because of the cost of removal and the disruption it 
would cause in workplaces, schools and communities. It is therefore 
sensible to consider whether more could be returned to legal status. 
Across the EU, only five of the 27 member states have no practice of 
regularisation (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, 2009).
The heated reaction to the Liberal Democrat proposal during the 
2010 general election that irregular migrants resident in the UK for 
10 years should be able to access legal status might suggest this was 
an exceptional proposal. Yet there is already a well-used provision of 
this kind. In 2003, the government brought within the Immigration 
Rules an existing ‘Long Residence Concession’ granting indefinite 
leave to remain to irregular migrants after 14 years unless there were 
serious grounds not to do so. The rule had reportedly been applied 
to some 2,000–3,000 cases a year in the 1990s (ippr, 2006). Guidance 
to UKBA staff sets out in some detail the factors that should be 
taken into account including strength of family connections in the 
UK, employment, criminal record, compassionate circumstances and 
positive contributions to society (Garton Grimwood, 2009; UKBA, 
2009a: ch 18). Case law suggests the rule has been applied after 
10 years’ residence (Vollmer, 2008).
There has also been a series of occasions on which successive 
governments have deemed it necessary to regularise the status of some 
thousands of migrants, including a scheme for seasonal agricultural 
workers (1986) and resident domestic workers (1998) and likewise for 
refused asylum seekers and those whose cases had not been resolved, 
in 1993–94, 1999–2000 and again in 2003–05. The UK was not alone 
in finding it necessary to regularise asylum seekers remaining in the 
country, Germany doing so in 2007 for those resident for eight years, 





The UK has never initiated an amnesty for a broader canvas of migrants 
of the kind regularly deployed abroad: a review in 2005 found 22 
such programmes since 1980 in the US and Europe. Those eligible 
were narrowly or broadly defined and what they were offered varied 
from a one-year work permit to permanent residence. Governments 
had been prompted to act in some cases by protests at the treatment 
of the ‘sans papièrs’, but underlying drivers had been the need to 
curb the economic and social consequences of a growing irregular 
underclass and the failure of enforcement measures to do so. Where 
temporary status was offered, many subsequently again became 
irregular. Weaknesses in programme design and administration and 
the unwillingness of employers to pay higher wages for legalised 
workers have proved to be barriers to positive outcomes, while well-
organised permanent programmes have a positive impact on wages 
and occupational mobility (Levinson, 2005). The terms of the offer, 
documentation required, cost and the way it is administered have a 
major impact on whether it is successful in encouraging people to 
apply (Anderson, 2004).
Evidence from the US and from Southern Europe has been that 
regularisation can lead to increased migration due to the extension of 
networks and family ties. US experience, however, is dominated by its 
long land border with Mexico, and Southern Europe by its extensive 
coastline and proximity to North Africa. Experience in Spain, for 
instance, has been influenced by its geographical location, colonial 
history and linguistic ties, and by its high level of demand for unskilled 
labour and narrow front-door for regular migration (Greenway, 2007). 
Experience abroad has nevertheless been taken as an indication that 
any kind of regularisation would be an incentive to migrants to try 
their luck in the UK.
A House of Lords inquiry nevertheless concluded that some form 
of regularisation is ‘unavoidable’ if a growing underclass of people, 
vulnerable to exploitation, is not to be created. It is in the interests 
of society that long-term residents should not remain in an irregular 
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position but should pay their taxes and have access to public services. 
Any regularisation would, however, need to be handled carefully to 
minimise the ‘pull factor’, dealing with cases on an individual basis 
rather than a large-scale amnesty. It should also be monitored carefully, 
providing a rare opportunity to obtain reliable information on the size 
and nature of the irregular population (HL Select Committee on the 
EU, 2002: para 86).
Options for the UK
The option of legal status being restored selectively could focus on 
categories of people (pensioners or family units in which one member 
is unauthorised, for instance) or broader criteria, as in proposals for 
‘earned regularisation’. Temporary permits could be issued initially 
on the basis of length of residence, past record, presence of family 
members, humanitarian considerations, contribution to the economy 
and sponsorship by a reputable organisation, with subsequent eligibility 
to earn longer-term legal status if certain conditions apply, such as 
English language proficiency and no criminal conviction (ippr, 2006, 
2009; JCWI, 2006; MRN, 2009). A modest step could be to adopt 
the ‘bridging visa’ proposed by the Irish government to enable those 
who have become irregular through no fault of their own to return 
to legal status.
The head of the Roman Catholic Church in England and Wales, the 
UNITE union and the Conservative Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, 
are among those who have argued for a regularisation programme in 
some form, the Mayor suggesting migrants could be eligible after five 
years if they could demonstrate a commitment to the UK economy 
and society (BBC, 2008). A regularisation scheme could contribute 
£3 billion per annum to GDP and a further £846 million to the public 
purse, cost £419 million per annum to public services; and potentially 
increase social tensions if there were perceptions of ‘queue-jumping’ 
(Gordon et al, 2009: paras 48–51).
Regularisation should, it is suggested, only be implemented as part of 
a package of reforms designed to reduce future irregularity. To succeed 
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it must reflect an understanding of the behaviour and needs of both 
migrants and employers and learn lessons from earlier programmes. 
A well-planned regularisation policy, as part of a broader package 
of reforms to address the causes of irregularity, has the potential, 
Papademetriou and Somerville argue, ‘to enhance public safety, cement 
the rule of law, increase tax revenues, create more orderly labour 
markets, cut down on exploitation and foster greater social stability’ 
(Papademetriou and Somerville, 2008). It would reduce the number 
of people unknown to the authorities, enable enforcement to focus on 
those who pose a threat, encourage cooperation with the authorities 
by those who currently shun contact and reduce the financial burden 
on local authorities for which they are not reimbursed (see Chapters 2 
and 4). Moreover, they argue, there is no practical alternative solution 
on the table. A fee paid by the migrant could also offset the cost of 
running the programme (Papademetriou and Somerville, 2008).
That view has not been supported by the Conservative or Labour 
parties. Migration Watch argues that regularisation would reward illegal 
behaviour, that those granted an amnesty would be replaced by others 
and that it would be a cost to the public purse because the migrants 
would gain access to the welfare state, albeit offset to an extent by 
their contribution to the economy (Migration Watch, 2006; Garton 
Grimwood, 2009). The actual impacts of regularisation would depend 
on the current economic and social position of irregular migrants, 
their position after regularisation, the effect that removing constraints 
has on their life choices and consequent impacts on the labour and 
housing markets. Those factors depend not only on the design of any 
regularisation scheme but also on the extent to which the migrant has 
been, and subsequently is, integrated into the workforce and society 
(Gordon et al, 2009).
conclusion
The best available estimate is that there were 618,000 irregular migrants 
in the UK in 2007, just over 1% of the population. The majority 
came legally and overstayed. There is a further semi-compliant group 
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working in breach of their conditions of stay. This chapter explored 
the causes of irregularity including the economic functions it serves, 
the extent to which it is shaped by migration and employment policies 
and how it is oiled by a lucrative global industry that exists because 
of the demand for its services. Yet the conditions that lead some 
migrants to risk all to reach the UK may be far removed from those 
leading young people from rich countries to remain after their visa 
has expired. Understanding irregularity in all its forms is a necessary 
basis for appropriate policy intervention.
The consequences of irregularity mean that government cannot be 
complacent yet its response should be proportionate, reflecting the 
modest levels of harm acknowledged to arise in most cases. A legal 
framework set 40 years ago, defining all breaches of the rules as criminal 
offences subject to removal from the UK, has however narrowed the 
scope for policy solutions beyond law enforcement. Redefining the 
less serious breaches so that they attract civil penalties could facilitate 
proportional enforcement and sanctions, the object being future 
compliance not removal from the UK.
The enforcement paradigm has been reinforced by UKBA’s location 
within the Home Office alongside responsibility for policing and 
national security, and its position within an inter-agency partnership 
addressing border control issues relating to drugs, organised crime and 
terrorism. The past decade has seen a constant stream of new offences 
and resources invested in detection, detention and removal. Yet just 
67,000 people were removed in 2009 or left ‘voluntarily’, nearly half 
of whom were detected at ports of entry. That figure, relative to the 
size of the irregular population, suggests that a greater focus is needed 
on prevention, addressing causes within the migration system itself 
and in the labour market.
Where demand for labour is not met from within the EEA, 
lack of legal migration channels encourages irregular working. 
Notwithstanding the impact of the recession, we saw in Chapter 3 
that there remain sectors where pay and conditions are insufficient 
to attract local staff. The government needs to be clear how these 
jobs will be filled by UK or EEA workers if this situation is not to 
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lead ‘overstayers’ to take up this employment. Demand for irregular 
migrants is also shaped by poor working conditions being allowed to 
continue within the labour market. The weakest link in the strategy to 
address irregular migration is the continuing capacity of unscrupulous 
employers to avoid compliance with employment standards. Experience 
abroad suggests that inspection relating to employment standards rather 
than separately as part of immigration control has greater levels of 
acceptance among employers.
If employers are to know whether an individual is entitled to work 
and to check without discriminating on any grounds, all prospective 
employees must have reliable documentation. A secure system of 
verifiable National Insurance numbers for that purpose would have 
been more appropriate than ID cards for foreign nationals. If issued 
solely for employment, there would have been less danger of further 
personal data being added and of cards being demanded for unrelated 
purposes. As in any ID system, it would be effective only to the extent 
that fraudulent manufacture and use is prevented and employers have 
the technology to check the information the card contains. To ensure 
that migrants do not inadvertently fall outside the rules they need clear 
information on their conditions of stay, not simply ‘No recourse to 
public funds’ stamped in their passport. While government recognises 
that it should ‘make it as straightforward as possible for migrants to 
stay compliant’ (Home Office, 2007a: 16) it has a long way to go to 
achieve that objective. Strengthening the evidence base on the full 
range of pathways to irregular status could provide the basis for a 
systematic review of rules and procedures to reduce the rate at which 
this is happening.
Extending identity checks to prevent access to services is highly 
problematic. Although access to some essential services is provided 
regardless of immigration status, the effect of the rules and transfer of 
data to UKBA is denying some individuals health care and potentially 
schooling – to what extent, we do not know. Beyond the implications 
for the individuals concerned, their exclusion from the institutions of 
mainstream society may pose risks to other members of the community. 
One necessary solution is a firewall that enables an individual to use 
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an essential service, and report abuse by their employer or that they 
have been a victim of crime, without their personal details being 
transferred: a firm legal principle that no information gathered by 
those responsible for protecting basic human rights can be used for 
immigration enforcement. That would not only protect the individuals 
concerned but secure their cooperation for the wider public good. 
Enabling exploited employees to report their employer would also, 
in curtailing opportunities for abuse, limit the demand for irregular 
workers.
Notwithstanding the heavy focus of rhetoric on enforcement, we 
saw that UKBA cannot eliminate or even severely reduce the extent 
of irregularity. There are a series of counter-pressures, not least the 
economic necessity of facilitating passenger movements across UK 
borders, the cost of detection and removal, and constraints imposed 
by the courts. This suggests that government should not over-promise 
what cannot be delivered. It might also reconsider its assumption that 
focusing public attention on enforcement activity does reassure: in 
reinforcing misconceptions on the scale of irregularity and the threat 
it poses, it may have the opposite effect.
The limited efficacy of enforcement further reinforces the need to 
look for complementary strategies to address the vulnerability of those 
who remain in the UK and identify pathways for some to return to 
legal status. If the argument for extending regularisation is accepted 
(acknowledging that limited pathways already exist), it is necessary to 
address the concern that it should not reward those who have broken 
the law more than those who abided by it and should minimise 
encouragement to future migrants to overstay. Setting conditions 
for regularisation that require the applicant to cover costs and to 
demonstrate a contribution to the UK (while not so onerous that 
few apply), and setting regularisation alongside preventative measures, 
coupled with proportional enforcement and voluntary return packages, 
could go some way towards meeting those concerns. Reducing the 
threshold for eligibility for automatic consideration well below the 
current residence threshold of 14 years could be a first pragmatic step, 
leading perhaps to consecutive reductions over a period of years to 
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deliver a manageable programme from which lessons could be learnt. 
In this way addressing irregularity would be mainstreamed across 
migration, employment and development policy: regular policies for 
irregular migration.
At the same time, it is important to be realistic. It is possible to 
reduce irregular migration but with the volume of mobility through 
the UK it will continue:
Instead of seeking perfection, with its predictable 
disappointments, controlling illegal immigration might 
proceed from the twin premises that uncertainty and 
imperfection will be a way of life, and policies will always 
be partly an exercise in the inexact. (Papademetriou, 2005)
Note
1 Chahal v the UK (1997) 23 EHRR 413.
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In previous chapters we looked at policy relating to migrants’ entry into the UK. It was evident that people come for different (if 
overlapping) reasons and stay for differing lengths of time. Here we 
look at policy relating to the 1,500 people who on average arrive each 
day and plan to stay for at least a year (Home Office, 2010). The intense 
political debates on migrant numbers are fuelled by perceptions of their 
impacts after arrival. Yet policy relating to what happens to those who 
come to work, study or join family in the UK has been neglected and 
marginal to those debates. That requires some explanation.
More than in any other chapter we find a lack of coherence on policy 
across government and, crucial on this topic, between government 
at national and local level. In part, I shall argue, this is because of a 
lack of clarity on what is meant by ‘integration’ and hence the aims 
of policy intervention; and in part because the policy paradigm had 
its origins in the post-war era and has not adjusted to the migration 
patterns of modern times. More recently, integration was conveniently 
buried within the cohesion agenda. We shall see that EU policy and 
funding has only impinged in limited respects and that there has been 
some convergence with, but also departures from, policies in other EU 
countries. Each, in effect, faces the same questions: what are the aims of 
policy intervention, which policy levers could be used and which tier 
of government should be responsible? Should policy target only some 
of those who come and to what extent should the public, employers 
and civil society be valued partners in delivery?
In Chapter 1, we looked briefly at some of the insights from 
migration theory relevant to developing appropriate policy levers. 
It is equally worth taking a moment to see what we can learn from 
analyses of the integration processes in which migrants are engaged 
before turning to policy at EU level and then to national policy in the 
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UK. Although local strategies are also crucial in this field it is on the 
national policy framework that I necessarily focus here.
Why ‘integration’?
The evolving relationship between migrants and the ‘host society’ 
is most commonly conceptualised in European academic and policy 
literature as ‘integration’. That term is less accepted in the UK, 
carrying connotations of ‘assimilation’: an expectation that migrants 
will become culturally similar to the host population and, as a policy 
objective, that they should (Brubaker, 2001). In policy debates it is also 
not uncommon to find ‘integration’used to refer to a characteristic of 
a group or individual, as in ‘they are not well integrated’. Used in this 
way, the term implies that the onus is solely on migrants, overlooking 
any responsibility that the receiving society might have to address the 
barriers they may face, like discrimination. Integration is also sometimes 
used to refer to a characteristic of a society, as in ‘Britain is one of the 
most integrated countries in the Western world’ (Alibhai Brown, 2006).
Civil society and academic critics have often avoided using 
‘integration’ because of this emphasis on race relations, cultural change 
and the agency of migrants rather than on the systemic barriers to 
participation that minorities can experience. That scepticism was 
reinforced when critics of multiculturalism, following terrorist attacks 
in London in 2005, advocated ‘integration’ as the antidote, encapsulated 
by Prime Minister Blair in a speech entitled ‘The Duty to Integrate: 
Shared British Values’ (Blair, 2006; Kundani, 2007: 123). Critics have 
struggled, however, to find an alternative term. Inclusion, for instance, 
has sometimes been used at the local level because it chimed with the 
mainstream social exclusion agenda (WMSMP, 2009: 3). Inclusion, 
however, implies enclosure within – not the two-way process of mutual 
change in which migrants are engaged.
I use integration here because of a lack of an acceptable alternative 
and because, as used by scholars in continental Europe, it does not 
focus exclusively on cultural change or community relations; nor 
solely on the migrant’s role. Rather, integration is understood as a 
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process engaging not only migrants but also the institutions and people 
among whom they live. It is the nature of the interaction between the 
migrant and society that has been found to determine the outcome 
of the process, but the two players are unequal in terms of power 
and resources: ‘The receiving society, its institutional structure and its 
reactions to newcomers are consequently far more decisive for the 
outcome of the process than the immigrants themselves’ (Penninx and 
Martiniello, 2004: 142).
Equally significant for policy intervention is the analysis that 
integration is not a single process but takes place across economic, 
social, cultural and political domains (Entzinger, 2000; Heckmann et 
al, 2006). In broad terms we can define these as:
•	 Structural: participation in the labour and housing markets and 
in social institutions such as education and health care. Here 
organisations, from public agencies to small employers, are key 
players and the opportunities they provide or barriers they erect 
are influential in integration outcomes.
•	 Social: processes of interaction between migrants and non-migrants 
within and beyond the workplace and social institutions.
•	 Cultural: changes in values and behaviour; including attitudes and 
behaviour towards migrants.
•	 Civic and political: participation in community life and the democratic 
process.
•	 Identity: the process that enables individuals, notwithstanding 
differing cultural backgrounds, beliefs and identities, to feel at some 
level that they can identify with the neighbourhood or country in 
which, and people among whom, they are living.
In this chapter, I therefore use the term integration to mean: processes 
of interaction between migrants and the individuals and institutions 
of the receiving society that facilitate economic, social, cultural, and 




Underpinning participation in each domain are migrants’ legal rights: 
whether they are permitted to work, to access public services and 
to vote, for instance, and their responsibilities. Whether the legal 
framework is inclusive or exclusive thus has significant implications 
for integration outcomes (Spencer, 2006a).
integration processes: what do we know?
Comparative studies in Europe reveal similarities in the experiences of 
migrants from different countries of origin but also differences between 
and within migrant groups, not least between men and women: there 
is no single integration experience (Kofman and Phizacklea, 2000; 
Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000). Significantly, a positive experience in 
one domain is not necessarily mirrored in another. An individual may 
be securely employed for instance but have little social interaction, 
nor identify with their local area (Spencer and Cooper, 2006; Rutter 
et al, 2008).
In designing policy levers, it is helpful to clarify that there are three 
sets of factors known to facilitate or impede integration processes:
•	 Factors relating to the migrant: including reasons for migration; 
education; skill level and previous work experience; proficiency in 
English; age; knowledge of the ways in which the labour market and 
services operate; and motivation. Migrants’ social and community 
networks also play a role in access to jobs and services (Castles, 2001; 
Kloosterman and Rath, 2003). Evidence on the relative importance 
of these factors is an essential foundation for policy intervention. We 
know for instance that language proficiency is strongly associated 
with the probability of being employed (Dustmann et al, 2003) and 
that migrants with poor English are least likely to have the practical 
information they need on arrival, to feel well treated by British 
people or to mix with them socially (Spencer et al, 2007).
•	 Factors relating to the society: determining whether there are 
opportunities open to migrants in relation to the labour market, 
accommodation, social and civic participation. At different points 
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in the economic cycle and in differing localities there may or may 
not be jobs that match their skills. Accommodation and other 
resources may be scarce; local institutions may be more or less open 
to participation by newcomers; and neighbours may be welcoming, 
distant or hostile. The history of migration into a neighbourhood, 
its current ethnic profile and lack of experience of migrants among 
local service providers have been found among the relevant factors 
at the local level (Waters and Jimenez, 2005; Robinson and Reeve, 
2006; SC Communities and Local Government, 2008: 13).
•	 Policy interventions: including generic policies covering all residents 
and targeted measures such as language tuition, specialist health care 
and local information packs; measures to address discrimination and 
public hostility; dispersal to areas ill equipped to meet migrants’ needs 
(Phillimore and Goodson, 2008a); and rules that allow or restrict 
migrants’ access to work and services.
Looking at migrant inequality in the employment domain in particular, 
we find 10 causal factors identified, including language proficiency, 
discrimination, length of residence, lack of knowledge of job-seeking 
processes, poor health and immigration status. Migrants found the 
service at Jobcentre Plus poorly tailored to their needs (Rutter et 
al, 2008). An earlier study of barriers to refugees’ labour market 
participation found language, lack of UK work experience, lack of 
qualifications and employer discrimination to be the principal factors 
(Bloch, 2004). The overall employment rate of the foreign-born is 67%, 
not far short of 73.5% for the UK-born (data for the first quarter of 
2010; ONS, 2010); but the far lower employment rates of those born 
in countries such as Bangladesh and Somalia can be masked by the 
high rates of white migrants (Dustmann and Fabbri, 2005; Cangiano, 
2007: Table 1).
It is striking that, beyond employment, evidence on outcomes for 
migrants, as opposed to ethnic minorities, is not routinely monitored. 
Even within employment there are significant gaps in knowledge 
essential for any integration strategy, such as the impacts of those labour 
market programmes for which migrants are eligible (Cangiano, 2007). 
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The most comprehensive review of inequality ever commissioned by 
government was not asked to include the foreign-born within its focus 
(NEP, 2010). There is an active debate on the way in which indicators 
can be used to measure integration, their limitations (eg in regularly 
omitting measures of adaptation by the host society) and the paucity 
of data available in practice to conduct the analysis (Entzinger and 
Biezeveld, 2003; Ager and Strang, 2004; Carrera, 2008; Phillimore and 
Goodson, 2008b; Niessen et al, 2009).
Models of policy intervention
Integration processes take place regardless of policy intervention. 
Migrants may find jobs, access public services and develop a sense of 
attachment to their neighbourhood without the benefit of any targeted 
policy measures, but policy may facilitate (or hinder) that process. The 
question is what forms of intervention are most likely to foster that 
participation and what level of resources should be invested, by and 
for whom. We might expect that some aspects of integration will be 
more susceptible to policy intervention than others.
There is a whole body of literature exploring why countries have 
different ‘philosophies of integration’, including differing traditions 
in the roles of public bodies and of welfare states (Favell, 2001b). 
Typologies often characterise countries as having clearly defined 
models: the French as ‘assimilationist’, for instance, and the UK as 
‘multicultural’. Evidence suggests that there may have been strengths 
and weaknesses in the differing approaches across integration domains: 
France more successful in encouraging migrant youth to identify as 
French, for instance, but weak on labour market integration,  Germany 
stronger on access to jobs and training, but weak on identification 
(Heckmann et al, 2001).
In recent times, interventions have nevertheless been more similar 
than those dichotomies suggest (Ireland, 2004). Policies are responding 
to similar pressures and interventions have shown some convergence 
at the national and local level: in narrowing the gap between rights 
enjoyed by citizens and long-term residents, for instance, and in 
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combating discrimination (Niessen, 2001: 31). A common feature 
has been policy shifts in reaction to events and to address what are 
perceived to be failures of earlier approaches (Doormernik, 2003). It is 
also common to find a gap between national policies and those at the 
local level where the social and economic situation may be different 
from that in the capital and local politicians develop their own approach 
(Castles et al, 2002; Ireland, 2004; Penninx and Martiniello, 2004).
Nevertheless, there remain four differences in emphasis across Europe 
that are reflected in recent policy shifts in the UK:
•	 whether policy focuses on individuals or minority communities;
•	 whether the priority is economic, social or cultural integration;
•	 which categories of migrant are the target of policy intervention; and
•	 whether participation in language and civic courses is voluntary 
or required.
Focus on individuals or minority communities?
Some European governments have, to an extent, pursued multicultural 
policies that see value in diverse cultural traditions, recognise ethnic 
(and recently faith) communities and give this recognition some 
institutional form (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010: 3). Arrangements are 
made to consult minority communities and minor adjustments made 
in law to accommodate cultural or religious differences, in relation to 
burial arrangements for instance. Legislation to tackle discrimination 
does so on the basis of an individual’s membership of a group defined 
by race, religion or belief and data is collected on that basis to provide 
an evidence base.
Advocates of this approach argue that valuing cultural heritage 
provides a positive identity and community support to individuals 
who are making their way in a sometimes hostile environment. It 
recognises that group membership is a factor in the way an individual 
is treated; while collecting data according to group membership makes 
it possible to implement effective anti-discrimination legislation. The 
rights of communities can be balanced against the right not to be 
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part of that community (Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic 
Britain, 2000: para 3.26), and respect for cultural traditions is not to 
be hidebound by them:
Multicultural integration policies support neither the crossing 
of boundaries from one culture to another, as do assimilation 
policies, nor the preservation of those boundaries, as does 
segregation, but aim to foster their permeability. (Spencer 
and Rudiger, 2003)
Critics counter that a multicultural approach can nevertheless 
overemphasise group differences, create vested interests in local ethnic 
political groupings, give too much power to patriarchal community 
leaders and reinforce what divides rather than what we have in 
common. It can ossify cultural practices that would otherwise adapt 
over time, pigeonhole individuals into an identity that may play a small 
part in their lives and encourage solidarity around ethnicity rather than 
political ideals. To some critics, its raison d’etre is less the protection 
of rights, than the maintenance of public order through managing 
relations between majority and minority populations (Favell, 2001a, 
2001b; Ireland, 2004; Malik, 2005).
These concerns contr ibuted to a ser ious questioning of 
multiculturalism in the UK in the past decade (Alibhai Brown, 2000; 
Goodhart, 2004; Phillips, 2005), reflected in Labour’s community 
cohesion agenda and, in reform of access to citizenship, in its emphasis 
on strengthening the direct relationship between the individual and 
the state.
Priority for intervention: economic, social or cultural integration?
Across Europe, policy prioritises some domains of integration more 
than others. States operating temporary labour schemes, for instance, 
may place little emphasis on migrants’ social integration, even though 
the migrants live within the community and may in practice remain 
long term (Entzinger, 2000). Equally, a focus on integration in the 
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labour market may neglect public attitudes towards migrants; or a 
focus on cultural integration may neglect access to jobs and services. 
Within the cultural domain, the degree to which shared norms are in 
fact necessary may be overemphasised (Bader, 2001) and the extent 
to which it is appropriate for the state to intervene to secure that goal 
is open to challenge. Policies relating to separate domains can also be 
uncoordinated or contradictory. In part this happens because strategies 
lack clear goals or are subject to competing departmental objectives 
(Zetter et al, 2002).
Which migrants?
On the first day that a migrant arrives, he or she is embarking on a 
process of integration into the UK’s economic, social and cultural 
life. If the visit is a short one, it is a process that will not proceed far. 
If it is a permanent stay, it may continue until they participate across 
all domains. A key question is whether all these new migrants should 
be the focus of integration policies and, if not, to whom intervention 
should be directed.
Across Europe, it is common to find a strong focus on refugees and/
or family migrants (though not the latter in the UK), while those who 
have come for work may also receive some support in improving their 
language and job skills. Mobile EU citizens are not seen as ‘migrants’, 
however (and cannot, therefore, be beneficiaries of EU-supported 
integration initiatives), despite facing many of the same challenges. 
The focus of EU and UK integration measures is invariably limited 
to legal migrants, although some European cities provide services to 
those with irregular status or fund non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) to do so (CLIP, 2008) and the integration processes in which 
they are effectively engaged cannot be ignored (see Chapter 5). UK 
interventions have focused on those remaining in the long term, while 
EU debates increasingly recognise that temporary residents may face 




A number of European states have recently required non-European 
migrants to demonstrate language skills and civic knowledge and/or to 
engage in integration programmes, some with compulsory testing. EU 
law and policy does not preclude this approach, including pre-entry 
testing as a condition of entry. Compulsion was first evident in relation 
to language and civic orientation courses for new arrivals (Spencer 
and Di Mattia, 2004). The Netherlands was the first EU country 
to expect migrants to start the integration process before departure, 
basic knowledge of the Dutch language and society being required 
as a condition of entry for family migrants from 2006. The test and 
substantial accompanying fee, it is argued, also has the implicit aim 
of reducing the number who enter (Carrera and Wiesbrock, 2009). 
Denmark is among those that have followed suit and, in relation to 
language proficiency, Germany and the UK (see later). We should bear 
in mind these differing approaches as we explore the development of 
integration policies first at EU level and then within the UK.
eu policy framework
Integration per se was not within the competency of the EU until 
the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. A limited role was nevertheless agreed from 
2003 on the grounds that failure of one member state to implement a 
successful integration policy could have adverse implications elsewhere. 
A modest programme of activity has been underpinned by agreement 
on Common Basic Principles on Integration (CEU, 2004), significant 
despite having no legal force because they reflect a level of consensus 
on what is meant by integration and the shared responsibility of 
migrants, the state, employers and civil society to facilitate it. The 11 
principles take as their premise that ‘immigration is a permanent feature 
of European society’ and that the successful integration of migrants is 
an essential part of managing migration effectively, but that member 
state policies and their target groups will differ. Integration is seen as 
‘a dynamic, long-term and continuous two way process of mutual 
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accommodation’ demanding the participation not only of immigrants 
but of ‘every resident’, and the onus is on states to create opportunities 
for immigrants’ full economic, social, cultural and political participation 
(CEU, 2004).
Implementation of EU policy has been through sharing evidence 
on good practice, including handbooks focusing on key areas such 
as civic participation and a dedicated website launched in 2009 
(European Commission, 2010). More significantly for the UK, a fund 
for the integration of third-country nationals (2007–2013, following 
an earlier Refugee Integration Fund) has supported a modest grant 
programme, while allowing most of it to be allocated to funding 
English language tuition (UKBA, 2008: 18). The Lisbon Treaty 
(Art 63a.4) now provides a mandate for measures ‘to provide incentives 
and support’ for integration but still only for third-country nationals. 
In a debate with resonance in the UK, it has been argued that 
responsibility for integration should be moved from the European 
Commission’s (then) Justice, Freedom and Security directorate, where 
it sits alongside immigration and security issues, to directorates with 
more relevant competencies and resources, such as Employment and 
Social Affairs (Collett, 2009).
Aspects of earlier EU policy were already relevant to integration, 
notably those relating to employment and social inclusion. Most 
significant were the Race and Employment Directives in 2000 that 
required member states to make discrimination unlawful in relation 
to employment and, to an extent, in services. EU law thus provided a 
framework for addressing one of the significant barriers migrants can 
face. Discrimination was, however, the one dimension of integration 
policy that was already well developed in the UK.
uK policy development
Research across Europe has found that differences between national 
and local contexts, the short timescale in which politicians need to see 
‘results’ and a political climate of hostility to migrants are among factors 
that limit integration policy options (Penninx and Martiniello, 2004). 
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National policy frameworks can be slow to adapt because institutional 
arrangements are anchored in a particular national ideology, leading 
to ‘pathological’ policy problems on which the political system finds 
it hard to think afresh (Favell, 2001a: 50).
We saw in Chapter 1 how racism marred the 1964 general election 
and that stark evidence of discrimination led the government to outlaw 
discrimination in public places and incitement to racial hatred in the 
first Race Relations Act of 1965. Citing the goal as ‘integration’, Home 
Secretary Roy Jenkins famously defined it as ‘not a flattening process 
of assimilation but as equal opportunity accompanied by cultural 
diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Rose et al, 1969: 25). 
The policy model that emerged, including rights to stand and vote in 
elections, ready access to citizenship and mechanisms for managing 
race relations through ‘community leaders’, was designed for a migrant 
population from a limited number of countries with historical links to 
the UK, expected to remain in the long term. It proved slow to adapt 
to the ‘superdiversity’ and greater mobility of migrants in recent years 
(Vertovec, 2007). The arrival of white migrants from Eastern Europe, 
in particular, revealed the ‘conceptual emptiness of the old policy 
framework’ (Favell, 2001a: 55).
Significantly, while the initial target of intervention was those 
who had arrived from abroad, it soon shifted to the second and 
subsequent generations. The necessity of separating policy relating 
to these British citizens from that relating to ‘immigrants’ has meant 
that policy towards ethnic minorities has been divorced from, and in 
Whitehall institutionally quite separate from, any policy relating to 
new arrivals. Moreover, while policy towards minorities retained a 
high political profile, policy relating to new migrants did not. With 
the partial exception of refugees, new migrants have been marginal 
to the policy agenda.
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from anti-discrimination to a duty to advance 
equality
The early Race Relations Acts were, despite their limitations, path-
breaking measures to address discrimination. From the first Act in 
1965, the law was strengthened over time to cover direct and indirect 
discrimination in relation to jobs, goods, facilities and services; and from 
2000 to require the 43,000 public bodies in Britain, from government 
departments through to schools and hospitals, to promote equality 
and good race relations, a duty subsequently extended to disability 
and gender.
In practice, the ‘race equality duty’, like the earlier anti-discrimination 
measures, has largely been used to address issues relating to ethnic 
minorities rather than recent migrants (McCarvill, 2011). Although the 
term ‘racial’ in the Race Relations Act means ‘colour, race, nationality, 
ethnic or national origins’, its relevance to people from abroad facing 
discrimination on the basis of nationality or national origins has 
received little attention. The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), 
established to promote and enforce the Act, had the power to investigate 
the operation of immigration control but migrants were never central 
to its agenda (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 252). The CRE’s successor, 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission, has shown greater 
interest in embracing them within its remit.
An EU Directive and pressure from Muslim communities prompted 
government to extend the law to discrimination on grounds of religion 
or belief. The Equality Act 2010 subsequently went further in providing 
a single duty on public bodies to advance equality on all grounds 
and to promote good community relations. That duty is potentially a 
powerful means to ensure that public bodies, in their employment and 
service provision, advance equality for all residents, including migrants. 
Yet the intentional exclusion of some migrants from full access to 
jobs and services, on the basis of their immigration status, may leave 
public bodies unsure as to whether the duty to advance equality should 
embrace this section of the community or not.
213
integration and citizenship
Equality for whom? Legal restrictions on access to jobs and 
services
While new migrants are entitled to civil rights such as freedom of 
speech as soon as they arrive, for many – as we have seen – the law 
restricts access to jobs, services, social housing, welfare benefits and 
voting: a pattern of restrictions that has developed ad hoc with no clear 
rationale. Migrant children can nevertheless attend state schools and 
there are no restrictions on using services such as public libraries or 
emergency health care. The result is complex, different categories of 
migrant having differing entitlements depending on their immigration 
status, country of origin and length of residence in the UK (Spencer 
and Pobjoy, 2011).
This pattern of inclusion and exclusion reflects a tension between 
the benefits to individuals, the economy and society of allowing access, 
and competing political and fiscal pressures to restrict it. Services such 
as English language tuition contribute to employability, and exclusion 
from a service can prove counterproductive: for instance, use of hospital 
emergency services when treatment by a GP would have been more 
cost-effective. Human rights obligations have constrained attempts to 
limit access in some cases (see Chapter 2); and government has seen a 
strong public health rationale for allowing all migrants to have access 
to treatment for communicable diseases (see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, 
provision incurs costs, not least if migrants have particular needs such 
as for an interpreter.
Underlying the tension between inclusion and exclusion can also 
be a difference of view as to whether entitlement should be on the 
basis of need or long-term residence or ‘belonging’. Social housing 
is the service that, rationed for all residents, most acutely highlights 
the implications of that choice. Where long-term residents wait 
long periods to access suitable accommodation, ill feeling may be 
generated if migrants are perceived to ‘jump the queue’ (Dench et 
al, 2006). Yet assessment of entitlement solely at the local level is not 
possible when migration contributes disproportionately to the national 
public purse, while having social costs that are concentrated among 
residents competing in a ‘scarcity auction’ for social housing at the 
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local level (Keith, 2008). Government estimates that only 6% of social 
housing lettings to new tenants went to foreign nationals in 2006/07. 
Nevertheless, ‘people feel very strongly about these issues, which go 
to the heart of their sense of fairness’ (CLG, 2008b: 24). The fact that 
most new migrants are ineligible for social housing and that there is 
evidence of extreme housing need has not resolved that tension for 
which the underlying cause is the shortage of accommodation (SC 
Communities and Local Government, 2008: 18; Robinson, 2010a).
Despite the significance of health, education and housing services 
in particular to integration processes, and the emphasis on advancing 
equality for ethnic minorities, government has not developed an 
evidence base on the impact of excluding migrants from these key 
services. Evidence on their implications should be part of any review 
of the efficacy of the current policy framework.
targeted integration strategy: refugees only
Recognition of the importance of jobs and services to new migrants has 
indeed been the rationale for the only targeted integration strategy that 
the UK has seen: for refugees. Reflecting the rise in refugee numbers 
and evidence of poor education, health and employment outcomes, 
the catalyst for Full and Equal Citizens (Home Office, 2000) was the 
availability of a new EU funding stream, the Refugee Integration Fund. 
Politically, it also served as a positive counterweight to the increasingly 
negative measures being taken to deter asylum seekers (Spencer, 2007). 
The aim was to help refugees secure access to jobs, accommodation, 
benefits, health, education and language services and to encourage 
community participation, all cited as key factors in ‘the integration 
process’. But there was no question of extending it to other migrants: 
“The assumption was that if coming to the UK is planned then you 
would be better prepared. But at the time it wasn’t discussed if it should 
be a broader strategy”.1
A National Refugee Integration Forum with strong NGO 
participation was set up to identify barriers to integration and 
practical solutions (with a parallel arrangement in Scotland). Its work 
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on employability was instrumental in the Department for Work and 
Pensions’ own strategy, Working to Rebuild Lives (2003, revised in 2005), 
targeting practical assistance on refugees seeking to enter the labour 
market, including access to National Insurance numbers, employment 
training and adaptation of professional qualifications obtained abroad. 
Significantly, this labour market focus in particular has never been 
replicated for other migrants (Cangiano, 2007).
The emphasis in the strategy was on opportunities for refugees to 
develop their potential, moving to self-sufficiency through work and 
inclusion in community life, with assurance that ‘inclusion in our 
society does not mean that a refugee is required to assimilate’ (Home 
Office, 1999: para 2.3). Revised in 2005, at the end of a decade in 
which more than 250,000 people had been granted refugee status or 
exceptional leave to remain (Home Office, 2005) it was sold to the 
press as a strategy to ensure that refugees contribute to the UK. It 
nevertheless remained focused on opportunity not compulsion and, 
significantly, defined integration as:
the process that takes place when refugees are empowered 
to achieve their full potential as members of British society, 
to contribute to the community, and to become fully able to 
exercise the rights and responsibilities that they share with 
other residents. (Home Office, 2005: 6)
Noting barriers such as lack of access to training, the aim was a 
personalised service in which refugees’ needs were assessed so that 
they could be signposted to relevant services. From 2008, a Refugee 
Integration and Employment Service was established to provide a 
12-month advice, employment support and mentoring service but 
the level of support provided, including that given to refugees on the 
Gateway programme (see Chapter 2), has never proved sufficient to 
address the disproportionate unemployment or broader challenges they 
experience (Phillimore and Goodson, 2008a; Evans and Murray, 2009).
Government insistence on the exclusion of asylum seekers from the 
strategy has also been a significant concern. NGO critics insist that the 
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integration process starts when the claim for asylum is made and that 
access to language support, decent housing and health care is critical to 
the longer term: a difference of view that reflects the tension between 
the Home Office’s overarching concern to limit asylum numbers and 
competing integration objectives (Refugee Council, 2009).
It is not only asylum seekers that have been excluded, however, but 
migrants who come to work, for family reasons or to study. There has 
thus been no review of the evidence on the barriers they experience, 
or consultation on how they might similarly be empowered to achieve 
their full potential as members of British society. A government review 
of the language requirements for accessing citizenship in 2003 did argue 
that more should be done to foster the integration of new migrants 
(Life in the UK Advisory Group, 2002, 2003). Ministers, however, 
had no appetite for a broader strategy: “There was no money to do 
something for new arrivals. Ministerial level discussion agreed that 
we would start with those applying for citizenship and work back 
from there”.2
english language proficiency
In the absence of a broader strategy for newcomers, expansion of 
English language tuition – through increased demand rather than 
strategic intention – is the principal means through which integration 
can be said to have been fostered. The central government budget 
contributing directly to integration in 2008 was estimated to be 
£350 million, of which more than £250 million was for English 
language courses (UKBA, 2008: 16–17). A level of English language 
proficiency is widely recognised as critical for those supporting families, 
accessing services, employability and communicating with the wider 
community (DIUS, 2009: 7). The cost of provision, however, raises 
the question of who should pay, whether learning English should be 
voluntary or required (before or after arrival), whether it should be 
a priority for those whose residence is only temporary, and whether 
translation of information into migrant languages reduces the incentive 
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to learn English (Audit Commission, 2007; SC Communities and Local 
Government, 2008: 42).
Access to education for children has been the service in which the 
importance of universal access has effectively outweighed counter-
pressures. The principal challenge for schools is language support 
for the rising number of children for whom English is an additional 
language and the range of first languages spoken. From the 1960s, 
additional resources have been provided, latterly through an Ethnic 
Minority Achievement Grant (CLG, 2008b: 7). Schools can also be 
affected by unanticipated increases in pupil numbers and ‘churn’ during 
the school year and by the needs of parents unfamiliar with the UK 
school system (Audit Commission, 2007).
For adults there is no separate introductory language programme 
for newcomers as in some European countries. Migrants may attend 
mainstream English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) classes, 
or a combined ‘language with civic content’ course. The increased 
demand for tuition following EU enlargement in 2004, coupled with 
requirements on applicants for citizenship to pass a language test (see 
later), led to increased provision and expenditure more than tripled 
between 2001 and 2008/09 while still failing to meet demand. To cut 
costs, asylum seekers in the UK for less than six months were excluded 
from fee remission from 2007 as were those on ‘no recourse to public 
funds’ (Phillimore and Goodson, 2008a).
Women from low-income families and low-paid workers were 
among those most affected (NIACE, 2008; SC Communities and Local 
Government, 2008: 39). Critics argued that the cutbacks would make 
it more difficult for those no longer eligible to become self-sufficient 
and to qualify for citizenship. Those who have entered the UK as 
spouses do not qualify for free language tuition in their first year, for 
instance, yet may have started a family or entered work during that 
period, reducing their subsequent availability for classes. Moreover, 
the earlier tuition starts, the quicker English is learnt and delay leads 
to additional costs if translation and interpreters are needed. The 
expert agency on adult education, the National Institute of Adult and 
Continuing Education (NIACE), argues that all those with language 
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skills below ESOL level 1 should at least be entitled to free provision 
until they reach that level (NIACE, 2008).
There has been a long-term concern that those working shifts or 
anti-social hours find it difficult to access tuition. More than two 
thirds of those who speak little English on arrival do not take English 
classes (Bloch, 2002: Table 4.3; Spencer et al, 2007). An inquiry in 
2006 found the quality of some teaching to be substandard and a lack 
of qualified teachers in parts of the country (Grover, 2006). Research 
also found provision to be insufficiently vocational and to offer little 
opportunity for the highly skilled to attain a necessary level of English 
to work in their profession. Failure to employ learning as a tool for 
integration means migrants have limited opportunities to develop their 
employability (Phillimore and Goodson, 2008a: 112). At the time of 
writing, it is unclear what impact further public expenditure cuts in 
2011 may have on the capacity of ESOL provision to meet demand.
Sharing the cost: employers
The cost of tuition raises the question whether employers who benefit 
from migrant labour should contribute. Labour argued that they bear 
some responsibility but was reluctant to insist:
Where employers fail to support English language training 
they are effectively externalizing the costs of employing 
migrant workers onto local services in their area. Businesses 
clearly benefit from a well integrated work-force that can 
speak English. Employers should look to include English 
language training as a part of creating a successful long-term 
sustainable business which adds value to the community. 
(CLG, 2008b: 33)
Some employers do take steps to facilitate integration, encouraged 
to do so by a Business in the Community Code of Practice on 
‘how they can make migrant workers feel welcome and … integrate 
more effectively into their workplace and the community’ (BIC, 
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2008: 2). Nevertheless, many are unable or unwilling to provide 
language training: ‘Widespread employer buy-in has not been secured 
through the prevailing system of voluntarism and exhortation’ (NIACE, 
2008: para 45).
Pre-entry English requirements
Concern that migrants should have sufficient English on arrival led 
to a requirement that labour migrants have a level of proficiency in 
speaking, reading and writing English before coming to the UK. 
More controversially those coming on the basis of marriage or civil 
partnership are now also required to speak some English before arrival 
(UKBA, 2009). The level required is said to need 40–50 hours of 
tuition and is justified in terms of future employability and savings 
to the taxpayer of translation services. The UK is not alone in taking 
this route, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, for instance, all 
having done so. Nevertheless, there is limited access to English classes 
in some regions of the world and those who are not literate in their 
own language or cannot afford classes may struggle to reach the level 
required. Hence they will not be able to join their families in the UK 
(see Chapter 4).
community cohesion agenda
The absence of a broader strategy to promote integration can in part be 
explained by Labour’s heavy focus after 2001 on community cohesion, 
notwithstanding that its target group only latterly included migrants. 
The driver of cohesion policy was disturbances in northern towns in 
the summer of 2001. A subsequent inquiry was:
struck by the depth of polarisation in our towns and cities.… 
Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary 
bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and 
cultural networks, mean that many communities operate on 
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the basis of a series of parallel lives. (Cantle and Community 
Cohesion Review Team, 2001)
The target of concern was second-generation ethnic minority youth, 
not newcomers to the UK. The agenda that emerged, resonating with 
critiques of multiculturalism, emphasised contact across community 
divides, civic participation and a shared sense of belonging based on 
common goals and shared values (Home Office, 2001). The focus was 
on addressing ethnic divides rather than the economic inequalities 
that underlay them (Flint and Robinson, 2008). Within weeks of the 
disturbances, the events of 9/11 in New York had added a security 
dimension to the agenda, reinforced by the London bombings of July 
2005, but the focus was the radicalisation of British-born people. When 
the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG), now 
responsible for the cohesion agenda, published its 152-page progress 
report the following year, reference to migrants merited less than a page 
(CLG, 2006). There was by then a lively debate on whether the diversity 
brought by migration undermined social solidarity and support for 
the welfare state, a ‘progressive dilemma’ that meant supporters of the 
welfare state could not simultaneously support high levels of migration 
(Goodhart, 2004). Nevertheless, the thrust of the argument was for less 
migration, not for measures to promote the integration of those already 
in the UK. Empirical evidence also cast doubt on the underlying claim 
(Banting and Kymlicka, 2006; Evans, 2006).
The relevance of migration to the cohesion agenda was however 
brought to the fore by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion 
(CIC), established to explore ways in which empowerment of local 
communities could build capacity to prevent and address community 
tensions (CIC, 2007a). The timing, following a major terrorist attack 
in London in 2005, was no coincidence. Nevertheless, the CIC struck 
a new tone in taking as its starting point that 80% of the public think 
people in their area get on well together, and challenged claims that 
Britain was ‘sleepwalking to segregation’ (see also Finney and Simpson, 
2009). It also questioned the narrow focus of the cohesion agenda 
on the ‘parallel lives’ scenario, arguing that the causes of community 
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tension differ. Competition for limited public resources could, for 
instance, create community divides if there was a perception that 
migrants were receiving special treatment to which longer-term 
residents were denied.
The CIC saw integration as a process running in parallel to cohesion, 
defining it as ‘the process that ensures new residents and existing 
residents adapt to one another’ (CIC, 2007b: 9). Nevertheless, and 
to that end, it argued that it was in the UK’s interests for migrants 
– whether temporary or permanent – to be able to participate fully 
in the labour market and in their local communities. Identifying a 
series of ‘barriers to integration’, from lack of information and advice 
through non-recognition of qualifications to public hostility, it noted 
that there was no single place in Government responsible for helping 
to address those barriers. Support of migrants was falling by default 
to local areas, leading to ad hoc local initiatives and some duplication 
of effort with no central guidance. All levels of government should 
do more, supported by an independent agency with a remit to foster 
economic, social and political participation: a source of evidence and 
guidance on good practice that could support local practitioners, ‘secure 
buy-in’ from Whitehall and the third sector, and act as a catalyst for 
policy development. Alongside action to address the concerns of settled 
communities, it advocated local contracts, in which new migrants 
would register at their local town hall and be given information and 
advice, there being a need to find creative ways to provide ‘cultural 
briefing’ on the norms and expectations particular to local areas (CIC, 
2007b: paras 5.24–5.45).
‘Integration’ subsumed within cohesion
In its response, however, the government rejected the call for a broad 
integration agenda, subsuming ‘integration’ within the good relations 
parameters of cohesion:
Community cohesion is what must happen in all communities 
to enable different groups of people to get on well together. A 
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key contributor to community cohesion is integration which 
is what must happen to enable new residents and existing 
residents to adjust to one another. (CLG, 2008a: para 1.3)
That definition of integration bears little resemblance to that we saw 
in the Home Office’s Refugee Integration Strategy, with its emphasis 
on the empowerment of refugees to achieve their full potential, a 
distinction recognised by UKBA:
“There is a much narrower definition of integration in CLG. 
It is seen as people getting on, as a subset of cohesion. It is 
a slightly different focus from the UKBA perspective. We 
recognise that integration takes place at different levels. We 
have a sharp focus on language and on knowledge of life in 
the UK, and a stronger focus on support for the individual 
whereas CLG are looking at the big picture, and the big 
picture is cohesion.”3
Defining integration in this way enabled CLG to fit the language of 
integration within its existing agendas, not only cohesion but a related 
issue that hit the radar of CLG after enlargement of the EU in 2004: 
the impacts of migration on local services:
“CLG ministers were not trying to make a grab for migration 
policy. They didn’t want to take on the responsibilities of 
other departments. But there were two things that were not 
covered – community impacts and coordination. So CLG 
took that on. The implicit assumption was that someone else 
was dealing with support for newcomers. It wasn’t their job.”4
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focus on impacts of migration at the local level
The government had not anticipated the significant number of ‘A8’ 
migrants that would come to the UK following enlargement of the 
EU. No consideration was given to the implications for services or to 
wider steps to facilitate integration. Yet EU citizens can experience 
many of the same challenges as other migrants (Markova and Black, 
2007; Spencer et al, 2007a).
Local service providers complained that they had insufficient 
resources to address the additional demands placed on them, in part 
because data on local population numbers (on which eligibility for 
funding is based) did not take account of recent changes. Had there 
been any overarching strategy for migration it might have been 
anticipated that investment in public services would need to keep pace, 
but there was no mechanism for forward planning of that kind. The 
Audit Commission found unanticipated numbers of East European 
children in schools, overcrowded housing posing health and safety risks, 
community tensions (for instance, in relation to rubbish disposal), and 
service providers facing communication barriers in meeting the needs 
of newcomers (Audit Commission, 2007).
Guidance was provided for local authorities on good practice (IDEA, 
2010) and a fund resourced by visa fees was established to support 
service providers. However, it was deemed a ‘drop in the ocean’ by a 
parliamentary Select Committee which heard that Westminster City 
Council, one of those most affected, would receive a maximum of 
£120,000 a year and some authorities less than the amount needed 
to fund one full-time post (SC Communities and Local Government, 
2008: 110, 129). A Migrants Impacts Forum brought local government, 
police and other stakeholders together “to get grass roots evidence and 
so that government could be seen to be listening”,5 but it was a less 
substantial initiative than the Migration Advisory Committee advising 
on labour migration (see Chapter 3) and, in the event, short-lived.
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fragmented responsibility in Whitehall
CLG’s new interest in migration meant that there were now two loci of 
responsibility for migrants: its own focus on cohesion and the impacts 
of migration at the local level and the Home Office responsibility for 
refugee integration and for citizenship. A small Migration Directorate 
was established in CLG which, following an internal review, rejected 
the CIC’s view that an external integration agency was needed. While 
it found that there was no strategy drawing together relevant activity 
across government, it was confident that it could now ensure ‘a stronger 
narrative and greater coherence of government policy around migrant 
integration’ if resourced to do so (CLG, 2008c: 8). At the time, the 
Migration Directorate had just 15 staff. Within the year it had been 
absorbed into the Cohesion Directorate.
A Select Committee inquiry on the impact of migration on 
cohesion in 2008 noted the lack of any policy or guidance on 
what action is needed for the integration of short-term economic 
migrants. It reflected on the ‘myriad’ of departments involved, the 
Audit Commission’s view that local authorities did not always know 
where to go for information and that there was evidence of conflicting 
approaches within government. However, if any national strategy 
emerged:
Central Government should not dictate to local authorities 
what practice should be adopted locally. Rather, the role 
of central government should be to set a national policy 
framework for action on integration and community 
cohesion, and provide guidance and support to others, 
particularly local government. (SC Communities and Local 
Government, 2008: 33–43)
The Select Committee’s remit was the impact of migration on 
communities and integration was considered through that prism. Had 
the starting point been integration across socio-economic, cultural and 
civic domains, the barriers to integration they explored and the range 
225
integration and citizenship
of interventions identified to address them would necessarily have been 
much broader. In the absence of that analysis, the government resolved 
with the Select Committee’s blessing that leadership on ‘integration’ 
should be split between CLG and the Home Office but gave neither 
the mandate or the resources to fulfil that role.
citizenship and civic participation 
Back at the Home Office, policy had been developed for migrants 
intending to remain in the long term: on access to British citizenship 
and to the permanent residence status that preceded it, Indefinite 
Leave to Remain (ILR). Until 2004, the UK had had a laissez-faire 
policy towards citizenship, the Nationality Act 1981 allowing those 
with long-term residence rights to apply after five years in the UK 
and to retain the citizenship of another country (dual citizenship): ‘A 
low-key, private and bureaucratic process’ (UKBA, 2008: 13). Access 
to citizenship was not used instrumentally to foster integration: 
applications were not encouraged, nor were new citizens provided 
with any symbolic acknowledgement of their new status, in contrast 
to the citizenship ceremonies popular in Canada, the US and Australia.
Home Secretary David Blunkett saw that as a wasted opportunity: 
access to citizenship was a lever that could be used to encourage civic 
participation and a sense of belonging to the wider community. He 
proposed that acquisition of citizenship should be celebrated in civic 
citizenship ceremonies but should also be a little harder to achieve: 
applicants required to provide, from 2004, evidence of a level of English 
language proficiency. Applicants would also (from 2005) be expected to 
demonstrate some knowledge about life in the UK in order to ‘develop 
a sense of civic identity and shared values’ (Home Office, 2002). An 
Advisory Board on Naturalisation and Integration (ABNI) provided 
guidance on the tests and on citizenship ceremonies. It argued that its 
integration remit should be extended to cover those newly arrived in 
the UK but was abolished in 2008 (ABNI, 2008).
While the threshold for access to citizenship had been raised, the 
intention was not to limit the numbers achieving that goal. It was 
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desirable that long-term residents eligible to apply for citizenship 
should do so, the incentive of citizenship status thus being used to 
lever some improvement in English and knowledge of life in the UK. 
Those requirements were extended to applicants for settlement in 2007. 
More failed the test than anticipated in the early years, an average pass 
rate until 2007 of 67% (UKBA, 2008: 14). Moreover, pass rates near 
or below 50% for a dozen countries, including Iraq, Bangladesh and 
Turkey, were masked by the success of those from English-speaking 
countries; thus the consequences for family migrants and refugees may 
have been greater than for labour migrants (Ryan, 2008).
Earned citizenship
Grants of British citizenship nevertheless rose to 165,000 in 2007 (see 
Figure 6.1), amongst the highest levels in Europe (Eurostat, 2009). 
Whether or not in response to that trend, the threshold was raised. 
Where citizenship had been seen as a means to promote integration, 















































figure 6.1: Grants of British citizenship (1990–2009)




economic and social contribution through volunteering and evidence 
of tax and law abidance. A new stage of ‘probationary citizenship’ 
(Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009) would, from 2011, 
lengthen the time taken to acquire full citizenship, during which time 
access to benefits and services would now be restricted (Home Office, 
2008). This extended period would allow the individual ‘to demonstrate 
their commitment to the UK and earn the privileges of citizenship’ and 
in so doing improve public perception of the contributions migrants 
can make (UKBA, 2008: 21; 2009: Annex A). A ‘good character’ 
requirement for citizenship had already been tightened up in 2008, 
excluding those who have all but the most minor conviction for an 
offence that is not ‘spent’. A more radical proposal to refuse or delay 
citizenship for those whose children committed criminal offences was 
dropped (Thorp and Garton Grimwood, 2009). Students, temporary 
workers and those on youth mobility schemes do not, as before, have 
access to citizenship status.
The reforms proved controversial in Parliament, in particular the 
extent to which details on implementation had been left to ministerial 
discretion, the additional complexity of the rules on access to benefits 
and the criminal justice connotations of the term ‘probation’ (Thorp 
and Garton Grimwood, 2009). Beyond Parliament, critics questioned 
the assumption that migrants should necessarily want to be British, 
the logic of establishing further obstacles to that status and the ever-
present threat ‘that one slip may take you off the ladder and out of 
the country’ (Dummett, 2008). The inclusion of a particular form of 
social participation, ‘active citizenship’, raised concern that increasingly 
prescriptive integration requirements would deny opportunities to 
those who fail:
The paradox of this strategy is that, in the name of 
integration, migrants are left either with an inferior legal 
status, or are simply excluded from the UK altogether. The 
focus of integration policy is no longer on the equalisation 
of opportunity, but rather on the discouragement and 
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penalization of migrants who do not possess certain attributes. 
(Ryan, 2008)
Labour intended, nevertheless, to go further, regulating access to 
probationary citizenship through a points system designed, in particular, 
to limit access for labour migrants, now deemed necessary ‘to manage 
population growth’. External lobbying had contributed to that shift 
in emphasis:
“The size of the population is now part of the discussion. 
Migration Watch has contributed to that thinking. They are 
very wised up with their statistics, a powerful lobby group 
and influential with the media and through them with the 
public. Ministers are aware of that.”6
Labour migrants would be awarded points for such factors as earning 
potential and having worked in regions such as Scotland in need of 
further immigration, while points would be deducted for anti-social 
behaviour ‘or in circumstances where an active disregard for UK values 
is demonstrated’ (UKBA, 2009: Exec Summary, para 10). Those who 
did not secure sufficient points for probationary citizenship would 
have to leave the UK once their visa had expired. Formal consultation 
found limited enthusiasm for the proposals and questioned the potential 
fairness of the system, but public polling found greater support (UKBA, 
2010a).
What had arguably begun as an attempt to celebrate acquisition 
of citizenship without accentuating the divide between citizens and 
non-citizens, had become an attempt to create an inclusive civic 
Britishness for those who earn that status at the expense of those who 
do not. The Coalition government will not pursue the ‘complicated, 
bureaucratic and ineffective’ earned citizenship policy but nevertheless 
believes it is ‘too easy’ to move from temporary residence to permanent 
settlement (UKBA, 2010b). No doubt further measures will follow. 
Rather than reinforce a divide between citizens, permanent residents 
and non-citizens, an inclusive sense of identity could alternatively be 
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forged on the basis of shared experiences, common interests and equal 
participation, while addressing the underlying causes of insecurity for 
which migrants get the blame: ‘Citizenship and a sense of belonging 
cannot be built on nationalism but must be based on some common 
form of social, economic and democratic equality’ (Lawson, 2008: 10). 
Evidence from local campaigns in which British citizens are strongly 
supportive of migrants suggests that policy could be designed to build 
solidarity rather than to create further divides (Squire, 2009).
Civic participation
While the citizenship reforms were intended to encourage 
volunteering, there has been little attempt to bring migrants within 
successive governments’ broader civic participation agendas.
A review of integration policies across Europe did rate the UK 
favourably in relation to political participation: allowing migrants to 
join political parties and form associations that can attract public funds 
and granting more generous rights to vote and stand for election than 
in many EU states. Only in its lack of any formal mechanisms for 
consulting migrants or their associations did it score 0% (Niessen et 
al, 2007: 185). The UK does indeed allow citizens of Commonwealth 
countries to vote in national and local elections and EU citizens in local 
and European elections. The former arose historically from the UK’s 
relationship with its colonies, the latter a requirement of membership 
of the EU. Neither thus derives from an intention to foster integration 
but, in allowing participation in the democratic process, has contributed 
to that goal. Beyond elections, the failure of many UK institutions to 
engage effectively with migrant community organisations has been 
documented, although there are instances where they have succeeded 
in shifting policy agendas (Anderson, 2010; Phillimore and Goodson, 
2010).
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integration policy: whose responsibility?
We saw in Chapter 1 that fragmentation of responsibility between tiers 
of government can inhibit coherent policymaking and implementation. 
In relation to integration, we see not only the consequences of 
fragmentation in Whitehall but lack of consensus on the respective 
roles of central and local government.
There has been a strong view, reflected by the Select Committee 
that reported on migration and cohesion in 2008, that integration is 
primarily a local responsibility. Many issues are indeed most effectively 
addressed at that level: the Select Committee arguing, for instance, 
that negative public attitudes are fuelled by local misunderstandings 
and that local government could help prevent myths arising through 
transparent decision-making in relation to social housing and resource 
allocation (CLG, 2008b; SC Communities and Local Government, 
2008: 23). Local action, however, cannot address the role played by 
national media, nor the role of central government in setting the tone 
of national debates (Maclaren and Johnson, 2004; Greenslade, 2005; 
Spencer, 2006b: 28; see also Chapter 2). It is also, moreover, only 
central government that can set the legal framework for integration, 
including equality law and the restrictions on migrants’ conditions of 
stay; that can ensure an adequate evidence base, and the coordination 
of private, public and civil society partners to mainstream integration 
objectives nationwide.
There is nevertheless a key role for local government. Across Western 
Europe, cities have often taken the lead in developing integration 
programmes, with differing levels of central guidance, requirements and 
resources. There is a series of networks in which local authorities share 
experiences, independent of dialogue at national or intergovernmental 
level, and a growing body of knowledge on policy drivers, levers and 
outcomes (CLIP, 2008; British Council, 2010; Cities of Migration, 
2010; Eurocities, 2010). In the UK, government has not encouraged 
local authorities to develop integration strategies per se, nor considered 
whether national policy supports or hinders local authorities in that 
role. It has, moreover, failed to resource them adequately to manage the 
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challenges for new migrants and settled residents: ‘local communities 
have been abandoned to manage these challenges alone’ (Robinson, 
2010b: 17). While some authorities nevertheless have policies relating to 
refugees and ad hoc initiatives with a broader target group, the Mayor 
of London is unusual in having supported a cross-cutting integration 
strategy for migrants, building on an earlier strategy for refugees, London 
Enriched (MOL, 2009, 2010).
The government consulted in 2009 on the desirability of extending 
the role of local authorities and devolved administrations. UKBA 
had already instructed the 11 regional refugee partnerships that it 
funded to broaden their remit to other migrants but only to facilitate 
cooperation, with a budget to match: for the East Midlands, for 
instance, just £130,000 a year (Local Government East Midlands, 
2009). The remit of those partnerships nevertheless had the potential 
to support the mainstreaming of integration objectives across the work 
of local agencies, to build an evidence base and spread good practice, if 
prioritised to do so (MOL, 2010). UKBA has used this structure to talk 
to local agencies; channels not available when A8 migration aroused 
their concern. The 2009 proposals suggested that local authorities 
could provide more advice and signposting to migrants (on a full cost 
recovery basis). Mentoring schemes and orientation days were among 
the limited options proposed. The latter could be on a compulsory basis, 
attract points towards probationary citizenship and provide information 
about services, volunteering and ‘British values’. They would have the 
side benefit of providing local authorities with data about newcomers 
in their area (UKBA, 2009). Being a low-key exercise, the proposals 
attracted scant attention. Nor were they intended to lead to any shift 
in scale, either in the development of a national integration strategy 
or in a programme to deliver it (UKBA, 2010a). The severe budget 
cuts now facing local authorities threaten their capacity to retain even 
current levels of engagement, including the financial support on which 
many refugee and migrant community organisations depend.
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conclusion
The intense political debates on migration are fuelled by perceptions of 
migrants’ impacts after arrival yet policy to foster economic, social and 
civic participation has been neglected and marginal to those debates. 
In the UK, there has been no strategy to foster the integration of 
migrants, only piecemeal interventions that lack the clarity of objectives 
and coherence in approach that such a strategy could provide. No 
department has been charged with providing leadership, neither the 
Home Office nor CLG having been given the mandate or resources 
to do so, leaving an extraordinary lack of coherence across Whitehall 
and between central and local government. The relationship between 
migrants and social policy agendas addressing exclusion, poverty or 
inequality, ‘place shaping’ or most recently ‘the Big Society’ has been 
left unexplored. Encouragement from the EU to develop a coherent 
approach has had little influence on developments in the UK.
Beyond a limited strategy for refugees, English language provision 
and an increasingly divisive ‘earned citizenship’ agenda, policy has 
focused on ethnic minorities, not on those who have recently arrived. 
Integration goals have not been embedded in mainstream agendas such 
as civic participation, so that key elements of an effective strategy are 
missing and mainstream provision can be out of tune with migrants’ 
particular needs. Little attention has been paid to understanding the 
causes of public hostility or the means by which it could be addressed. 
Rather, there has been an assumption that concerns can be assuaged 
through the robust and repeated assertion that migration is now 
more tightly controlled, coupled with an assurance that migrants will 
only access services and resources to which their contribution makes 
them entitled. Evidence that the percentage of the public who deem 
immigration and race to be among the ‘most important issues facing 
Britain today’ rose in the 10 years after Labour came to power from 
3% to 40% in June 2007 (MORI, 2009) suggests that approach has 
not been successful.
Confusion within government on the meaning of integration, from 
the Home Office’s refugee definition emphasising economic and 
233
integration and citizenship
social participation to CLG’s narrow focus on ‘getting on’ with other 
residents, has muddied the water, demonstrating that the way in which 
an issue is conceptualised in government can limit its capacity to act. 
The model developed in response to Commonwealth immigration 
has proved ill adapted to the diversity of modern migration and left 
a legacy of scepticism on the language of ‘integration’ that any new 
strategy would need to overcome.
Experience abroad and in the UK suggests that local authorities 
could be key players. Employers and civil society could also be 
mobilised to make a far greater contribution, not least in the context 
of the severe limits on public funds that will constrain any future 
intervention. Nevertheless, government cannot simply devolve 
responsibility to the local level. It needs to identify those barriers that 
can only be addressed at the national level, ensure that integration goals 
are built into mainstream programmes and, crucially, set the tone of 
public and media debates. The new duty on public bodies to promote 
equality and good community relations could be one lever to drive 
this agenda forward.
The lack of a strategic overview of integration processes and of an 
evidence base on the impact of existing interventions has enabled 
contradictory policies to emerge: contradictions that reflect competing 
pressures on government but whose impact could be mediated if 
acknowledged and addressed. Notable here are the conditions attached 
to immigration status, which for many new migrants limit participation; 
conditions that could be reviewed to assess whether, in the light of 
evidence on their impact, all of the restrictions are necessary and 
proportional.
An evidence-based review could lead to a holistic strategy across the 
labour market, social, cultural, political and identity domains in which 
integration processes take place; facilitating a level of participation by all 
migrants, not only those with the right to settle. Integration processes 
start on day one, not least through interaction with neighbours, 
employers and service providers and it is in the early months that 
challenges can be most evident.
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There is a plethora of advice on what such a strategy might contain 
in relation to integration in the labour market (LDA, 2005; Rutter 
et al, 2008; Phillimore and Goodson, 2008a; OECD, 2009) and other 
domains (Grover, 2006; Spencer et al, 2007; CLIP, 2008; European 
Commission, 2010; Haque, 2010). The goal would be to identify and 
address barriers to participation in each sphere, for which responsibility 
would lie not only with government and public agencies but with 
a broad range of actors from employers and trades unions, voluntary 
and community-sector organisations, to neighbours and migrants’ 
families and communities (Spencer, 2006b: 9). In that way, the focus 
of the strategy would not be top-down instruction from national 
government but the mobilisation of key partners at the national and 
local level to foster integration processes as a shared responsibility, to 
the mutual benefit of the economy and society as a whole. Within the 
‘Big Society’ umbrella, an integration agenda could foster an inclusive 
civic identity based on shared experiences, rather than a divided society 
in which some are never allowed to feel that they have earned the 
right to belong.
Notes
1 Interview with Home Office official, 6 August 2009.
2 Interview with Home Office official, 6 August 2009.
3 Interview with Home Office official, 6 August 2009.
4 Interview with former CLG official, 18 August 2009.
5 Interview with former CLG official, 18 August 2009.
6 Interview with Home Office official, 6 August 2009.
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In the course of this book I have looked at the context in which migration and integration policies are developed; at policies 
towards those seeking asylum, migrant workers, international students, 
family members and irregular migrants before turning to migrants’ 
economic, social and civic participation. In this chapter I draw out 
the common themes that have emerged, look at what we have learnt 
about policymaking on migration, address some overarching debates 
and conclude with an alternative way forward.
We saw in Chapter 1 that the UK is far from alone in experiencing 
migration on a significant scale; the outcome of global, economic, 
social and political forces which will ensure that, at differing levels and 
in evolving forms, migration will be a permanent part of our future. 
Recognising that structural context does not mean that governments 
are powerless to intervene but is to understand that managing migration 
necessitates addressing underlying causes, at home and abroad, and 
devising policy tools that reflect the complexity of the processes at 
play. Despite decades of experience, however, successive governments 
have reacted to migration with ad hoc initiatives; presenting no vision 
of what they want to achieve or coherent strategy to deliver it. In this 
chapter I suggest how that could change.
There are influential voices who argue that the overriding priority 
for government should be to limit entry and settlement severely in 
order to curb population growth. Tighter controls are needed, it is 
suggested, to reduce pressure on housing and public services, protect 
jobs for existing residents, strengthen cohesion and avoid support 
growing for far-right parties. Regardless of the weight that government 
gives to the case for further limits on migration, however, there are 
competing priorities to which it has to give credence. There are also 
significant constraints on its capacity to determine who comes to the 
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UK, and who stays. Any analysis of the efficacy of migration policy must 
take account of the ways in which it can unravel, at national or local 
level, when it moves on from policymakers to the operational phase.
competing priorities and constraints
We saw that the first constraint is that the very nature of migration 
means UK policy cannot be devised in isolation from that of other 
states, or from the UK’s broader international interests. Relationships 
with Commonwealth countries had to be taken into account in the 
early decades after the Second World War; their influence subsequently 
giving way to that of our European neighbours on whose cooperation 
the UK relies to strengthen the EU’s external borders, prevent ‘asylum 
shopping’ (as it is perceived) and facilitate removals. Nevertheless, the 
optional ‘opt-out’ from EU provisions has allowed the UK to pick and 
choose those policies deemed in the national interest (albeit at some 
political cost), so that UK policy developments have often proceeded 
in parallel to those at EU level rather than dictated by them.
With EU membership, however, comes non-negotiable free 
movement of EU citizens to work in Britain. In 2004, the UK could 
have chosen to take advantage of transitional arrangements to limit 
the entry of the ‘A8’ nationals of the enlarged EU for seven years. The 
decision not to do so brought economic benefits but subsequently a 
high political cost, not mitigated by the quid pro quo that UK citizens 
could then study or take up employment in 24 other member states. 
Free movement for EU citizens means that restrictions to limit the 
numbers who enter can generally only apply to those coming from 
beyond the EU (or indeed EEA) borders. Yet it is the highly skilled 
workers and international students among them from whom many of 
the benefits to the UK economy derive.
Bilateral relationships can equally be crucial, as in securing the 
cooperation of France to close the Sangatte refugee camp in Calais (in 
a way that met the UK’s immediate need to curtail entry, not the needs 
of the refugees concerned). But international relations work through 
reciprocity: the Coalition government finding in 2010, for example, 
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that the price for India’s cooperation on favourable terms of investment 
was to be given a say in how its citizens would be treated by the cap 
on non-EEA migrant workers. Reciprocity in broader international 
agreements can equally be a constraint; business benefiting from the 
UK’s participation in the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), for instance, but that in turn imposes limits on the extent 
to which intra-company transfers of staff can be curtailed by the cap 
(see Chapter 3). The absence of a UN framework for the broader 
governance of migration has led to a proliferation of mechanisms for 
dialogue and collaboration, demonstrating that migration cannot be 
addressed effectively on a unilateral basis (see Chapter 1).
Human rights obligations
Governments are further constrained by obligations under international 
human rights treaties and by the ethics that underlie their existence: 
public acceptance in a liberal democracy that people should be able to 
choose their life partners and children allowed to live with their parents, 
for instance, imposing some constraint on government’s freedom to 
curtail family migration beyond any impact of human rights law. There 
are instances where government has felt it necessary to address the 
conflict between immigration controls and those principles: Labour 
honoring its 1997 manifesto commitment to remove the ‘primary 
purpose’ rule, for instance, taking action to curb the excessive delays 
faced by families waiting in the Indian subcontinent and removing 
the bar on entry for same-sex partners. At other times thinly disguised 
attempts have been made to bypass such ethical considerations, leading 
to scepticism that steps taken to protect individuals (such as those to 
prevent forced marriages) are in fact designed to limit the number of 
people allowed to enter (see Chapter 4).
The UN Convention on Refugees is one significant constraint 
on policy options on asylum. There has remained a commitment 
in principle to its core requirement that all who ask for sanctuary 
should have their case considered and not be returned to a country 
where they could face persecution. When the number of applicants 
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rose significantly in the 1990s, however, the then Conservative 
administration began to erect barriers to entry, remove safeguards in 
the determination process and use exclusion from welfare provision 
as a means of immigration control, a process taken to extraordinary 
lengths by the Labour government over the next decade.
The Human Rights Act 1998 enabled individuals more readily to 
challenge immigration rules breaching the European Convention on 
Human Rights and, to ministers’ regret, their decisions have repeatedly 
been subject to court challenge under this and other statutes. Some 
significant changes in policy and practice have had to be made as a 
result, not least to provide a level of support to refused asylum seekers 
and to refrain from removals to countries where the individual could 
face torture (see Chapter 2). Such reforms have not changed the 
direction of policy but have relieved some of its harshest effects on 
people’s lives.
The considerable strengthening of discrimination law has created 
the potential, if not yet the reality, that migrants will derive benefit 
from that protection. Yet the statutory discrimination against new 
arrivals, in the patchwork of restrictions attached to conditions of 
entry that limit access to work, services, benefits and the democratic 
system, militates against equality of opportunity and thus economic, 
social and civic integration.
Legacy of the past
We saw, furthermore, that new governments do not start with a clean 
slate and their scope for action is limited, to a degree, by the legacy 
they inherit. Historic patterns of immigration have created networks 
of co-nationals, family and friends that influence the paths of future 
migrants; and policy frameworks are already in place, bringing with 
them the constraining paradigm in which they were conceived.
A new government, moreover, inherits a system for administering 
and enforcing immigration controls that is more or less fit for purpose. 
Labour’s inheritance in 1997 included rising numbers of asylum seekers, 
a backlog of 50,000 applications and a system of administration severely 
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ill equipped for policymaking or the operation of immigration control. 
Its legislative hyperactivity then exacerbated the problems staff faced, 
with no less than seven major pieces of legislation on immigration, 
asylum and citizenship in the decade 1999–2009. More fundamentally, 
it inherited a way of thinking about migration as a problem not an 
opportunity, which in part it overcame; and a way of thinking about 
integration, which it did not.
Economy rules
Most significantly, as the Coalition government is finding to its 
cost, government cannot shut the door to migration because of the 
economic price that the country would pay. Even the British National 
Party agrees that the UK should remain open to ‘genuine’ international 
students and to labour migrants if there is ‘a need to rebuild British 
industry or when there is a genuine shortage of skills’ (BNP, 2010: 19).
In its shift to ‘managed migration’, Labour departed from the ad 
hoc expansion of work permits that the Conservative administration 
had overseen in the 1990s, to an overt strategy of making the UK 
competitive in the global market for talent, intent on maximising the 
economic gains and expansion of public services that the mobility of 
the highly skilled could bring. Recruitment from developing countries 
raised concerns about the impact of that ‘brain drain’, leading to a 
modest shift in NHS recruitment practice. Yet few questioned the 
benefits to Britain when the NHS plan, launched in 2000, heralded 
an increase of 9,500 doctors and 20,000 nurses that could only be 
delivered by staff from abroad; or disagreed when business, in a period 
of economic growth, demanded red tape be scrapped to enable them 
to hire the IT specialists and engineers they needed and to bring in 
their own staff from abroad (see Chapter 3).
Nor did the Opposition challenge the wisdom of Blair’s campaign, 
launched in 1999 and reinforced in 2006, to secure 25% of the English-
speaking student market. International students make a substantial 
economic contribution, expand the range of courses available to 
UK students and bring cultural benefits to education that are more 
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difficult to quantify. Students from EU countries, through reciprocal 
arrangements, pay the same fees as UK students; hence those most 
lucrative as a source of income are those from beyond the EU’s borders 
– the very people whom a tight limit on numbers would need to 
control (see Chapter 3).
Economic growth brought demand for high-skilled workers for 
the knowledge economy but also an expansion in low-wage jobs. In 
opening up entry channels for low-skilled workers and later for A8 
‘migrants’ from an enlarged EU, Labour recognised that the absence 
of legal channels in face of strong demand for labour in sectors like 
construction, agriculture and hospitality could only fuel demand 
for irregular workers. The consistently high employment rate of A8 
workers demonstrates that the jobs were indeed there to be had.
In its openness to the economic benefits of migration, Labour 
transformed the parameters of policy and debate, its success in 
marking Britain as a country open to overseas talent confirmed by 
the insistence of the Coalition’s first Home Secretary, Theresa May, 
that the government would ensure the country continued to attract 
the ‘brightest and the best’. Nevertheless, as we emerge from recession, 
there is less consensus now on the overall benefits of labour migration 
and greater awareness that the benefits to employers do not necessarily 
equate to benefits for all.
Managing demand
‘Demand’ for migrant workers can reflect a shortage of people in the 
resident workforce with suitable skills but also the pay and conditions 
employers are willing to provide. Upskilling at the high end of the 
labour market has, to an extent, been a priority: expansion of training 
places for doctors and nurses did substantially address the NHS’s heavy 
reliance on overseas health professionals. No such intent, however, 
has been evident in reducing the need for migrants in occupations 
such as social care, where in London more than 60% of care workers 
are foreign-born. In sectors facing public expenditure constraints, 
cutting off the supply of migrant workers will thus not necessarily 
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lead to an increase in suitable domestic supply. Improvements in pay 
and conditions, training, and support in making the transition from 
benefits to work are key elements of that equation.
Where employers and agencies are determined to exploit irregular 
migrants, paying below the going rate, tackling the incentives for 
migrants to overstay and work without permission (and for traffickers 
to profit) means closing down the spaces where this can happen. The 
Gangmasters Licensing Authority and enforcement of the minimum 
wage play a key role but are inadequate in their reach to prevent 
vulnerable workers from exploitation (whether migrants or not), and 
hence the ongoing demand for their labour. Protecting the rights of 
migrant workers alongside those of other staff is essential to prevent 
their employment undercutting the rate for the job. It is also in the 
interests of employers who do not want to face unfair competition 
from those willing to break the rules.
The solutions to the level of demand for skilled and low-skilled 
migrant labour thus lie in education, skills and employment policy more 
than in migration policy. Hi-tech border controls to keep unauthorised 
workers out are no substitute for tackling the incentive for them to be 
there. The Points-Based System provides a mechanism to match supply 
to demand but the core issue is managing demand (see Chapter 3).
There are thus, as in other areas of migration policy, competing 
priorities and interests at stake. Government must consider the pros 
and cons of importing skilled migrants to address gaps in the labour 
market for which there may be alternative solutions; and assess the value 
of tackling demand for irregular migrants by enforcing employment 
standards, against labour market flexibility in a deregulatory climate. It 
must consider, with developing countries, the risk of denuding those 
countries of skilled staff, against the value of migrants’ remittances 
to their economies and of migrants’ skills and ideas if they return: 
development goals need not be antithetical to a labour migration 
policy but do need to be reflected within its objectives.
We saw that those whose primary concern is to limit population 
growth now focus not solely on the numbers who enter but on those 
allowed to settle, arguing that Britain could continue to benefit from 
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skilled workers from abroad as long as there are tight restrictions on 
who is allowed to stay. Yet here again there is a downside to consider: 
the most sought-after workers might be expected to choose a country 
that allows them to put down roots (why disrupt your career and family 
with a further move?). Those who know they will have to leave may 
moreover be less motivated to make a full social and civic contribution 
while in the UK; while for employers, temporary staff entail the cost 
and disruption of replacement when they leave.
Limits of border controls
Governments also face limits on what can be achieved by border 
controls and not only because of the pull factor of labour market 
demand. More than a hundred million people arrive at the UK’s 
borders each year, of whom the majority are British and European 
citizens enjoying freedom to travel for work, leisure or family reasons, 
but who nevertheless need to pass through passport control. More 
than 12 million are people subject to immigration controls, many of 
them contributing to the £16 billion the tourism industry earns from 
international visitors each year, helping to sustain Britain’s fifth largest 
industry, which is forecast to support nearly three million jobs by 2020 
(see Chapter 5). We saw that each minute of delay in passing through 
immigration control has an economic cost. Government cannot 
afford to threaten that income: plans to curb the time limit for tourist 
visas from six to three months in 2008 were reportedly dropped on 
those grounds. Managing the entry and exit of that volume of people 
does not permit 100% surveillance because of the time and level 
of intrusion; border control is thus, of necessity, a risk management 
exercise. No government is likely to want to go so far as one columnist 
has suggested and say that it is powerless in the face of porous borders 
(Toynbee, 2010). Nor would that be true. Yet a reality check suggests 
that government should not over-promise what cannot be delivered.
This is not to say that more could not be done to manage borders 
effectively. The E-borders information system should by 2014 provide 
information on whether each migrant has left the UK by their 
wilful betrayal or capacity constrained?
254
appointed date. Significant resources would, however, then be required 
to track down and remove those who have not and a cost borne if 
the individual was by then fulfilling an essential role. Migration Watch 
suggests that a far greater number of prospective students should be 
interviewed before receiving a visa in order to improve detection of 
those who are not genuine in their intent to study (Migration Watch, 
2010). This could be done but government has to balance the potential 
advantage of so doing against the staff costs, delays and deterrence 
effects that this would entail in an increasingly competitive market 
for international students.
We saw in relation to asylum that it is difficult to assess how effective 
policy has been overall in curtailing numbers because there are so 
many variables at play, not least the cessation of conflicts that were 
the immediate cause of flight and the time-lag in the effects of new 
measures. Extension of visa requirements and carrier sanctions has 
undoubtedly prevented an unknown number of would-be asylum 
seekers from reaching the UK. Whether that counts as success depends 
on whether one considers the impact on the individuals among them 
who were in need of protection and who thereby failed to receive it.
Ethics and efficacy of internal controls
Finally, governments are constrained by the ethics and efficacy 
of internal controls intended to ensure that people observe their 
conditions of stay and leave when their visa has expired. We saw in 
Chapter 5 that the vast majority of irregular migrants (estimated at 
618,000 in 2007) arrived legally but overstayed; and that there is a 
further number who are ‘semi-compliant’: irregular because they are 
working or accessing services to which they are not entitled. The law 
defines all of these as criminal offences for which the individuals are 
subject to removal, making no distinction between those who arrived 
in the back of a lorry and those who are simply working longer hours 
per week than permitted – an inflexible legal framework in need of 
reform. Removals are also costly and beset with difficulties, hence the 
numbers removed scarcely touch the numbers who remain, whose 
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removal would in itself be highly disruptive and controversial. Public 
support for curbing migration does not, moreover, preclude fervent 
resistance to the removal of families settled within a local community.
When the Coalition government dropped plans to introduce identity 
cards for British citizens it retained them for foreign nationals. This 
leaves open the continuing expectation on local service providers 
that they will police entry to services, informing the immigration 
authorities if they suspect irregular migration status. That approach 
has met with some resistance from service providers, not least health 
professionals who do not consider this to be their role; and it carries 
social as well as individual costs, including to public health if individuals 
cannot access essential services. An information ‘firewall’ barring 
transfer of information relating to key services does and could further 
protect access regardless of immigration status where it is deemed that 
social policy objectives or human rights protection need to be accorded 
greater priority than immigration control.
policy trade-offs to meet competing objectives
The government’s freedom of manoeuvre in devising migration 
policy is thus circumscribed by competing pressures and constraints. 
Governments can shift priorities and occasionally the paradigm, as 
Labour did in opening up Britain to ‘the brightest and the best’, but 
refining entry channels and border controls does not address the 
structural factors that drive migration; and each shift in priorities can 
carry a cost, whether or not explicit in the policy debate.
The decision to impose a cap on migration from outside the EEA 
has brought into the open some core tensions, notably between the 
immediate economic benefits of overseas labour and students and the 
long-term goals of reducing the dependency on migrant labour and 
curbing population growth. A less explicit trade-off is the exclusion 
of most new migrants from ‘recourse to public funds’, with a prior 
requirement to demonstrate that such support will not be needed if 
entry is allowed. That exclusion from services and welfare benefits 
protects the public purse from those who have not contributed to 
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it and is intended to reassure the taxpayers who have. The downside 
is that excluding newcomers from that safety net lays them open to 
exploitation at work and to violence within the home (by limiting 
their freedom to walk away), while exclusion from free health care 
may also have public health implications. Underlying this particular 
debate lie differing views on the basis of entitlement, most evident in 
relation to a tightly rationed resource, social housing: whether access 
should be on the basis of need (where those of newcomers could trump 
those of longer-term residents) or on the basis of residence, belonging 
and previous contribution to the public purse (or, at its most extreme, 
ethnicity, the BNP asserting in this context ‘the importance of the 
prior status of the indigenous people’; BNP, 2010: 21). The question 
is whether, in a society that will continue to have a diverse section 
of the community who do not hold UK nationality or permanent 
residence, exclusion from the safety net of the welfare state is a means 
to secure their acceptance or more likely to perpetuate economic 
inequality and social divides.
Lack of a governance structure to match the task
Trade-offs, winners and losers are the stuff of politics but migration 
policy has lacked a governance structure that has the competing 
interests facing each other around the table, to make those choices, 
and the costs attached, transparent.
Transferring responsibility for labour migration across to the 
Home Office in 2001 made it possible, in theory, to develop a 
holistic migration policy – linking labour migration, family, asylum 
and integration for the first time. The downside is its isolation in the 
Home Office from departments that could tackle the causes of demand 
for migrant labour, and continuing separation from departments 
responsible for international development, justice, education and 
health, for instance, which urgently need to be given a say. Officials 
communicate where their agendas meet but there is no mechanism 
to recognise and reconcile competing national policy objectives, to 
engage the devolved administrations and local government whose 
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interests can diverge from those of central government, or to ensure 
that broader local impacts are consistently taken into account – hence 
the kickback when the number of A8 migrants brought unanticipated 
consequences for local services.
The weakness in governance arrangements has often allowed the 
imperatives of migration control, felt keenly in the Home Office, to 
override other considerations, and to conflict with mainstream policy 
objectives. Where departments have held the Home Office back, as 
in the influence the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
exerted to rein in steps to curb student numbers in 2009, it has tended 
to happen behind the scenes with little public debate on the pros 
and cons, winners and losers, of that decision. One counter-factor 
has been the space provided by the Migration Advisory Committee 
(MAC). Taking evidence and applying rigour to its analysis of the 
need for and implications of labour migration, the MAC has since 
2007 brought greater transparency and reasoned debate to this one 
aspect of migration policy, the value of which was recognised in the 
Coalition government’s decision to retain access to its advice. When 
the MAC asked, in the context of its consultation on the cap, how it 
should balance conflicting economic and social impacts, it began to 
open up that debate (see Chapter 3). Yet it is also necessary to consider 
broader impacts, on international relations or development, for instance; 
and what impacts there could be if there was an effective integration 
strategy for new migrants, reducing the social and economic costs of 
adjustment in the early months after arrival.
The quid pro quo of the lack of joined-up policymaking has been 
the near exclusion of migrants (and migrant voices) from consideration 
in mainstream policies. Where it is now expected that policymakers 
will consider the potential implications of policy on women, ethnic 
minorities or disabled people (and that their voices will be heard in 
the policymaking process), there has been no such expectation in 
relation to migrants: hence policies that could help to foster integration 
processes, like initiatives on civic participation or employment services, 
have largely not been expected to take that role on board.
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The Home Office has been given huge discretion to change the 
Immigration Rules with scant parliamentary scrutiny. The scope of 
that freedom, however, differs across the system, the expansion of 
labour migration largely delivered by changing the rules but asylum 
reform requiring primary legislation, bringing media attention as 
well as parliamentary debate. Parliamentary Select Committees have 
played a key role, focusing a spotlight on the operation of the system 
and its impact on individuals and human rights norms that would not 
otherwise have occurred. NGO voices have consistently identified 
the impact of immigration controls on migrants’ lives and, with 
ethnic minority communities, have secured some changes to policy 
and practice where the evidence left government little option but to 
respond.
Weak evidence base
The trade-offs implicit in migration policies are rarely explicit in 
policy debates. Nor is the evidence base on which to make reasoned 
choices available in many instances because of a lack of data or research 
addressing the questions to which policymakers need answers. In 
recent years the evidence gap has begun to be addressed in relation to 
labour migration and asylum but it is still severely limited in relation 
to family migration, irregular migration, students and integration. 
Hence we know surprisingly little, for instance, about the impact of 
‘no recourse to public funds’ on those subject to that constraint in 
their early years (is it a proportional response to the need to protect 
public funds or a counterproductive barrier to integration?); or about 
the ways in which, and reasons why, those who come legally to the 
UK subsequently acquire irregular status. A stronger evidence base is 
needed to underpin a more effective policymaking process – and a 




The constraints that government faces in managing migration have 
largely not been shared with the public. Where the door remains open, 
the rationale has not been explained. Governments have not chosen 
or felt able to share with the public the opportunities and constraints, 
the conflicting objectives, winners and losers, and tough choices to be 
made. They have not given the public the information that explains the 
apparently inexplicable, why government cannot simply shut the door.
Instead, successive governments have sought to reassure the public 
that migration is under control when rising numbers suggested it was 
not. Tabloid media pressure is at times intense, ready to exploit any 
instance of abuse (and sometimes to invent it; see Chapter 2), creating 
a climate in which it is difficult for government or external voices 
to foster an evidence-based examination of the options. In face of 
that challenge, the response – in promising ever-tougher measures to 
address abuse – has arguably served to reinforce concerns among a 
public sceptical that the next measure will be any more effective than 
the last. In reinforcing the anxiety they sought to assuage, ministers 
have exacerbated their own predicament.
Ministers have thought it possible, moreover, to send a mixed 
message: that some migrants are good for Britain while others are 
unwelcome. At the very time that government was reinforcing negative 
perceptions of asylum seekers in 2000–05, it was campaigning to attract 
more international students and skilled workers, in some cases from the 
same source countries. There was no recognition that the public might 
need some explanation. The economic contribution of workers and 
students at a national level might be very different from that of asylum 
seekers (who are, after all, not allowed to work); but the perception 
of these newcomers at the local level may not mirror that distinction.
Highly problematic for government is that the heat of the ‘debate’ 
encourages those who benefit from migration policy to keep their head 
below the radar, employers’ representatives rarely speaking up publicly 
in favour of relaxing controls, choosing to lobby in private rather 
than attract unwelcome publicity for an unpopular sentiment. NGOs, 
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meanwhile, find significantly more to criticise in government decisions 
than to praise. Hence government regularly finds itself isolated in this 
policy field, on the defensive, apparently unable to please regardless 
of ever-greater levels of legislative reform and resources deployed in 
its attempt so to do.
lack of a strategy to promote ‘integration’
Public concern about migration numbers reflects perceptions about 
their impact after arrival. Yet an extraordinary policy omission has 
been the lack of any strategy to foster the economic, social and civic 
participation of new migrants – the 1,500 people who, on average, have 
arrived each day to stay for more than a year. Fostering participation 
requires engagement from the institutions and people in mainstream 
society as well as migrants, and policy intervention can facilitate – or 
hinder – that process (see Chapter 6).
With the exception of refugees, there has been a policy vacuum 
on this agenda: no department charged with leadership, no clarity of 
objectives and no framework in which to mobilise employers and civil 
society partners or support local authority initiatives. In Chapter 6 
we saw how early measures relating to Commonwealth immigrants 
remained focused on those communities as minority ethnic groups, 
no longer addressing issues related to newcomers; and how latterly 
‘integration’ was subsumed within the narrower cohesion agenda. For 
long-term residents, encouragement to learn English and knowledge 
of ‘life in the UK’ gave way to ‘earned citizenship’ provisions likely to 
further marginalise migrants from the mainstream. The relationship 
between migrants and broader social policy agendas addressing 
exclusion, poverty, inequality, place-shaping and most recently the ‘Big 
Society’ is as yet unexplored. Those concerned that migration may 
undermine cohesion have been more likely to argue for less migration 
than to consider the policy levers that can ensure communities are 




What does this suggest could be done to detoxify migration as a 
divisive issue and design policies that find a better balance in meeting 
conflicting policy objectives?
First, there is no alternative to engaging the public in a debate that 
is honest about the options and what can and cannot be delivered: the 
trade-offs and constraints that explain why bringing migration down 
to zero is not an option – the costs to the tourist industry; to small 
businesses, universities and prospective UK students; to families divided 
from loved ones; to refugees denied sanctuary; to families unable to find 
a carer for an elderly relative; and to Britain’s international reputation. 
The public has been given no explanation, no rationale. They have 
not been consulted on the choices to be made. Knowing the reasons 
may not change minds but it could form the basis of a more reasoned, 
inclusive, debate.
This will not be easy. There are genuine conflicts of interest for some 
sections of the public that cannot be ignored. There is also a lack of 
information, some misinformation and epistemic uncertainty, as well as 
unhelpful divisive rhetoric. That could be redressed in a communication 
strategy designed to ensure that the public has the facts, without caveat 
and without exaggeration. The communication, however, needs to be 
two-way. Regular consultation, in fora that enable differing viewpoints 
to be heard on the basis of evidence on the choices at stake, should 
inform future policy reform.
Second, a step that lies entirely within government control: a 
governance system that ensures across central, devolved and local 
government that the implications of migration and conflicting policy 
choices can be aired and resolved, and barriers to implementation 
identified and addressed. Migrants, and those who engage with them as 
employers and union representatives, service providers and community 
groups, also need to be heard. No longer should it then be possible to 
plan an expansion of migration without considering the implications 
for housing or education provision; a curtailment of numbers without 
considering the costs to those sectors of the economy, devolved nations 
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or families affected; or to devise procedures relating to vulnerable 
migrants divorced from the standards of care considered acceptable for 
other members of the public. Migration cannot be managed effectively 
or humanely without the cooperation of EU neighbours, and the UK 
also needs to consider whether its repeated opt-out of agreements 
(which would often in practice only require modest changes in policy) 
is the best way to secure it.
Third, on the basis of those deliberations and public consultation, 
government should identify and make explicit the positive objectives 
that its migration and integration policy is intended to achieve. If 
limiting the growth of the population is an objective it should be 
explicit here, alongside the commitment to uphold the UK’s obligations 
under international law and, one might hope, to ensure that families 
are not divided; while creating conditions conducive to the economic, 
social and civic participation of migrants and an inclusive sense of 
belonging for all residents at the national and local level.
Having identified its objectives and sought a stronger evidence base, 
government could develop a comprehensive migration policy. The 
chapters of this book have been replete with suggestions on what it 
could entail, both within the migration system itself and, in relation to 
labour migration, in addressing the underlying conditions that create 
demand for legal and irregular migrant labour.
On labour migration, the optimal first step is to secure investment 
in skills training and improvements in pay and conditions in low-wage 
occupations, and more effective supervision of employment standards, 
to reduce demand for migrant workers. If, as seems likely in a time 
of severe public expenditure constraints, that is not going to happen, 
then we need honesty that there will be a continued reliance on 
migrants and make provision accordingly, not least to ensure access 
where needed to English language tuition. There is infinite scope for 
nuancing the criteria for access to labour market entry channels to 
raise the threshold for entry, but the absence of mechanisms to match 
demand from among local workers can only incentivise employers and 
migrants to break the rules. On students, the alternative to lucrative 
international fee-payers is less clear. Universities and colleges rely 
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on that income to keep courses open for UK students and there are 
broader, less quantifiable benefits to international relations and trade. 
Further steps could be taken in issuing visas to ensure a genuine 
intention to study; and further measures taken within the UK to 
foster a positive experience in education and employment to support 
their studies, enabling the UK to continue to attract students in an 
increasingly competitive international market.
On asylum, there has been no shortage of suggestions for restoring 
safeguards in the refugee determination system; for raising levels of 
welfare support to end destitution; and for alternatives to detention 
and forced returns (where incentives for voluntary return have been 
shown to be both more cost-effective and humane). For those who are 
vulnerable, not least children and women in need of maternity care, 
the government should ensure that standards of care are no less than 
considered acceptable for other people in the UK (see Chapter 2).
On family migration, we saw the strongest need for an evidence 
base to inform future policy: on the implications of dividing or uniting 
families, age restrictions on marriage, lack of recourse to public funds 
and English language requirements before entry and settlement. We 
need to know what impact family migrants have on the labour market, 
what facilitates participation at a level commensurate with education 
and skills and what the most effective means might be to facilitate 
their full social and civic participation. Armed with that evidence, 
family migration – including dependants of labour migrants and 
students – could be fully integrated into a holistic migration policy 
(see Chapter 4). A major concern in the current strategy to cut net 
migration is that the axe will fall on family migrants for whom, unlike 
labour and student migration, there is no powerful interest group to 
fight back. Yet it is cuts in this entry channel that would have the most 
direct impact on people’s lives in the UK.
On irregular migration, I argued that the 1971 legal framework, 
which criminalises minor breaches of conditions of stay alongside 
evasion of immigration control, contributes to a focus on enforcement 
at the expense of prevention and militates against a proportionate and 
hence effective response. Recategorising minor breaches so that they 
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attract civil penalties, with a view to ensuring future compliance, would 
enable criminal enforcement activity to focus where it is most needed. 
The core strategy, nevertheless, should focus on prevention, reducing 
demand for irregular migrant workers and identifying ways in which 
the design and operation of entry controls and conditions of stay foster 
the propensity to irregular status. The government should ensure that 
those whose status is irregular can get access to basic services (essential 
on social as well as human rights grounds), and identify pathways 
for some of the estimated 618,000 irregular migrants, just 1% of the 
population, to return to legal status (see Chapter 5).
On integration, I argued that the capacity to facilitate economic, 
social and civic participation and a mutual sense of belonging is 
primarily that of organisations and individuals at the local level, from 
employers and unions through to community groups, neighbours and 
migrants’ own families. Nevertheless, government needs to provide 
a conducive legal and policy framework, clarity on objectives and 
an inclusive rhetoric to facilitate that process (see Chapter 6). The 
government’s rationale for the drive to create a ‘Big Society’ is that ‘we 
need to draw on the skills and expertise of people across the country 
as we respond to the social, political and economic challenges Britain 
faces’ (Cabinet Office, 2010). Integration is one of those challenges 
and could be at the heart of that agenda.
I noted in Chapter 1 that policymaking is not a linear or necessarily 
rational process, hence I am not imagining that the path to reform 
could progress in the logical way that I have suggested. Nevertheless, 
if the government is to break the pattern of reactive reforms in which 
its room for manoeuvre is severely constrained by a poorly evidenced, 
polarised debate, then it could do worse than to start by sharing with 
the public the opportunities and constraints that it faces; by establishing 
a governance system that enables the full range of competing issues to 
be considered and resolved; and by setting clear public objectives for 
migration policy on which it could attempt to build the consensus 
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Taking the UK as a case study, this thesis addresses a paradox: that 
in the face of consistent public pressure to reduce the number of 
migrants (people born abroad) and a commitment from successive 
post war governments to do so, significant levels of migration have 
nevertheless continued. In the decade 2000 – 2009, 1.9 million more 
people came to live in the UK (for more than a year) than left to 
live abroad. Like its European neighbours, the UK did not set out to 
become a multicultural country yet, by March 2010, 11.4 percent of 
its population had been born abroad.
Drawing on literature from across the range of disciplines that 
contribute to the developing field of migration studies, the thesis 
investigates the multiplicity of factors that have led to that divergence 
between public demand and delivery. In contrast to earlier analyses of 
UK migration policy it identifies, first, factors within the dynamics 
of migration processes that have limited the capacity of the State to 
regulate the entry of migrants; and, second, a series of competing 
policy objectives and constraints within and out-with the policy 
making process itself. It then demonstrates the impact of those factors 
on migration trends and policy development across the four principle 
channels of entry to the UK, migration for protection (asylum), for 
work, study, family union and reunion; and in relation to migrants 
with irregular immigration status. Identifying public concern as 
deriving primarily from perceptions of the impact of migrants post 
entry to the UK, it goes on to explore the factors that have hindered 
the development of policies relating to migrants’ economic, social, 
cultural and civic participation.
In that analysis, the thesis draws on historical accounts of the 
development of migration law and policy prior to the election of 
a Labour government in May 1997; on government documents, 
legislation, parliamentary debates and the reports of regulatory bodies 
in the period from May 1997 through to one year after the election 
of a Coalition government in May 2010; and on interviews with 
wilful betrayal or capacity constrained?
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Ministers, Special Advisors and senior officials who provided insights 
on the operation of the policy making process at the micro level.
dynamics of migration
The terms of political debate on migration can suggest to the public that 
the entry of migrants is a matter within state control; hence continuing 
high levels of migration are seen as a failure of government will, as 
incompetence in implementation of entry controls, or as evidence of 
abuse of the immigration system by migrants themselves. The thesis 
uses three key insights from migration theory to demonstrate that there 
are factors driving and shaping migration flows which in fact constrain 
the capacity of states to manage migration and which governments 
need to take into account, but regularly fail so to do (Castles 2004). 
The first is that there are global structural factors that drive migration 
beyond the personal decisions of individual migrants and their families. 
Through the lens of world systems theory we see that migration is, 
in part, a feature of the operation of the global market economy, an 
outcome of the dislocation caused by foreign investment in capitalist 
modes of production in developing countries and the simultaneous 
growth in demand for cheap labour in the industrial world. The UK 
conforms to the ensuing analysis that, for former colonial powers, 
the direction of migration flows that result can reflect the transport, 
communication, cultural and linguistic ties that remain (Sassen 1988; 
Massey, Arango et al. 1993). 
At the national level, migration theory and evidence from 
advanced industrial democracies has shown how structural factors in 
these destination countries play a significant role in the demand for 
migrant labour: through a shortage of people with the skills needed, 
a declining population of working age, or through the persistence of 
spaces within the labour market where employers can take advantage 
of migrant workers willing to accept pay and conditions unattractive 
to the domestic labour force . This analysis forms the basis of the 
consideration in Chapter 3 of labour migration trends and policy, from 
which two conclusions are drawn: that regulation of labour migration 
281
requires governments to address the underlying, mutable, demand 
factors which drive it, not only to refine the rules of entry; and that 
restricting labour migration without addressing those factors would 
in some instances be damaging to the economy and to the delivery of 
public services.  In a similar vein, the analysis of international student 
migration in this chapter shows that it is structurally embedded in the 
viability of the UK’s higher education sector, the supply-side financial 
interests of education providers creating a demand for these students, 
from which the broader economy also makes a tangible gain (Piore 
1979; Anderson and Ruhs 2010; Findlay 2010).
From migration theory we also know that, while acknowledging 
the significance of structural factors, we cannot ignore the agency of 
migrants, their households (for whom there can be a collective strategy 
to diversify risk through migration) and, in the case of students, the 
motivation of parents to secure places for their children in universities 
that will enhance their career prospects.  It is not only economic 
motivation, however, that is reflected in such decisions to move. Threat 
of persecution, war or civil conflict is a persistent factor, displacement 
sometimes not a by-product of conflict but an intended weapon 
of war. In practice, while it may be possible to identify individuals 
whose decision to migrate was entirely for economic reasons or to 
find sanctuary, where the decision was entirely voluntary or lacking 
in choice, the causes of conflict are often related to poverty and to 
the collapse of effective government and the rule of law. Thus mixed 
motivations for mobility are common and the distinction between 
choice and compulsion less clear than the labels ‘labour migrant’ 
and ‘refugee’ would suggest  (Van Hear, Brubaker et al. 2009). The 
implications of this analysis are explored in Chapter 2, where we see the 
challenge it poses for a refugee determination system based narrowly 
on a definition of persecution that often bears little resemblance to 
the reality of the need for protection today. 
The self-perpetuating dynamic of social networks, a form of 
social capital, is a further factor driving migration flows, migrant 
networks reducing the risk and cost of migration (through access 
to jobs, accommodation, information and support); so that access to 
summary
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networks can contribute to a decision to migrate and to the choice 
of destination. Thus we see that migration can become progressively 
more independent of its original drivers and new arrivals less reflective 
of economic demand in the destination country (Gurak and Caces 
1992; Haug 2008). The thesis develops this analysis in relation to family 
migration in particular (Chapter 4), demonstrating the continuing 
dominance of family members from Old Commonwealth countries 
within current flows because of primary immigration from those 
countries in the post war period, and a continuing cultural preference 
among some communities to choose marriage partners from the family 
country of origin rather than from within the UK.
A third insight from migration theory is the role played by the 
highly profitable ‘migration industry’ of recruitment and travel agencies 
operating within and out-with the law (Salt and Stein 1997). It has 
a vested interest in the continuation of migration flows, feeding on 
and reinforcing the underlying structural factors that drive them. The 
thesis explores the impact of that industry and the efficacy of responses 
to it in Chapter 5 (irregular migration), arguing that the market for 
people smuggling (the procuring of illegal entry for material gain) and 
trafficking (involving coercion or deception) is perpetuated by the 
combined effect of restricted legal channels of entry and the continuing 
demand for low-skilled labour operating under precarious conditions. 
Irregular migrants serve an economic function and operating outside 
of the rules can be a strategic choice for both employers and migrants, 
although the complicity of each party (the extent of their knowledge 
and volition) varies (Ruhs and Anderson 2010). The thesis demonstrates 
that understanding the functions that illegality serves, and how it 
operates in practice, help to explain its persistence. Unless its economic 
rationale is understood, efforts to reduce its extent are unlikely to 
be effective. The chapter draws on recent evidence on enforcement, 
detention and removal to demonstrate that interventions have indeed 
proved both costly and of limited effect.
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policy making process 
The thesis develops an analysis of the migration policy making process 
in which the decisions (and non decisions) of policy makers are subject 
to a series of constraints, including the structural drivers of migration 
(above), which shape their decisions but can also be shaped by them. 
In so doing it acknowledges the recent development in political theory 
to ‘bring the State back in’ to analysis of migration but questions, with 
evidence from the UK, the extent to which states can control migration: 
casting doubt on the assertion that ‘the speeding train of international 
migration is fuelled by economic and social forces, but it is the state 
that acts as a switching mechanism, which can change the course of 
the train, or derail it altogether’ (Hollifield 2008:196). Rather than 
reinforcing the policy failure thesis, however (‘The more that states 
and supranational bodies do to restrict and manage migration, the 
less successful they seem to be’(Castles 2004:205), it finds evidence 
across the six areas of policy it explores for a more nuanced analysis: 
finding instances where policy intervention has had a significant effect 
on access by certain categories of people to the UK; instances where 
policy intention has been thwarted during the implementation process; 
and instances (most evident in relation to irregular migration) where 
lack of efficacy of the chosen mode of intervention, combined with 
evidence of conflicting priorities, casts doubt on the actual intention 
of policy makers to have the stated effect. 
The thesis demonstrates that, in the development of each dimension 
of migration policy, successive UK governments have operated within 
political, legal, economic, technical, evidential, capacity and cost 
constraints; endeavouring, through a process of trade-offs that are 
rarely explicit, to achieve differing and sometimes competing policy 
objectives.  Moving beyond a dominant focus in migration theory on 
the impact of economic factors (while confirming many of its insights, 
not least that those who benefit from migration are more influential 
than ‘cost bearers’ (Freeman and Kessler 2008), the thesis highlights the 
impact of  path dependency (the constraint imposed by past migration 
flows, legislation and institutional models and the paradigm in which 
summary
wilful betrayal or capacity constrained?
284
they were conceived (Hansen 2002); the impact of international 
agreements and of human rights instruments (the latter most evident 
in relation to family migration and asylum claims), albeit not to the 
extent optimistically anticipated by Soysal (1994); of European law 
(most significantly restricting capacity to regulate flows of citizens 
of European Economic Area (EEA) countries); and of domestic law, 
the UK courts having shown a significant capacity to challenge the 
discretion of the Executive, and at times the will of Parliament, where 
the fundamental rights of migrants are at stake. Analysis of policy 
documents, reinforced by interviews with key players in the policy 
making process at the time, provides evidence that the fragmented 
structure of the policy making system – departmental policy silos 
with no effective inter-departmental governance facility to resolve 
competing priorities – has been a further, endogenous, factor shaping 
the short-termist, reactive nature of much policy making in this field.
integration
The impact of policy silos is most evident in relation to integration 
policy (addressed in Chapter 6), where responsibility has been divided 
between two departments with differing priorities, and between central 
and local government; a constraint on policy development exacerbated 
by lack of political consensus on the meaning of ‘integration’ or on 
the goals of ‘integration policy’. A past tendency, albeit intermittent, 
for governments to associate integration with cultural assimilation or 
with a focus on race relations and extremism (rather than on equality 
of opportunity, on the one hand, and addressing racism and structural 
inequalities on the other), has led to some resistance to the use of the 
term ‘integration’ within civil society and within academia. There is 
also a stronger focus in the literature on ethnic minorities than on 
the experiences of new arrivals to the UK or on policy towards them 
(with the exception of a body of literature on refugees). The thesis 
thus draws on analyses of integration in continental Europe where 
it has been identified as a series of processes taking place in different 
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domains (Entzinger 2000; Penninx and Martiniello 2004; Heckman 
2006); from which the author develops a definition of integration as: 
‘processes of interaction between migrants and the individuals 
and institutions of the receiving society that facilitate 
economic, social, cultural and civic participation and an 
inclusive sense of belonging at the national and local level’.
Analysis of integration as process rather than end state allows a focus on 
the three sets of factors that facilitate or impede that process: relating 
to migrants, to society and to policy intervention. 
In its analysis of policy development in this area, the thesis draws 
on the body of literature which explores differing philosophies and 
practices in relation to integration policies across Europe (including 
Favell 2001; Ireland 2004). Notwithstanding the limited impact of 
European Union initiatives in this area of policy, the literature points 
to some convergence in aims and practices across Europe, but the 
thesis nevertheless identifies four continuing differences in emphasis 
that are reflected, if only implicitly, in recent policy shifts in the UK: 
whether policy should focus on individuals or minority communities; 
whether the priority is economic, social or cultural integration; which 
categories of migrant should be the target of policy intervention; and 
whether integration courses should be voluntary or required. 
Lack of any strategic focus in government on this area of policy nor 
public pressure to address that omission, coupled with limited empirical 
evidence on the impact of interventions, has enabled contradictory 
policies to emerge. They include restrictive conditions attached to 
migrants’ permission to stay which, in limiting access to jobs, education, 
social housing and participation in the democratic system, impede 
integration in those domains. 
Recognising the constraints which governments face in managing 
migration is not to suggest that they are powerless to intervene. It is 
to suggest that managing migration necessitates addressing underlying 
causes, at home and abroad, and reconciling competing policy 
objectives: devising a governance system and policy tools that reflect 
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the complexities of the processes at play. The evidence demonstrates, as 
others have found (Hill 2009) that it is also necessary to take account 
of the ways in which policy can unravel when it moves on from policy 
makers into the implementation phase.
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samenvatting
Dit proefschrift gaat over een paradox, waarbij het Verenigd Koninkrijk 
als casus dient. De paradox houdt in dat ondanks een voortdurende 
druk van de publieke opinie om de aantallen migranten (d.w.z. in 
het buitenland geboren personen) terug te brengen en ondanks het 
voornemen van alle opeenvolgende naoorlogse Britse kabinetten om 
aan die druk gehoor te geven, de immigratie niettemin aanzienlijk van 
omvang is gebleven. In het eerste decennium van de nieuwe eeuw 
vestigden zich 1,9 miljoen meer mensen in het Verenigd Koninkrijk 
(voor een periode van meer dan een jaar) dan er vertrokken. Echter, 
net zo min als voor zijn Europese buren is dit voor het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk een reden geweest om zichzelf als een multiculturele natie 
te gaan zien, en dat ondanks het feit dat in maart 2010 11,4 procent 
van de bevolking elders was geboren.
Met een beroep op de literatuur uit de reeks van disciplines die 
bijdragen aan het zich steeds verder ontwikkelende terrein van de 
migratiestudies, onderzoekt dit proefschrift de veelheid van factoren 
die hebben geleid tot de divergentie tussen de wensen van het grote 
publiek en de uitkomsten van het gevoerde beleid. In tegenstelling 
tot eerdere analyses van het Britse migratiebeleid gaat het allereerst 
na welke aan de dynamiek van migratieprocessen inherente factoren 
het vermogen van de overheid tot regulering van de toelating van 
migranten beperken. Vervolgens identificeert het een reeks van met 
elkaar concurrerende beleidsdoelstellingen en –beperkingen binnen en 
buiten het eigenlijke beleidsvormingsproces. Daarna laat het zien welke 
impact deze factoren hebben op de ontwikkeling van de migratie en 
het migratiebeleid bij elk van de voornaamste vier toegangskanalen 
tot het Verenigd Koninkrijk: asiel, arbeid, studie, gezinsvorming 
en –hereniging, en daarnaast ook in relatie tot migranten met een 
irreguliere status. Uitgaande van de veronderstelling dat de bestaande 
bezorgdheid vooral is ingegeven door de wijze waarop het grote 
publiek de gevolgen van de vestiging van migranten in het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk percipieert, onderzoekt deze studie de factoren die de 
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beleidsontwikkeling op het gebied van de economische, sociale, 
culturele en politieke participatie hebben belemmerd. 
De analyses in dit proefschrift zijn gebaseerd op historische bronnen 
voor zover het de ontwikkeling van het migratierecht en –beleid betreft 
in de periode voorafgaand aan het aantreden van het Labourkabinet 
in mei 1997. Voor de periode van mei 1997 tot één jaar na de komst 
van het huidige coalitiekabinet in mei 2010 dient een analyse van 
overheidsdocumenten, wetgeving, parlementaire debatten en de 
rapporten van toezichthoudende organen als basis. Daarnaast zijn 
interviews gehouden met ministers, hun speciale adviseurs en hoge 
ambtenaren om zo meer inzicht te verkrijgen in de totstandkoming 
van het beleid op microniveau.
de dynamiek van migratie
Uit de manier waarop het politieke debat over migratie wordt gevoerd 
kan het grote publiek de indruk krijgen dat de overheid de toelating 
van migranten onder controle heeft. Dientengevolge worden de 
blijvend hoge immigratiecijfers beschouwd als een gebrek aan goede 
wil bij de regering, als een blijk van onvermogen om de toegang tot 
het grondgebied daadwerkelijk te controleren, of als een bewijs dat 
de migranten zelf misbruik maken van het systeem. Op basis van drie 
essentiële inzichten uit de migratietheorie laat deze studie zien dat er 
tal van factoren zijn die omvang en vorm van migratiebewegingen 
bepalen. Overheden kunnen die in maar zeer beperkte beïnvloeden, 
maar zij dienen er wel rekening mee te houden (Castles 2004). Helaas 
gebeurt dit laatste lang niet altijd. Allereerst is wereldwijd sprake 
van structurele factoren die migratie meer doen zijn dan de som 
van een reeks persoonlijke beslissingen van individuele migranten 
en hun gezinnen. Door de lens van de mondiale systeemtheorie 
zien we dat migratie ook een gevolg is van de wijze waarop de 
markteconomie wereldwijd opereert: buitenlandse investeringen 
leiden tot de verplaatsing van kapitalistische productieprocessen naar 
ontwikkelingslanden, terwijl tegelijkertijd de vraag naar goedkope 
arbeid in de geïndustrialiseerde wereld toeneemt. Voor voormalige 
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koloniale mogendheden zoals het Verenigd Koninkrijk betekent dit 
dat de richting van de migratiebewegingen die hieruit voortvloeien 
de bestaande banden op het gebied van vervoer en communicatie 
en op taal- en cultureel gebied weerspiegelt (Sassen 1988; Massey, 
Arango et al. 1993).
De situatie in veel hooggeïndustr ialiseerde democratieën 
biedt afdoende bewijs voor de aan de migratietheorie ontleende 
veronderstelling dat structurele factoren in deze landen van grote 
invloed zijn op de vraag naar arbeidsmigranten. Voorbeelden van zulke 
structurele factoren zijn een tekort aan bekwame arbeidskrachten, 
een in omvang afnemende beroepsbevolking, of het hardnekkig 
voortbestaan van niches op de arbeidsmarkt waar werkgevers migranten 
weten aan te trekken die bereid zijn loon en arbeidsomstandigheden 
te accepteren die voor de lokale werknemers onaantrekkelijk zijn. 
Deze analyse vormt het uitgangspunt voor een beschouwing van 
arbeidsmigratie en het op dit gebied gevoerde beleid in hoofdstuk 
3. Deze beschouwing leidt tot twee conclusies. Allereerst vraagt de 
regulering van arbeidsmigratie van overheden dat zij zich niet alleen 
blind staren op verfijning van de toelatingsvereisten, maar zich ook 
rekenschap geven van de factoren die de almaar voortdurende vraag 
naar arbeidsmigranten in stand houden. Veel van die factoren zijn wel 
degelijk te beïnvloeden, en dit leidt tot een tweede conclusie. Die 
luidt dat een overheid die onvoldoende aandacht schenkt aan zulke 
beïnvloedingsmogelijkheden en die uitsluitend focust op beperking 
van de arbeidsmigratie in bepaalde gevallen schade kan berokkenen aan 
de economie en de publieke dienstverlening. Vanuit een gelijksoortige 
gedachtegang laat de analyse van internationale migratie van studenten 
in hetzelfde hoofdstuk zien dat deze structureel is ingebed in het Britse 
hoger onderwijs en de levensvatbaarheid ervan ten goede komt. De 
financiële belangen van de onderwijsaanbieders creëren vraag naar deze 
studenten en ook de economie in meer algemene zin profiteert hiervan 
aantoonbaar (Piore 1979; Anderson & Ruhs 2010; Findlay 2010).
Hoe belangrijk structurele factoren ook mogen zijn, de migratietheorie 
leert ons ook dat we niet voorbij kunnen gaan aan het handelen van 
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individuele migranten, hun huishoudens (voor wie migratie een 
collectieve strategie kan zijn om risico’s te spreiden) en, in het geval 
van studenten, de motivering van ouders die zich verzekerd willen 
weten van een plaats voor hun kinderen op universiteiten die goede 
carrièreperspectieven bieden. Dergelijke migratiebesluiten worden 
evenwel niet alleen ingegeven door economische motieven. Ook de 
dreiging van vervolging, oorlog of conflict is een veel voorkomende 
oorzaak van migratie; soms is de verdrijving van bevolkingsgroepen 
niet een neveneffect van een conflict, maar wordt deze welbewust 
als strijdwapen gehanteerd. Natuurlijk, er bestaan omstandigheden 
waaronder een besluit tot migratie exclusief is ingegeven door 
economische motieven dan wel exclusief door de noodzaak ergens 
bescherming te zoeken, en er zijn ook situaties waarin zo’n besluit 
geheel vrijwillig dan wel volledig noodgedwongen tot stand komt. 
Niettemin zien we in de praktijk dat bij het ontstaan van veel conflicten 
zowel armoede als het gebrek aan goed bestuur of het ineenstorten 
van de rechtsstaat een rol spelen. Gewoonlijk wordt mobiliteit dan 
ook bepaald door een mix van motieven en het onderscheid tussen 
vrije keuze en dwang is in de praktijk vaak minder scherp dan de 
etiketten ‘arbeidsmigrant’ en ‘vluchteling’ doen vermoeden (Van 
Hear, Brubaker et al. 2009). De implicaties van deze analyse worden 
verkend in hoofdstuk 2, waar we zien hoezeer de feitelijke behoefte 
aan bescherming zoals die tegenwoordig bestaat een uitdaging vormt 
voor een erkenningsysteem voor vluchtelingen dat is gebaseerd op een 
zeer enge omschrijving van het begrip ‘vervolging’.
De zichzelf bestendigende dynamiek van sociale netwerken, een 
vorm van sociaal kapitaal, vormt een volgende migratiebevorderende 
factor. Migrantennetwerken beperken namelijk de risico’s en de kosten 
van migratie, omdat zij toegang bieden tot werk, huisvesting, informatie 
en ondersteuning. Het beschikken over toegang tot netwerken kan 
daarom bijdragen aan iemands besluit te migreren en aan de keus 
van een bestemming. Zo zien we dat migratiebewegingen geleidelijk 
steeds losser kunnen komen staan van hun oorspronkelijke oorzaken, 
terwijl nieuwkomers zich minder nadrukkelijk laten leiden door de 
economische vraag in het land van bestemming (Gurak & Caces 1992; 
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Haug 2008). Dit proefschrift analyseert deze stelling in het bijzonder 
voor gezinsmigratie (hoofdstuk 4), en wel door te laten zien hoe 
dominant ook vandaag nog de gezinsmigratie uit de landen van het 
Oude Gemenebest is. Deze is het gevolg van primaire immigratie in 
de naoorlogse jaren, maar ook van een nog altijd bestaande cultureel 
bepaalde voorkeur binnen sommige migrantengemeenschappen voor 
een huwelijkspartner uit het land van oorsprong boven een partner 
uit het Verenigd Koninkrijk. 
Een derde inzicht ontleend aan de migratietheorie heeft betrekking 
op de zeer winstgevende rol van de ‘migratie-industrie’, bestaande 
uit wervings- en reisbureaus die zowel binnen als buiten de grenzen 
van de wet opereren (Salt & Stein 1997). De migratie-industrie heeft 
belang bij een continuering van de migratie, zij profiteert van de 
onderliggende structurele factoren, en versterkt die tegelijkertijd ook 
weer. Hoofdstuk 5 van deze studie, dat gaat over irreguliere migratie, 
verkent de impact van de migratie-industrie en de effectiviteit van 
de hiertegen ontwikkelde maatregelen. Dit hoofdstuk redeneert dat 
de markt voor mensensmokkel (het regelen van illegale binnenkomst 
voor materieel gewin) en mensenhandel (mensensmokkel waarbij 
ook dwang en/of bedrog in het spel is) zichzelf in stand houdt door 
de combinatie van beperkte legale mogelijkheden voor binnenkomst 
en de voortdurende vraag naar laaggeschoolde arbeid onder slechte 
omstandigheden. Irreguliere migranten dienen een economisch doel 
en het buiten de regels om opereren kan een strategische keuze 
zijn van zowel werkgevers als migranten, zij het dat de mate van 
medeplichtigheid (d.w.z. de mate waarin men beschikt over kennis en 
de mate van vrijwilligheid) aan beide kanten kan variëren (Ruhs & 
Anderson 2010). De studie laat zien dat een beter begrip van de functies 
van illegaliteit en van de gehanteerde praktijken kan helpen verklaren 
waarom dit verschijnsel zo hardnekkig is. Pogingen om illegaliteit uit 
te bannen zullen nauwelijks effect sorteren zolang de economische 
rationaliteit ervan niet wordt begrepen. Het hoofdstuk gaat in op 
nieuwe feiten over handhaving, detentie en uitzetting en laat zien dat 
zulke interventies niet alleen kostbaar, maar ook weinig effectief zijn. 
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Het beleidsproces
Het proefschrift ontwikkelt een analyse van de totstandkoming van 
migratiebeleid en gaat er hierbij van uit dat de besluiten die beleidsmakers 
nemen (dan wel het ontbreken daarvan) onderhevig zijn aan een 
reeks beperkingen, waaronder ook de eerder besproken structurele 
determinanten van migratie. Deze kunnen hun besluitvorming 
beïnvloeden, maar beleidsmakers kunnen die determinanten ook zelf 
beïnvloeden. Deze visie doet recht aan de recente trend in de politieke 
theorievorming om de rol van de staat in de analyse van migratie 
weer sterker te benadrukken, maar zij roept toch ook de vraag op in 
hoeverre staten migratie werkelijk kunnen beheersen. Zo blijkt men op 
grond van het Britse voorbeeld vraagtekens te kunnen plaatsen bij de 
bewering dat “de voortdenderende trein van de internationale migratie 
wordt gevoed door economische en sociale krachten, maar dat het 
de staat is die de wissels bedient en daarmee de loop van de trein kan 
veranderen of hem zelfs kan doen ontsporen” (Hollifield 2008: 196). 
Anderzijds wordt Castles’ stelling dat overheidsbeleid slechts gedoemd 
is te falen evenmin bevestigd: “Hoe meer staten en supranationale 
instanties doen om migratie te beperken en te beheersen, hoe minder 
ze daarin lijken te slagen” (Castles 2004: 205). De zes terreinen die in 
deze studie zijn verkend leveren een meer genuanceerd beeld op. Er 
zijn situaties waarin beleidsinterventies een significant effect hebben 
gehad op de toelating van bepaalde categorieën migranten tot het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk, maar er zijn ook situaties waar de uitvoering 
van beleidsintenties is tegengewerkt. Tenslotte doen zich situaties 
voor (vooral in het geval van irreguliere migratie) waarbij een gebrek 
aan effectiviteit van de gekozen interventiewijze, in combinatie 
met duidelijk conflicterende belangen, de vraag doet rijzen of de 
verantwoordelijke beleidsmakers daadwerkelijk de bedoeling hadden 
het formeel beoogde effect te realiseren. 
De studie laat zien dat achtereenvolgende Britse kabinetten bij 
de ontwikkeling van elke dimensie van het migratiebeleid hebben 
geopereerd binnen een keurslijf van politieke, wettelijke, economische, 
technische, juridische, capaciteits- en kostenbeperkingen. Daarbij 
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hebben ze gepoogd via een zelden expliciet gemaakt proces van 
compromissen sluiten uiteenlopende, soms zelfs onderling strijdige 
beleidsdoelstellingen te verwezenlijken. In deze studie is een poging 
ondernomen om voorbij het dominante theoretische focus te kijken, 
dat stelt dat migratie vooral door economische factoren wordt 
ingegeven. Dit neemt overigens niet weg dat de relevantie van de 
economie wel degelijk ook hier weer bevestiging vindt. Daarbij blijkt 
ook duidelijk dat degenen die baat hebben bij migratie meer invloed 
hebben op besluitvormingsprocessen dan zij die de kosten ervan dragen 
(Freeman & Kessler 2008). Maar daarnaast laat de studie ook duidelijk 
het belang van padafhankelijkheid zien: migratie wordt in belangrijke 
mate beperkt door de aard van eerdere migratiebewegingen, door 
juridische en institutionele modellen en door de omstandigheden 
waaronder deze ooit tot stand zijn gekomen (Hansen 2002). Voorts is 
er de invloed van internationale verdragen en van de mensenrechten - 
welke laatste vooral een rol spelen bij gezinsmigratie en asielaanvragen 
- zij het niet in de mate die Soysal (1994) in haar optimisme heeft 
voorspeld. Ook het Europees recht speelt een rol, vooral omdat het de 
mogelijkheden van de nationale regeringen beperkt om de migratie 
van burgers van de landen van de Europese Economische Ruimte te 
reguleren. Tenslotte speelt ook het nationaal recht een rol: daar waar 
de grondrechten van migranten in het geding zijn, leggen Britse 
rechters een opmerkelijke bekwaamheid aan de dag in het trotseren 
van ministeriële besluiten en soms ook van de wil van het parlement. 
De analyse van beleidsdocumenten, aangevuld met interviews met 
vroegere hoofdrolspelers in het proces van beleidsontwikkeling, 
toont aan dat de gefragmenteerde structuur waarbinnen beleid tot 
stand komt – departementale ‘kaasstolpen’ zonder enige vorm van 
interdepartementale sturing om onderling strijdige beleidsprioriteiten 
te wegen – ook kan worden gezien als een oorzaak van het reactieve, 
kortetermijnkarakter van veel maatregelen op dit gebied. 
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integratie
Het effect van de ‘kaasstolpen’ is het duidelijkst zichtbaar 
in het integratiebeleid (behandeld in hoofdstuk 6), waar de 
verantwoordelijkheden zijn verdeeld tussen twee departementen die 
elk hun eigen prioriteiten hebben, en ook nog tussen de centrale 
overheid en de lagere overheden. Deze rem op de beleidsontwikkeling 
wordt nog versterkt door het gebrek aan politieke consensus over 
de betekenis van ‘integratie’ en over de doelstellingen van het 
‘integratiebeleid’. Vroeger hadden overheden soms de neiging 
integratie vooral te interpreteren als culturele assimilatie en daarbij 
te focussen op interraciale betrekkingen en extremisme, in plaats van 
zich te richten op het scheppen van gelijke kansen en het bestrijden 
van discriminatie en structurele ongelijkheid. Mede hierdoor vertonen 
het Britse maatschappelijk middenveld en de academische wereld 
enige aarzeling bij het gebruik van de term ‘integratie’.  Ook in de 
Britse wetenschappelijke literatuur bestaat veel meer aandacht voor de 
(over het algemeen reeds lang gevestigde) etnische minderheden dan 
voor de ervaringen van nieuwkomers of voor het voor deze laatsten 
gevoerde beleid (de vluchtelingen vormen hierbij een uitzondering). 
Dientengevolge leunt dit proefschrift sterk op analyses van het 
integratieproces op het Europese vasteland, waarbij met name opvalt 
dat integratie daar wordt opgevat als een reeks van processen die 
plaatsvinden in verschillende maatschappelijke domeinen (Entzinger 
2000; Penninx & Martiniello 2004; Heckmann 2006). Hierdoor 
geïnspireerd heeft de auteur van dit proefschrift de volgende definitie 
van integratie ontwikkeld:
‘interactieprocessen tussen migranten enerzijds en de 
individuele leden en de instituties van de ontvangende 
samenleving anderzijds die economische, sociale, culturele 
en politieke participatie, alsmede een gevoel erbij te horen, 
faciliteren op nationaal en lokaal niveau.’ 
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Door integratie als een proces in plaats van als een eindtoestand te 
beschouwen, ontstaat een beter zicht op de drie sets van factoren 
die dit proces bevorderen dan wel belemmeren, namelijk factoren 
die te maken hebben met de migranten, met de samenleving en met 
beleidsinterventies.
In haar analyse van de beleidsontwikkeling op dit gebied baseert 
deze studie zich op de bestaande literatuur over beleidsfilosofieën en 
–praktijken in heel Europa (o.a. Favell 2001; Ireland 2004). Hoewel 
de impact van EU-initiatieven op dit beleidsterrein beperkt is, wijst 
de literatuur toch op een zekere convergentie in doelstellingen en 
praktijken tussen de lidstaten. Niettemin worden in dit proefschrift 
vier aspecten van beleid geïdentificeerd waarop accentverschillen 
zijn blijven voortbestaan, zij het soms impliciet, tussen het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk en de meeste andere landen. Het gaat hier om de vraag of 
het beleid zich primair moet richten op individuele migranten dan 
wel op minderheidsgroepen, om de vraag of voorrang moet worden 
gegeven aan economische, sociale dan wel aan culturele integratie, om 
de vraag welke categorieën migranten doelgroep zouden moeten zijn 
van overheidsbeleid en om de vraag of inburgeringscursussen vrijwillig 
dan wel verplicht dienen te zijn.
Het gebrek aan een eenduidige beleidsstrategie ten aanzien van 
integratie alsook het ontbreken van enige publieke pressie om dit 
verzuim goed te maken, in combinatie met een beperkte empirische 
onderbouwing van de effectiviteit van beleidsinterventies, hebben de 
ontwikkeling van maatregelen die met elkaar in tegenspraak zijn in de 
hand gewerkt. Zo kunnen aan verblijfsvergunningen voor migranten 
beperkende voorwaarden worden verbonden inzake toegang tot werk, 
onderwijs, sociale huisvesting en deelname aan het democratisch proces, 
waarvan duidelijk is dat die een integratiebelemmerend effect hebben.
Het feit dat overheden beperkingen ervaren bij het reguleren 
van de migratie betekent nog niet dat zij in het geheel niet over 
interventiemogelijkheden zouden beschikken. Het betekent wel dat 
migratieregulering de aanpak van achterliggende oorzaken vereist 
in zowel binnen- als buitenland en ook vraagt om overbrugging 
van tegenstrijdige beleidsdoelstellingen. Dit vergt een systeem van 
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besluitvorming en een beleidsinstrumentarium dat de complexiteit van 
de in het geding zijnde processen aankan. De praktijk toont evenwel 
aan, zoals ook anderen hebben laten zien (Hill 2009), dat men zich er 
tevens van bewust dient te zijn dat complexe beleidsvragen ontward 
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